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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to examine Internet financial reporting (IFR) in an emerging 
capital market. It has three main objectives: first, to examine the provision of financial 
information on the websites of Chinese listed companies and identify the factors 
determining the financial information on such websites; second, to examine the 
economic consequences of IFR on a company’s value in China; and, third, to investigate 
the perceptions of Chinese participants regarding IFR. 
Fifteen research questions were designed and twelve hypotheses formulated to 
accomplish the above aims and objectives. This study applies an empirical approach to 
investigating IFR practices of Chinese listed companies. The study combines 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, with an emphasis on quantitative research 
methods. To answer the research questions and test the twelve hypotheses, data 
collection comprised an IFR index review and semi-structured interviews. 
 
Descriptive analyses showed relative improvement in the disclosures of financial 
information, corporate governance information, social responsibility, timeliness of 
disclosure, presentation and usability on the sampled websites. The results of a 
univariate analysis and a multivariate analysis indicated that company size, industry 
type, big-4 auditor type, state share ownership, foreign share ownership, CEO duality, 
and the proportion of independent directors are significant explanatory variables 
associated with disclosures on corporate websites. Conversely, leverage, profitability, 
legal person ownership, and board size have no predictive value for determining 
Internet financial reporting practices among listed companies. Sensitivity analyses were 
performed and the results were consistent. This finding meets the expectations of 
agency theory, signalling theory, institutional theory, the cost and benefit approach, and 
stewardship theory. 
 
The finding from the interviews with company participants suggested that factors 
determining whether companies adopt IFR include: communication tools with investors 
and other stakeholders, provision of timely information to investors, the extent to which 
having a website improves a company’s image and reputation, management decisions 
and likelihood of winning awards. Factors influencing companies not to disclose 
financial information on their websites included the presence of financial information in 
iii 
other media. Additionally, some companies had no website because there is no legal 
requirement to do so and so a website is not a management priority. Participants from 
companies also provided some ideas for IFR improvement from China’s perspective. 
  
Univariate and multivariate analyses were performed to discover whether IFR and its 
components affect a firm’s value. Models for both 2010 and 2011 revealed that IFR 
total score has a significant negative impact on firm value. Additional regression tests 
were therefore performed to examine firm value and IFR components, IFR content, 
timeliness, corporate governance, social factors, presentation and usability all have a 
negative effect on firm value. A significant negative association between IFR 
information and firm value suggests proprietary costs are particularly relevant for IFR 
disclosure.  
 
This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical and theoretical evidence 
about IFR practices of China listed companies. Results from statistical analysis, together 
with perceptions of participants, as expressed in interviews, provided a better 
understanding of IFR practices. In light of the research results, regulators and policy 
makers are expected to benefit from a clearer understanding of the needs of the market, 
thereby creating a new challenge for regulators when developing future schemes 
regarding the financial reporting regulatory framework, in order to achieve a higher 
level of compliance and transparency. These empirical results provide a significant 
benefit to professional bodies; in particular, furthering understanding of IFR practices 
and their characteristics, helping to standardise IFR content, to define codes of conduct, 
and to dictate rules and recommendations for the future. The findings will benefit 
companies seeking to learn about how to exhibit best practice. The results will be 
interesting to academics and future researchers in the area of emerging markets, as the 
Chinese stock market is developing rapidly and offers a unique institutional 
environment. This research also provides useful insights into the relationship between 
agency issues, the cost and benefit approach, unique institutional frameworks and IFR.  
Key words: IFR, Corporate governance, Firm value, Perceptions. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Developments in information and communication technologies have changed the ways 
in which companies relate to their shareholders, clients and suppliers. One such change 
is the use of the Internet for corporate reporting (Lymer, Debreceny, Gray & Rahman, 
1999) particularly when in the case of investor relations. Marston (1996, p. 477) defines 
Investor Relations (IR) as “the link between a company and the financial community, 
providing information to help the financial community and the investing public evaluate 
a company”. In a broader context, IR activities function as an instrument to reduce 
information asymmetry between a firm and market participants by providing 
information that may be relevant to the pricing of the company’s shares (Deller, 
Stubenrath & Weber, 1999). Thus, Internet Investor Relations (IIR) provide a broad set 
of information on the financial performance of a company and non-financial 
information that may be of relevance to the financial market (Bollen, Hassink, Lang & 
Buijl, 2008). This activity is also referred to as Internet Financial Reporting (IFR), 
which can be defined as “the public reporting of operating and financial data by a 
business enterprise via the World Wide Web or related Internet-based communications 
medium” (Lymer et al., 1999).  
 
A large number of descriptive and explanatory studies have dealt with IFR in developed 
countries. However, very little research has examined IFR in China (Xiao et al., 2004; 
He and Zhang, 2007), one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The number 
of companies listed on China’s two main Stock Exchanges, the Shanghai and the 
Shenzhen, reached 2,537 by the end of February, 2014, while the total market 
capitalisation of China’s stock market boomed to 23,756.61 billion RMB (UK£2,375.67 
billion) (CSRC, 2014). An issue, which affects the Chinese stock markets, is the lack of 
transparency and corporate disclosure among Chinese listed companies. To maintain the 
confidence of the Chinese capital market and international investors, transparency in 
corporate disclosure practices is demanded (Groom et al., 2004). IFR provides one type 
of voluntary disclosure, which helps to achieve transparency by disseminating timely 
information in various ways, using easily accessible tools that serve the interests of all 
market players.  
2 
Empirical studies confirm the role of corporate governance in determining corporate 
transparency (Beasley, 1996; Gul et al., 2010). While in the corporate world, and in 
most developed countries ownership and control are separate, major listed companies 
on the Chinese Stock Exchanges are ultimately controlled by central or local 
government; namely, they are state owned. To completely reform the capital market, the 
Chinese government had to implement procedures to convert state-owned shares to 
tradable shares (CSRC, 2005). Despite the ongoing reform, ownership structure remains 
a significant corporate governance issue. High state ownership and legal person 
ownership in China result in traditional agency issues between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders. Thus, this unique setting in China provides an excellent 
perspective from which to empirically examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and IFR in a market dominated by state owned enterprises. 
Additionally, prior research suggests that the return required by investors on their 
investment decreases with improvements in the voluntary disclosure of valuable 
information by the firms in question (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Moreover, 
empirical studies carried out by Barry and Brown (1985) and Botosan (1997) found 
voluntary disclosure helps to reduce the cost of capital. Some IFR studies report an 
association between IFR and firm value. Silva and Alves (2004) reported on the 
existence of a significant association between IFR and firm value in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico according to the Tobin’s Q. Meanwhile, Garay et al. (2013) found that an 
increase of 1% in an IFR disclosure index causes a 0.1592% difference in the Tobin’s Q 
and an increase of 0.0119% in firms’ Return on Assets (ROA) in seven stock markets in 
Latin America. Conversely, some recent studies have indicated that the belief that 
voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of capital and increases firm value may not hold 
true for all stock markets. Lan et al. (2013) examined 1066 Chinese listed companies 
and found no evidence of extensive voluntary disclosure benefits for listed companies in 
China in the form of lower capital costs. Their analysis suggests that voluntary 
disclosure in the Chinese stock market may have a very different impact that it has on 
other stock markets. This research seeks to provide important insights into accounting 
issues by examining the economic impact of IFR disclosure and other corporate 
governance factors on Chinese listed companies. 
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1.2 Problem statement  
In the last decade, accounting research in the context of China has increased. This 
reflects both the rise of China as a global economic force and the unique context of 
China as an interesting setting for providing insights into to the role of accounting 
(Radhakrishnan, 2014). The development of China’s stock market has been 
characterised by excessive administrative control and intervention, a lack of 
transparency, and an underdeveloped legal and regulatory framework (Cheung et al., 
2010). Institutional features, such as ownership structure, board monitoring, the 
incentives of managers, and managers themselves, all have an important impact on 
financial reporting outcomes. China provides an excellent setting in which to examine 
the role of accounting and agency issues (Radhakrishnan, 2014) and conflicts between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Disclosure is important to mitigate 
asymmetric information and agency problems; therefore, research on IFR in the Chinese 
context could produce valuable insights into how agency issues relate to the quality of 
voluntary financial reporting. 
 
To create a more attractive business environment and improve the efficiency of the 
Chinese stock market, the CSRC initiated major corporate governance reforms to 
promote disclosure transparency in 2001. In January 2002, the CSRC issued its own 
code of corporate governance for listed companies in China, prescribing a desired 
corporate governance structure. The measures highlighted the importance of 
transparency and established corporate governance requirements. The code aims to 
increase the confidence of investors, strengthen the capital market and improve the 
accountability and credibility of the financial information provided by listed companies. 
In terms of information disclosure methods, the CSRC acknowledged a large number of 
individual investors in China require listed companies to make information available not 
only at company’s premises, on the stock exchange, and at relevant licensed brokers and 
branches, but also via financial reports in a specified publication and on the internet (Qu 
and Leung, 2006). Therefore, the transformation of the disclosure environment is 
expected to motivate listed companies to improve disclosure transparency and make 
information disclosure more external-user oriented (Qu et al., 2013).  
In addition, the effect of disclosure level on the cost of capital is of considerable interest 
and importance to the financial reporting community (Botosan, 1997). Internet 
disclosure is considered highly cost effective. It helps to overcome manifestations of 
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market failure, such as asymmetric information in the capital market and agency 
problems. As a result, companies might enhance their market valuations by improving 
their voluntary disclosure of information on their websites. The question of whether 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital is of interest in its own right, as the growing 
complexity of China’s market is resulting in calls for a clearer understanding of IFR and 
its economic impact, which will benefit investors, public companies and regulators 
alike.  
1.3 Research objectives and research questions  
 
Previous accounting literature states that the IFR is a form of voluntary disclosure 
practices, IFR refers to the use of corporate websites in disseminates information about 
the company's financial performance. The purpose of this study is to examine the IFR in 
the Chinese context; the main aim being to investigate the practices and determinants of 
IFR in Chinese companies and participants’ perceptions of IFR. This study has three 
main objectives: first, to examine the provision of financial information voluntarily 
disclosed on the websites of Chinese public companies and identify the factors 
determining the voluntary financial information on such websites; second, to examine 
the economic consequences of IFR on a company’s value in China; and, third, to 
investigate the perceptions of Chinese participants of Internet financial reporting. The 
three main objectives are described below: 
Objective 1: To examine the provision of financial information on the websites of 
Chinese public companies and identify the factors determining the financial 
information on such websites. 
The purpose of this study is to provide useful descriptive and empirical information 
about the financial information disclosed by Chinese public companies on their websites 
(where they have a website) and how this information can be evaluated. The study 
examines the determinants of company specific variations in IFR, i.e. company size, 
profitability, leverage, industry type and auditor type. In addition, China has been 
undergoing gradual corporate governance reform. It is expected that corporate 
governance mechanisms, such as share ownership structure, board size, CEO duality 
(CEO duality means that the position of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chair 
positions occupied by one person) (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), and board independence 
(measured by proportion of independent directors to total directors) relate to IFR. 
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Furthermore, since prior explanatory studies were purely quantitative in nature, this 
study will also investigate additional factors by conducting semi-structured interviews 
with companies’ participants, to identify the motivation behind constructing and 
renewing websites and to explain the reasons why some companies have not created a 
website.  
In order to address the research objective 1, the following general research questions 
need to be answered: 
RQ1: What are the scope and patterns of IFR and its components by Chinese listed 
companies? 
RQ2: Is there any difference between bigger listed companies and smaller listed 
companies with regard to IFR and its components?  
RQ3: What company specific factors determine the level of IFR and its components by 
Chinese listed companies? 
RQ4: What are the corporate governance factors that determine the level of IFR and its 
components by Chinese listed companies? 
RQ5: What factors influence whether Chinese listed companies disclose the English 
version of IFR? 
RQ6: What factors influence whether Chinese listed companies disclose financial 
information on their websites?  
RQ7: In the companies’ participants’ view what are the additional factors that determine 
the level of IFR and its components by Chinese listed companies? 
RQ8: In the companies’ participants’ view what factors influence the non-financial 
disclosure of IFR by Chinese listed companies? 
RQ9: Why have some companies not set up websites yet? 
Objective 2: To examine the economic consequences of IFR on a company’s value 
The decision by a firm’s management to disclose information about its underlying 
performance is likely to involve a trade-off between the direct and indirect costs 
incurred when providing such information and the benefits derived by the firm or its 
shareholders from such disclosure (Scott, 1994). Numerous studies have examined the 
economic benefits of IFR in a variety of contexts. These contexts include stock price 
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reactions to IFR, the cost of capital and firm value. However, no China-based study 
links the quality of IFR with any one of these contexts. This provided the motivation to 
undertake an IFR study based on data relating to China. Using the survey data as a 
basis, the study examines the impact of IFR on a company’s value; examining whether 
the total index, the content, the presentation, the timeliness and the usability affects a 
company’s value. The company’s value can be measured using the Tobin’s Q ratio and 
Market/book value. Tobin’s Q is calculated on the basis of the relationship between the 
market value of the company and the book value of its assets.  
In order to address the research objective 2, the following general research questions 
need to be answered: 
RQ10: Is there any significant difference between the bigger and smaller Chinese listed 
companies’ firm value? 
RQ11: Is there any significant difference between the firm values of Chinese listed 
companies with an English version of IFR and those without?  
RQ12: Is there any significant difference between the firm values of Chinese listed 
companies that disclose financial information on their websites and those who do not?  
RQ13: How do IFR and its components impact on Chinese listed companies’ firm 
value? 
Objective 3: To investigate the perceptions of Chinese participants of Internet 
financial reporting.  
Davis (1989, P.320) defined perceptions as falling into two categories: perceived 
usefulness, meaning “the degree a user believes that a particular aid would enhance his 
performance”; and perceived ease of use meaning “the degree to which a user believes 
that using a particular aid would reduce or be free of effort”. Prior studies have revealed 
that disclosing financial information on a company's website is beneficial to users for 
several reasons, including timely delivery of information at low cost. Accordingly, this 
study attempts to identify the main advantages of Internet reporting, from the 
perspective of participants in China. The literature review also identifies many problems 
caused by Internet reporting, such as information overload and issues relating to data 
integrity as well as confidentiality. Consequently, this research addresses the issues 
relating to the development of company websites. Additionally, it also proposes the 
participants’ suggestions on ways that IFR could be improved. 
7 
In order to address the research objective 3, the following general research questions 
need to be answered: 
RQ14: What are the perceptions of IFR from the participants in China’s perspective? 
RQ15: How, from the participants in China’s perspective, can IFR be improved?  
1.4 Research methods adopted in this study 
The approach to this study combines quantitative and qualitative research methods, with 
emphasis on quantitative research methods. Triangulation is defined as the use of 
different research approaches and techniques in the same study to increase the validity 
of the findings (Collis and Hussey, 2003). In this thesis, content analysis and semi-
structured interviews with Chinese participants are used to elicit information about the 
participants' views regarding IFR. Table 1.1 presents the research methods adopted in 
this study.  
To build a disclosure index, the study updated previous checklists (by Abdelsalam et al., 
2007; Marston and Polei 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Debreceny et al., 2002). The more 
comprehensive measurement instrument made it possible to draw conclusions regarding 
how the specification guidelines issued by CSRC in 2005 and the corporate governance 
report on Chinese listed companies (CSRC, 2005) affected Internet reporting practice. 
The index was divided into four categories: content - which included accounting and 
financial information; corporate governance information; social responsibility 
information and contract details information; timeliness of information, presentation 
and usability. Semi-structured interviews with the participants in the companies were 
carried out to discover the motivation behind constructing and renewing websites and to 
identify the reasons why some companies had not created their own websites. The 
interviews will also yield some suggestions for IFR development in China.  
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Table 1.1 Research methods adopted in this study 
 
Research 
Objectives 
Research 
questions 
Research 
types 
Data answering 
research questions 
Analysis 
technique 
Answers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 
1 
RQ1 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Descriptive  
Statistics  
Chapter 
6 
RQ2 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Descriptive  
Statistics 
Chapter 
6 
RQ3 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Pearson 
correlation test, 
Spearman’ rho 
correlation test 
and  OLS 
regressions 
Chapter 
6 
 
 
RQ4 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Pearson 
correlation test, 
Spearman’ rho 
correlation test 
and OLS 
regressions 
Chapter 
6 
RQ5 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Logistic 
regressions 
Chapter 
6 
RQ6 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Logistic 
regressions 
Chapter 
6 
RQ7 Qualitative 
research 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Chapter 
8 
RQ8 Qualitative 
research 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Chapter 
8 
RQ9 Qualitative 
research 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Chapter 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Objective 
2 
RQ10 Quantitative 
research 
Secondary data Mann-Whitney 
test and T test 
Chapter 
7 
RQ11 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Mann-Whitney 
test and T test 
Chapter 
7 
RQ12 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Mann-Whitney 
test and T test 
Chapter 
7 
RQ13 Quantitative 
research 
Content analysis 
(Disclosure index) 
Pearson 
correlation test, 
Spearman’ rho 
correlation test 
and  OLS 
regressions  
Chapter 
7 
 
 
Objective 
3 
RQ14 Qualitative 
research 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Chapter 
8 
RQ15 Qualitative 
research 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Chapter 
8 
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1.5 Research motivation and importance 
The main motivation behind this research is to examine the level of IFR in China and 
assess the factors that are determining the scope of IFR. It examines the economic 
consequence of companies disclosing IFR, and participants’ perceptions of IFR. The 
research covers several new areas, which have not been previously examined. 
The first new area of the study is the use of a new method for constructing disclosure 
indices. The study is expected to provide a new approach to assess the extent to which 
companies disclose IFR on their websites. The content and presentation have been 
examined in earlier studies (Xiao et al., 2004; He and Zhang, 2007), but this study is 
distinctive in considering the content including accounting and financial information, 
corporate governance information, social responsibility information, contract details 
information, timeliness information, and presentation and usability to provide a clearer 
portrayal of Chinese listed companies engaged in IFR. 
Emerging markets are important yet highly understudied subject, as noted in recent 
research on corporate governance in emerging markets (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
The Chinese government recently highlighted corporate governance issues and 
emphasised its intention to improve the situation. The second new area is to shed light 
on whether corporate governance factors have improved IFR practices in China. 
Corporate governance factors include issues of ownership structure, board size, role 
duality (CEO also being on the board directors) and board independence (measured by 
the proportion of independent directors to total directors).  
The third new area has to do with the fact that earlier explanatory studies were in the 
main purely quantitative in nature. This study employs semi-structured interviews to 
identify issues, which cannot be explained with a statistical model. It sheds light on how 
the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches can better explore 
complicated accounting phenomena. Additionally, this study differs from prior studies 
conducted in the same area because it not only examines the factors that led companies 
to adopt IFR practices but also investigates the factors that influenced companies not to 
disclose information on their websites.  
The fourth element, which makes this study innovative relates to the fact that prior 
empirical studies showed that IFR leads to a reduction in information asymmetry 
between managers and investors; therefore companies tend to benefit from a lower 
information asymmetry and from a lower cost of debt capital (Orens, 2010). Other 
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studies showed that IFR positively influences the firm’s value (e.g. Cormier et al., 
2009a; Garay et al., 2013). The Chinese stock market is still in its early stages and the 
investor protection environment is weak in comparison with developed countries. This 
makes it worthwhile to look at the economic consequences of IFR on Chinese listed 
companies, which is an area not previously examined. 
The fifth innovation of this study is the addition of a new theoretical framework to 
existing IFR literature. Prior studies investigating the determinants of IFR theories in 
China ignored the cost and benefit approach (Xiao et al., 2004; He and Zhang, 2007). 
This study considers institutional theory and the innovation diffusion theory as well as 
agency theory, signalling theory, and the cost and benefit approach. The theoretical 
triangulation applied in this thesis has provided a broader understanding of IFR 
practices. 
Sixthly, although prior research details the increasing supply of IFR there is lack of 
empirical research investigating the participants’ perceptions of this information. This 
research investigates the perceptions of Chinese participants of IFR. Through semi-
structured interviews with participants, the research gained an insight into the 
advantages and problems apparent in current IFR practice, with specific reference to the 
implementation of IFR for the purposes of development and improvement. 
It is expected that this research will be beneficial to regulators, professional bodies, 
investors, companies and academics. From the regulators’ perspective, the 
understanding of IFR practices in China could help formulate future policy to protect 
investors and improve trust in and the quality of Internet reporting information. From 
the professional bodies’ point of view, the study may help to standardise IFR content, to 
define codes of conduct and rules and make recommendations. From the investors’ 
perspective, this study helps clarify the disclosure practice of Chinese listed companies 
thus encouraging investors to consider the disclosure characteristics outlined in this 
study when making investment decisions. From the companies’ perspective, disclosing 
IFR on their websites and having high disclosure levels helps investors to search, obtain 
and download the required information, thus attracting more potential investors. From 
the academics’ point of view, the study may help explain IFR and its key determinants 
and how IFR impacts on firm value in China. This research provides useful insights into 
how agency issues and the unique institutional framework are related to IFR, which is 
useful for future research in the area of emerging markets.   
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1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured as follows. The chapter following the introduction provides 
background information about the development of financial reporting regulations, stock 
markets and corporate governance in China. It helps to explain Chinese characteristics 
affecting IFR practices. It also gives an overview of Internet development in China. 
Additionally, the regulatory environments regarding IFR in different countries are 
reviewed in this chapter. 
Chapter three reviews prior research concerning four research fields: (1) descriptive 
studies providing an overview of the use of the internet for disseminating financial 
reporting in certain countries; (2) explanatory studies providing a theoretical 
background for their analysis and considering differences in practice, focusing on 
linking independent variables to IFR; (3) research relating to the economic 
consequences of IFR investigating how IFR impacts on the firms’ value, stock prices 
and capital; and (4) stakeholder perceptions on IFR explaining the benefits and issues of 
adopting IFR and other factors that lead companies to adopt IFR practice. The chapter 
starts by outlining the main published papers regarding IFR. It also provides more 
discussion about the research of IFR in China. The chapter ends by describing how this 
study addresses the gaps left by prior studies.  
The theoretical foundations of IFR activities are outlined in chapter four. The chapter 
reviews the literature regarding agency theory, signalling theory, the cost and benefit 
approach, institutional theory and discusses how those theories can be applied in this 
study to help better understand what factors influence the information that companies 
post on their website. Based on these theories, eleven hypotheses are developed to 
examine the factors determining the impact of IFR and its components on Chinese listed 
companies. Prior research has found that the management’s incentive in disclosure 
decisions is to minimise the firm’s cost of capital (Richardson and Welker, 2001) and 
maximise firm value (Core, 2001). One hypothesis regarding the economic 
consequences of IFR and its components on Chinese listed companies are therefore 
generated.  
Chapter five presents the research methodology and research methods used and outlines 
the assumptions of epistemology, ontology, and methodology. This study is designed to 
be a concurrent quantitative-dominant mixed methods research, in which quantitative 
and qualitative data are collected and analysed, with more emphasis placed on 
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quantitative data. A web survey and semi-structured interviews are employed in the 
study. To carry out the analysis a disclosure index is created on the basis of the 
information provided by companies. All the variables having an impact on the study are 
identified in this chapter. Finally, this chapter discusses the process of the semi-
structured interview method, including the reliability and validity of qualitative research 
and related ethical considerations.  
Chapter six discusses the empirical results obtained through the quantitative study. The 
quantitative models are based on the extant literature taking into consideration the 
availability of data. The chapter starts with a description of the data obtained and then 
presents a univariate analysis. The OLS regression technique and logistic regression 
technique are employed to test those constructed models. Additional sensitivity analysis 
is carried out by using the alternative weighting system of IFR content and other 
components, including the measurements of company size and profitability.  
Chapter seven presents the empirical results relating to firm value measured according 
to Tobin’s Q and the Market/book ratio. As mentioned in chapter three, previous studies 
have examined the factors determining IFR practice (He and Zhang, 2007) but ignored 
the economic impact of IFR on firm value. In response to the call for more research 
examining the relationship between IFR and firm value (e.g., Xiao et al., 2004; Trabelsi 
et al., 2008), three years of firm value data (namely, 2010, 2011 and the average of 
2009, 2010 and 2011) was collected and tested to find out the economic consequences 
of IFR and its components. The results of the descriptive study, the univariate analysis 
and the multivariate regression analysis are presented in this chapter.  
The empirical results generated from the qualitative study are presented in chapter eight. 
The results of previous studies (Xiao et al., 2004) indicate that part of the variation in 
IFR of Chinese listed companies has not been captured by the statistical models. This 
highlights the need to identify other factors influencing IFR practices. Opinions 
gathered from participants positioned to influence IFR might help to identify such other 
influencing factors. The qualitative component of this study has the potential to explore 
the motivation behind IFR from the participants’ point of view. Additionally, the 
advantages and limitations within IFR practice are also presented in this chapter, along 
with future incentives to improve IFR on corporate websites.  
Chapter nine concludes this thesis. It provides a summary of the main findings of this 
study, and outlines the contributions that this thesis makes to the body of existing 
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literature and knowledge in this area. It also outlines the limitations of this study and 
puts forward suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Contextual analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background information about the development of financial 
reporting regulations, stock markets and corporate governance in China (Section 2.2, 
2.3, 2.4). It helps to explain the Chinese characteristics affecting IFR policies and 
practices.  Section 2.5 gives an overview of Internet development in China. Section 2.6 
discusses the regulatory environment regarding IFR. Finally, section 2.7 provides a 
summary. 
 
2.2 Development of financial reporting regulation in China 
Since China adopted a policy of openness toward the outside world in 1978, it has 
undergone the practices and consequences of economic reform and transition from a 
formal centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy. Developments in 
Chinese Accounting have also been undergoing a radical transformation. In 1985, the 
National People’s Congress issued “The Accounting Law”, to specify the 
responsibilities of accountants, measurement processes, and the principles of accounting 
transactions. The Accounting Law provides a fundamental legal framework for ensuring 
uniform accounting practice, and corporate financial reporting by corporate entities. 
Under the Accounting Law, all corporate entities are required to prepare and present 
financial statements. The Accounting Law includes provisions to help ensure each 
enterprise discloses a true and fair opinion of its financial performance in its reports. 
Chapter IV of the Accounting Law requires each corporate entity to establish its own 
internal accounting supervision system. This is to ensure that all enterprises follow a 
systematic approach to maintaining books and accounts, and when preparing financial 
statements. Top management must not exercise undue influence over accounting 
personnel by manipulating measurements or failing to disclose financial information. 
 
After implementation of Company Law in 1993, managers were obliged to guarantee 
the probity of financial statements. Company managers are responsible for ensuring 
timely preparation of annual financial statements, which reflect a true and fair view of 
the corporate entity’s financial condition and its operating results. According to Article 
166 of Company Law, management is also responsible for submitting a corporate 
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entity’s audited financial statements to a general shareholders’ meeting, within four 
months of the end of the financial year.  
 
In 1998, the Securities Law was issued, requiring listed companies’ financial statements 
to also incorporate non-financial information; a policy intended to facilitate the 
informed decision making process. Article 65 of the Securities Law requires that, apart 
from providing operating results, listed companies’ financial statements must focus on 
information relating to: (a) the general business condition of the company, (b) any 
company involvement in major litigation, (c) changes to the number of shares issued, 
and (d) any important matters submitted during the annual general meeting for 
shareholders’ consideration. In addition, Article 66 of the Securities Law calls for 
information briefly introducing the directors and senior managers of the company, data 
on shares and corporate bonds issued, the top 10 company shareholders and the 
proportion of their shareholdings. Combining financial and non-financial information 
assists readers of financial statements to obtain a broader insight into the state of a 
company’s affairs (World Bank, 2009). 
 
According to the statutory framework of China, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is 
primarily responsible for regulating accounting and auditing practices.  In 1992, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued, the “Accounting Regulation for Experimental Listed 
Companies”. This was a landmark moment for the Chinese accounting system.  
Effective since July 1993, the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE) 
forms the basis of the conceptual framework for financial reporting in China.  The 
ABSE identifies objectives and users of financial accounting, and qualitative 
characteristics relating to information and definitions of the elements on financial 
statements. Under a legal mandate, the MOF issues Chinese Accounting Standards 
(CAS), and the Ministry of Finance issues the Chinese Standards on Auditing (CSA).  
 
The development of new Chinese accounting standards has been an important step for 
the development of the Chinese economy; it is experiencing increasing integration into 
the global capital markets. On 15 February 2006, the MOF formally announced the 
issuance of new Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBEs), comprising 
new basic Standards, specifically, the 38 Specific ABSEs and Implementation 
Guidance.  The ABSEs cover nearly all topics disclosed under current International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). The ASBEs came into force, for all listed 
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Chinese enterprises, on 1st January 2007.  Other Chinese enterprises have been 
encouraged to apply the ABSEs, except in the case of certain modifications, which 
reflect China’s unique circumstances and environment (Deloitte, 2006). In response to a 
call from the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on establishing global 
uniform accounting standards, the MOF prepared a roadmap for full convergence of 
CAS with the IFRS (Deloitte, 2006). 
 
2.3 Development of Stock Markets in China 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) regulates the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange; they were founded in 1990 and 1991 
respectively.  These capital markets opened up the investment process to individual 
investors, offering a means for non-state-owned enterprises (typically owned by 
collectives) to raise capital. The establishment of Stock Exchanges led to growth in 
many areas; as represented by the number of listed enterprises, market capitalisation, 
funds raised from share issuance, and trading volume. By 2001, China's financial 
markets had become the largest of any developing country. The number of listed 
enterprises had increased from 53 in 1992 to 2,537 in March 2014. Meanwhile, the total 
market capitalisation of China’s stock market boomed, rising from RMB 104.81 billion 
in 1992, to RMB 23,756.61 billion in 2014 (that is, increasing more than 200 times in 
23 years) (CSRC, 2014). 
 
Chinese companies operate under a unique ownership structure, which differs from that 
of their Western counterparts. A dominant feature of share ownership in China is the 
non-tradable equity ownership of the state. This is either through direct investment, or 
indirectly through holdings in domestic institutions (subsequently named legal persons), 
many of which are partially or wholly owned by central governments or local 
authorities. This characteristic is a product of the ongoing process of corporatisation and 
the partial privatisation of former state-owned companies, which began with the 
economic reform process in 1978, and has gathered pace in recent years. A typical listed 
Chinese company issues shares to five distinct classes of owners: (i) the state, (ii) legal 
persons, (iii) employees, (iv) domestic individuals and, finally, (v) foreign individuals 
or institutional holders. There are two major classes of non-tradable shares: state-owned 
shares and ‘legal person’ shares. Since April 2005, before commencement of non-
tradable share reform, about two-thirds of shares issued were non-tradable (Li et al., 
2009). The CSRC launched the non-tradable shares reform under the leadership of the 
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CPC and the State Council, intending to make non-tradable shares publicly tradable 
(Guo and Keown, 2009). 
 
Tradable shares in China can be divided into A shares, and those denominated in a 
foreign currency, B shares. Originally A shares were only available to Chinese citizens 
and institutions for trade, while B shares were available exclusively to investors outside 
mainland China. The intention behind the issuance of B shares was to attract foreign-
currency investment to China. In 1993, a number of selected Chinese mainland 
companies received permission to list on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), 
which trades in Hong Kong dollars; the shares issued in this case are H shares. In 
addition, some Chinese companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 
their shares are termed N shares. However, following a reform dated 20 February 2001, 
domestic investors can also invest in B-shares.  
 
In November 2002, the CSRC and the People’s Bank of China (POBC) launched the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme as a provision for foreign 
investors to participate in the phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy. A-shares 
have been available to QFII since 23 May 2003, in order to enhance the strength of 
institutional investors in the market, and to insure alignment with the commitments of 
China’s World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership. The parallel Qualified 
Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) scheme was launched officially in April 2006, 
allowing Chinese commercial banks to invest in financial products overseas, on behalf 
of Chinese institutions and residents. By the end of March 2013, 197 foreign institutions 
had licensed QFII investors, to grant a combined $41.745 billion of QFII quotas to 
invest in China's capital markets under the QFII program (Reuter, 2013).  
 
Despite this rapid growth, however, high speculation, insider trading, insufficient 
shareholder protections, as well as false financial reporting by listed companies (Kwon, 
2009) have limited China’s stock market. The level of voluntary disclosure remains 
relatively low, leading investors to doubt the quality of reports issued. Typically, listed 
companies only disclose required items, and seldom provide data in advance of 
publication of annual reports (Haw et al., 2000).  
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2.4 Development of corporate governance in China 
According to Charkham (1995), Corporate Governance (CG) refers to the relationship, 
responsibility, and dissemination of power and information among all market 
participants such as shareholders, management, administration, employees, 
stakeholders, capital market authorities and the government. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. The initial aim in developing 
CG was to protect shareholders’ rights, when investing in a listed company (Demirag, 
1998; Whittington, 1993). Gillan and Starks (1998) argue that CG is a system of laws, 
rules, and factors that control activities in a company.  Generally, CG can be classified 
into two categories: internal and external governance. Internal governance is primarily 
comprised of ownership and control; boards of directors and executives have unique 
characteristics reflected in their compensation; while external governance covers the 
production market, the takeover market, and the state regulatory system (Huson et al., 
2001; Gillan, 2006). 
Corporate governance issues have come to the fore in China since 1970, when the 
Chinese government launched its open door policy and began reforming the corporate 
policies of State Owned Enterprise (SOEs). Traditional SOEs were initially ideological 
organisations, created as work units to serve social and political purposes, rather than to 
meet economic objectives. The early economic reforms, which introduced a pricing 
system and profit incentives to SOEs, did significantly improve performance. The 
opening of the Chinese capital market accelerated the development of corporate 
governance in China. The key to a legal framework for CG in China consisted of 
Company Law in December 1993 and Securities Law in December 1998. Both laws 
were revised in 2004 and the changes became effective in 2006, providing a foundation 
on which to base a CG framework in China.  
 
The revision of Company Law improved companies’ governance structure and included 
mechanisms to protect lawful shareholders’ rights and public interests. It highlighted the 
legal obligations and responsibilities of those control of companies, i.e. the directors, 
senior management and supervisors. It improved companies’ financing and financial 
accounting systems and the systems governing corporate mergers, divisions and 
liquidation (OECD, 2011). The revised Securities Law improved the systems governing 
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issuance, trading, registration and settlement of securities, and provided for the 
establishment of a multi-tiered capital-market architecture. It improved the supervision 
of listed companies, making the issuance process more transparent, and established a 
mechanism for introducing a system to recommend/sponsor listings. It also increased 
the legal responsibilities of listed companies and rules on integrity, setting out the 
obligations of controlling shareholders, or those actually in control, namely the 
directors, supervisors and senior management (OECD, 2011). 
 
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organisation and agreed to adopt the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance to improve CG at Chinese listed companies. In 
order to establish a complete modern enterprise system and standardise the operating 
process of listed companies and securities, the CSRC also issued CG regulations. In 
January 2001, the CSRC issued a “Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
companies” (Hereinafter referred to as “the code”) in China. In January 2004, the CSRC 
issued a “Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Security Companies” in China 
(CSRC, 2004). The code sets forth the basic principles for CG, to be followed by listed 
companies in China, to protect investors’ interests and rights, outline basic behaviour 
rules and moral standards for directors, supervisors, managers and other members of 
senior management at listed companies (CSRC, 2004). 
  
2.5 Internet development in China 
Table 2.1 presents the world Internet users statistics. Up to June 30, 2012, the world 
population of Internet users was 7,017,846,922, representing 34.3% of the whole 
population worldwide. The growth rate of Internet users was 566.4% between 2000 and 
2012. The Asian population of Internet users worldwide is 3,922,066,987; representing 
27.5% of the Asian population, and 44.8% of the global population, and a growth rate of 
841.9% from 2000 to 2012 (World internet users’ statistics, 2012).  
 
In terms of Internet development in China specifically, by the end of June 2013, the 
number of Internet users in China had reached 591 million, an additional 26.56 million 
users since the end of 2012. The Internet penetration rate was 44.1% of the population, 
an increase of 2.0% compared with that at the end of 2012.   
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Table 2.1 World Internet Usage 
 
WORLD INTERNET USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS 
June 30, 2012 
World 
Regions 
Population 
(2012 Est.) 
Internet 
Users 
Dec. 31, 
2000 
Internet 
Users 
Latest Data 
Penetr
ation 
(% 
Popula
tion) 
Growth 
2000-
2012 
Users 
% 
of 
Table 
Africa 1,073,380,925 4,514,400 167,335,676 15.6 % 3,606.7% 7.0 % 
Asia 3,922,066,987 114,304,000 1,076,681,059 27.5 % 841.9 % 44.8 % 
Europe 820,918,446 105,096,093 518,512,109 63.2 % 393.4 % 21.5 % 
Middle 
East 
223,608,203 3,284,800 90,000,455 40.2 % 2,639.9% 3.7 % 
North 
America 
348,280,154 108,096,800 273,785,413 78.6 % 153.3 % 11.4 % 
Latin 
America / 
Caribbean 
593,688,638 18,068,919 254,915,745 42.9 % 1,310.8% 10.6 % 
Oceania / 
Australia 
35,903,569 7,620,480 24,287,919 67.6 % 218.7 % 1.0 % 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
7,017,846,922 360,985,492 2,405,518,376 34.3 % 566.4 % 100.0% 
 
(World Internet users’ statistics, 2012)  
 
By the end of June 2013, China had 464 million mobile Internet users, an increase of 
43.79 million, compared with the end of 2012. By the end of June 2013, rural Internet 
users accounted for 27.9% of total users in China, reaching 165 million. This figure rose 
slightly compared with the figure in 2012, to 9.08 million. The ratio of Internet users 
using desktops dropped slightly to 69.5%, and by 1.1% compared with the figure at the 
end of 2012. Over the same period, the proportion of those using mobile phones to 
access the Internet rose to 78.5%. In June 2013, the ratio of Internet users using 
desktops continued to fall, while the ratio of Internet users using mobile phones rose 
swiftly. By the end of 2013, China had a total 14.70 million domain names, including 
7.81 million “.CN” domain names; a rise of 4.0% compared with the end of 2012, 
accounting for 53.1% of total domain names in China; the number of “.CN” domain 
names reached 270,000. The total number of websites rose to 2.94 million (CNNIC, 
2013). 
According to (CNNIC, 2013), the fast rise in the number of Internet users is attributable 
to the following factors:  
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Firstly, guided by a series of state policies like the National Strategy for Information 
Development from 2006 to 2020, and the “Eleventh Five-Year Plan” for the 
Informatisation of the National Economy and Social Development, governments and 
relevant institutions in all areas inputted a large amount of money and manpower into 
the construction of network infrastructure to establish information service platforms to 
meet people’s need for Internet access. The number of Internet users and level of 
Internet applications in use is not only an indicator of local Internet development, but a 
sign of the integration of informatisation correspondent with industrialisation.  
 
Secondly, with progress in industrial technology, the recombination of network 
operators and the intensification of competition, the software and hardware 
environments associated with Internet access were optimised constantly. The 
Penetration of 3G technology facilitates the use of mobile phones at network terminals. 
Meanwhile, the constant decrease in the price of Internet access and users’ terminal 
products, as well as the continuous improvement in product performance, and user 
experience, constantly lowered the threshold of Internet access.  
 
Lastly, the public accesses the Internet actively. With social and economic development, 
people’s living standards are also currently rising continuously. After material needs are 
satisfied to some extent, social communication and information acquisition become 
critical to modern life. Innovative interpersonal communication requires access to the 
Internet, as the media for communication. Additionally, a large number of migrant 
workers returned home from areas with Internet access amid the financial crisis, and 
spread understanding and familiarity with the Internet to the people around them; 
moreover, the multiplier effect of interpersonal messaging raised rural people’s 
awareness and willingness to access the Internet.  
 
Thus, the number of Internet users in China is now rising steadily; however, compared 
to countries that have had longer history of Internet adoption, Internet penetration in 
China is relatively low. However, with the fast growth of the national economy, and the 
constant improvements in network infrastructure, the penetration rate of the Internet is 
increasing.  
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2.6 Regulation environment regarding IFR 
Regulators are playing an important role in protecting investors and improving the 
trustworthiness and quality of information reported on the Internet Financial reporting 
(Al-Shammari et al., 2007). Currently, several countries have issued guidance about 
IFR. This section, will introduce the regulatory environment, with regard to IFR, 
including that in the U.S.A, U.K., Europe, and Canada. The development of the Chinese 
regulatory body, the CSRC and the specification for the IFR, “Electronic information 
disclosure specification for listed companies”, as published in 2005, will also be 
detailed. 
There are no mandatory guidelines prescribing the content and presentation of the 
information on corporate websites in a comprehensive way. Currently, the development 
of standards for Internet reporting remains at the discussion stage (Marston & Polei, 
2004). In 2002 the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 2002) issued a 
worldwide report encouraging discussion of this topic. Several countries have since 
issued guidelines for Internet Financial reporting. Below is a brief summary of these 
guidelines. 
In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ have issued requirements and recommendations 
regarding the timely dissemination of financial information (Matheson & Reynolds, 
2004). In the U.K., the U.K. Companies Act Order 2000 (electronic communication) 
permits companies to fulfil some of their statutory reporting requirements by providing 
the required reports on their corporate websites (Rowbottom, Allam & Lymer, 2005). In 
a European context, Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Commission relates to the 
harmonisation of transparency requirements, and establishes the Internet as an 
acceptable means by which to communicate financial information (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004). In 2003, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) released 
Electronic Communications Disclosure Guidelines, strongly recommending all listed 
public companies to maintain a corporate website to make investors relations 
information electronically available.  
 
A company’s ownership and management structure greatly influence its disclosure 
strategy (Chau and Gray, 2002). The information environment of the Chinese stock 
market is characterised by strong state shareholding representation among listed 
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companies and conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. 
Second, the state government and its regulatory agency, the CSRC have played a 
leading role in protecting minority shareholders, by pushing standards to establish a 
good corporate governance regime (Qu et al., 2013).  
Although an increasing number of public companies are now owned by non-
government entities, a majority of listed companies on the Chinese Stock Exchanges 
remain ultimately owned by central or local government (Lan et al., 2013). The unique 
ownership structure of listed companies has caused an agency problem, which is 
characterised by the conflict of interest between majority state ownership and minority 
public ownership (Xu and Wang, 1999). Companies with higher state ownership are 
expected to lack motivation to disclose IFR to public shareholders for two reasons. 
First, it is suggested that state shareholders are able to obtain information through 
internal channels (Xiao et al., 2004), and second, disclosure of IFR information to the 
stock market will enable public investors to more closely monitor management’s related 
party transactions. Therefore, it is assumed that higher state ownership will weaken the 
pressure on a company to disclose IFR to public shareholders. Higher state ownership 
has also been associated with a lack of emphasis on efficiency and profitability, which 
implies a negative relationship between state ownership and disclosure (Ferguson et al., 
2002).  
To create a more attractive business environment and improve the efficiency of the 
Chinese stock market, The CSRC has initiated major corporate governance reforms to 
promote disclosure transparency, introducing the Chinese Code of Corporate 
Governance (2001), and the Code of Corporate governance for Security Companies 
(2004) in April 2005. The Chinese government also initiated an ownership reform 
program, aiming to eliminate various share ownership types and ensure all shares 
become legally tradable A-shares (Jiang et al., 2008). These measures were intended to 
highlight the importance of transparency and emphasised corporate governance 
requirements. The recommendations also aimed to increase the confidence of investors, 
strengthen the capital market and improve the accountability and credibility of the 
financial information provided by listed companies. Therefore, this transformed 
disclosure environment is expected to motivate listed companies to improve their 
disclosure transparency and make information disclosure more external-user oriented 
(Qu et al., 2013).  
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Compared to developed countries, the regulatory mechanisms for the stock market are 
still in the development stage in China. Only recently have the CSRC and the two Stock 
Exchanges begun to emphasise procedures for standardising financial reporting and 
information disclosure by listed companies (Chen & Thomas, 2003). Therefore, China 
can draw many lessons from the experiences and legislative decisions of the developed 
countries mentioned above. At present, a major problem is the lack of availability of 
transparent and reliable accounting information to assist investors and other market 
participants to make decisions effectively (Lin & Chen, 2005). 
In response to the spread of Internet reporting by firms worldwide, the CSRC also 
encourages listed companies to disclose information on their websites. Since 2000, in 
China, listed companies have been required to provide their full annual and interim 
reports, and prospectuses to the official Website of the CSRC (http://www.crsc.gov.cn), 
the SHSE (http://www.sse.com.cn ) and the SZSE (http://www.cninfo.com.cn) (Xiao et 
al., 2004). In 2005, the CSRC published “Electronic information disclosure 
specification for listed companies”, JR/T 0021-2004. This specification defined the 
quality of Internet financial reporting required: comprehensibility, relevance, 
materiality, timeliness, reliability and completeness. Disclosure of more details, such as 
social reporting, sales of key products, market share of key products, earnings or sales 
forecasts, and historical share prices, share price performance in relation to the stock 
market index, and the difference between the IAS and China GAAP, are also 
encouraged but not mandatory (CSRC, 2005). The purpose of the specification is to 
improve the quantity and quality of the financial information disclosed on the Internet. 
It encourages listed companies to post voluntary disclosures online, to improve investor 
relations. In 2008, the CSRC released its 5 year plan for Internet reporting, and adoption 
of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) format, to promote listed 
companies adopting to a new technology (CSRC, 2008).  
 
With the development of regulatory guidance, prescribing the information disclosed on 
websites in certain countries, it is expected that regulatory recommendations and 
requirements will necessarily lead to an increase in companies disclosing more 
information on their websites. The specifications issued by the CSRC in 2005 suggest 
that there will also be an increase in Chinese listed companies disclosing more 
information on their websites.  
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2.7 Cultural environment and IFR  
Culture is a concept that has been studied, researched and discussed for thousands of 
years. It influences every aspect of society, far beyond what is commonly admitted. An 
understanding of cultural relativism is important in the evaluation of diverse accounting 
systems and those undergoing changes (Secord and Su, 1994). Hofstede (1980, p 5) 
refers to culture as ‘the collective programming of the minds that distinguishes the 
members of one group from another’. Hofstede (1980) classified culture into five 
dimensions, namely high versus power distance, individualism versus collectivism, high 
versus low uncertainty avoidance, masculinity versus femininity, and long versus short-
term orientation.  
Gray’s study represents an attempt to apply Hofstede’s model to accounting by 
identifying the mechanism whereby societal values are associated with the accounting 
sub-culture, which directly influences accounting practices. Gray identified four 
accounting values linked to societal values: professionalism versus statutory control; 
uniformity versus flexibility; conservatism versus optimism; and secrecy versus 
transparency (Chow et al, 1995). Gray suggested that ‘a methodological framework 
incorporating culture may be used to explain and predict international differences in 
accounting systems and patterns of accounting development internationally’ (Gray, 
1988, p 5).  
In the context of China, Bond et al. (1988) identified the historical root of Chinese 
culture as Confucian traditions, which emphasise thrift and perseverance, virtues, 
associated with long-term orientation. Confucianism addresses the power of human 
beings; that is, the country is regulated by the rule of man rather the rule of law (Faure 
and Fang 2008). The Confucian principle of harmony has greatly influenced Chinese 
society, pervading almost every aspect of social life within the country (Tian 2007). In 
Hofstede’s terminology, Chinese society can be characterised as having large power 
distance, high levels of collectivism, strong uncertainty avoidance, less masculinity and 
long-term orientation (Chow et al., 1995).  
According to Gray’s (1988) cultural model, China’s accounting development and 
practices should support statutory control, uniform practices, a conservative 
measurement approach, and secrecy in reference disclosure. Statutory control and the 
enforcement of accounting systems echoes the Confucian heritage that establishes the 
hierarchical nature of society. As a society marked by strong uncertainty avoidance and 
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a long-term orientation, China adopts a conservative approach both in accounting 
measurement and when adopting new accounting practices. In a collectivist society, 
companies are more inwardly focused, which can create secrecy, resulting in limited 
disclosure of information in China. Furthermore, organisations operating in a society 
with large power distance like China may feel unwilling to share private information 
with the public, so their disclosures will be more limited. Meanwhile, strong uncertainty 
avoidance means the preference for secrecy is relatively high, leading to a preference 
for the concealment of information. Thus, Chinese firms would be expected to adhere to 
rules and regulations and disclose minimal information voluntarily in their annual 
reports. Thus, it is argued that Chinese culture does not promote voluntary disclosure 
(Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). In relation to the specific case of IFR, it is expected that 
due to the high levels of collectivism and strong uncertainty avoidance, which lead 
Chinese people to view conflict and change as threatening, they will resist change and 
be less willing to adopt IFR practices.  
However, the Chinese cultural environment has undergone some dramatic changes in 
response to the recent economic reform and open-door policy. Accounting reforms 
launched since the 1980s have aimed to establish a new framework for regulating 
financial reporting suited to China’s recently emerged socialist market economy. The 
adoption of accounting standards in 1993 marked a turning point in China’s accounting 
history, as it moved from a rigid and uniform approach towards a more international 
Anglo-Saxon orientation (Chow et al., 1995). Ralston et al. (1999) suggest that the new 
generation of managers scored much higher on values consistent with individualism, but 
scored lower on traditional Chinese values such as collectivism and Confucianism. This 
cultural change is a consequence of the government’s “open-door” policy, which has 
encouraged younger Chinese managers to act more independently, openly, and to take 
risks in the pursuit of profit, even when their actions are in conflict with traditional 
practice. Indeed, according to Qu and Leung (2006), despite the high level of secrecy 
within Chinese society, Chinese listed companies are now more willing than in previous 
decades to provide voluntary information in their corporate annual reports. In essence, 
this finding demonstrates that disclosure in Chinese society has improved, despite the 
argument that the society is generally secretive (Qu and Leung, 2006). In terms of IFR, 
voluntary disclosure will also be greatly influenced by adoption of cultural change. 
Presumably, in line with their western counterparts and pressure from both domestic 
and international investors, Chinese listed companies will be willing to publish Internet 
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reports and disclose financial data, which exceeds the current disclosure requirements. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter has explained the current financial reporting environment of China. It has 
provided information about the development of Chinese financial reporting systems, the 
development of the Chinese stock markets, and CG systems in China. Internet usage 
statistics were reviewed and regulations linked to Internet financial reporting were 
discussed.  Such reporting is essential for a better understanding of the factors 
influencing IFR practices, as will be discussed in following chapters.  
 
  
28 
Chapter 3 Prior research on Internet Financial Reporting 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews selected studies to date concerned with Internet Financial 
Reporting (IFR). The first set of studies (section 3.2) is descriptive studies, including 
single country studies and international comparative studies, to provide a picture of 
what information, content and formatting features are available on company’s websites. 
The second set of studies (section 3.3), partially overlaps the first set, and presents 
explanatory quantitative studies to examine what factors determine companies’ 
disclosure of IFR on their websites. These factors include, for example, company 
specific factors and corporate governance factors. The third set of studies (section 3.4) 
investigates the economic consequences of IFR disclosure, the impact of IFR on firm 
value, the cost of capital, and stock prices. The fourth set of studies (section 3.5) focuses 
on stakeholder perceptions of IFR, and discusses the advantages and issues associated 
with developing IFR. Finally, IFR studies in China are reviewed in section 3.6 and the 
gap in the research in this area is identified in section 3.7.  
 
3.2 Descriptive research 
Early descriptive research studies provided an overview of the use of the Internet for 
disseminating financial reporting in carefully chosen developed countries. These 
included studies in the USA: Louwers, Pasewark and Typpo (1996), Petravik and Gillett 
(1996), Flynn and Gowthorpe (1997), Debreceny and Gray (1997), Ashbaugh, 
Johnstone and Warfield (1999), Deller, Stubenrath and Weber (1999), Ettredge, 
Richardson and Scholz (2001), FASB (2000). Studies in the UK: Marston and Leow 
(1998), Hussey, Guiliford and Lymer (1998), Deller, Stubenrath and Weber (1999), 
Hussey, Guiliford and Lymer (1998), Craven and Marston (1999). Finally, European 
studies: Lymer and Tallberg (1997), Gowthorpe and Amat (1999), Deller, Stubenrath 
and Weber (1999), Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999), Brennan and Hourigan (2000), 
Brennan and Kelly (2000), Lybaert (2002), Debreceny and Gray (1999). The majority 
of these studies focused on listed companies. Table 3.1 below presents some early 
research results from scholars who conducted descriptive research. 
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Table 3.1 Prior descriptive research 
US Data collection 
date  
Population Corporate 
website (%) 
Financial 
data on 
site (%) 
Louwers, Pasewark and 
Typpo (1996) 
March 1996 Top 150 Fortune 500 
companies 
65% 37% 
Petravik and Gillett (1996) May 1996 Top 150 Fortune 500 
companies 
69% 55% 
Flynn and Gowthorpe 
(1997) 
December 1996 Top 100 Fortune 500 
companies 
89% >71% 
Debreceny and Gray (1997) Late 1996 50 Largest US 
industrial corporations 
98% 69% 
Ashbaugh, Johnstone and 
Warfield (1999) 
November 1997 - 
January 1998 
290 Non-financial US 
listed companies 
87% 70% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 
January 1998 Top 100 Standard & 
Poor companies 
95% 91% 
Ettredge, Richardson and 
Scholz (2001) 
May 1998 259 AIMR companies 
plus 231 Compustat 
computer technology 
and biotechnology 
companies 
82% >80% 
FASB (2000) January 1999 Top 100 Fortune 500 
companies 
99% 93% 
UK 
Marston and Leow (1998) November 1996 FT-SE 100 companies 63% 45% 
Hussey, Guiliford and 
Lymer (1998) 
August 1997 FT-SE 100 companies 75% 54% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 
January 1998 FT-SE 100 companies 85% 72% 
Hussey, Guiliford and 
Lymer (1998) 
March 1998 FT-SE 100 companies 91% 63% 
Craven and Marston (1999) July 1998 Largest 200 UK 
companies 
74% 71% 
Europe 
Lymer and Tallberg (1997)  All 72 Finnish listed 
companies 
90%  
Gowthorpe and Amat 
(1999) 
July 1998 All Spanish listed 
companies 
49% 19% 
Hedlin (1999) September 1998 60 listed Swedish 
companies 
98% 83% 
Deller, Stubenrath and 
Weber (1999) 
January 1998 Top 100 DAX 
companies 
76% 71% 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer 
(1999) 
December 1997 
December 1998 
32 companies listed on 
the Vienna Stock 
Exchange 
72% 
88% 
63% 
82% 
Brennan and Hourigan 
(2000) 
Brennan and Kelly (2000) 
July 1998 
July 1999 
94 companies listed on 
the Irish Stock 
Exchange 
99 companies listed on 
the Irish Stock 
Exchange 
37% 
67% 
26% 
56% 
Debreceny and Gray (1999) Late 1998 15 largest listed from 
each of UK, Germany 
and France 
98% 82% 
Lybaert (2002) July 2000 188 AEX companies 86% 94% 
 (Resource: Smith and Pierce, 2005) 
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More recently, some studies have been carried out in less developed countries, 
including that of Dutta and Bose (2007) who examined IFR in Bangladesh. They 
examined 268 companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the 
Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE), and only 38.81 percent of 268 companies were 
found to have websites. Another study involved a survey of IFR carried by Mohamed et 
al. (2009) in Oman. The authors investigated the practices of IFR by companies listed 
on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) in Oman, and found that among the 142 
companies listed on the MSM, only 84 operated websites, with even fewer (only 31) 
engaging in IFR.  
 
One study covered a three-year period, offering a picture of IFR improvement in 
Croatia. Pervan (2009) examined voluntary Internet reporting amongst Croatian listed 
companies from 2005-2007. A 30 items IFR score was collected in 2005, 2006, 2007. 
The level of Internet disclosure was 6.85 in 2005, 7.31 in 2006, and 9.44 in 2007. The 
longitudinal data indicated increased use of Internet reporting. They concluded there is 
large scope for the improvement of Internet reporting practices in Eastern Europe.  
 
Bozcuk et al. (2009) investigated the current state of IFR considering recent regulatory 
changes in the financial reporting environment at Turkish firms. They found a 
statistically significant increase in the number of firms providing financial disclosures 
on the internet, from 415 in 2003 to 438 in 2007. They also highlighted a number of 
problem areas, such as the extremely low level of voluntary disclosures and the apparent 
reluctance of listed firms to provide non-mandatory financial information. This research 
focuses not only on the quoted firms but also on large unlisted industrials. The research 
also benefitted from being conducted between 2003 and 2007, enabling the authors to 
provide data concerning the development of IFR within a 4-year period in Turkey.  
 
Other studies carried out an IFR comparison within a single country between industry 
sectors. Malhotra and Makkar (2012) conducted research examining IFR practices in the 
Indian corporate sector and inter-sector comparisons. A sample of 50 companies from 
different sectors was covered in this study, and 35 index items created. The analysis of 
the results showed that about 80% of the sample companies provided both mandatory 
and voluntary information. The banking sector provided more extensive financial 
information than the other sectors. The paper suggests that greater emphasis should be 
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placed on the provision of up-to-date financial information, to include full annual 
reports, while presenting information on websites.  
 
To facilitate their study of IFR by bank and non-bank listed companies in Indonesia, 
Pertiwi and Hermana (2013) built an IFR index comprised of four elements: content, 
timeliness, technology and user support. The final sample consisted of 25 banks and 9 
non-banking listed companies in Indonesia. Similar to Malhotra and Makkar’s (2012) 
results, the banking sector’s IFR index score was reportedly higher than the IFR index 
score of the non-banking sector. Among the four catalogues of the IFR index, the user 
support score was higher than the content index, the timeliness index and technology 
index. Both the above studies concluded that the banking sector provided comparatively 
more abundant information on their websites than other sectors.  
 
The following International comparative research offers a clear picture of how 
companies use the Internet for financial reporting across countries. International 
comparisons in the research are presented below: 
 
Deller et al. (1999), in a survey of top 100 companies’ websites (US, UK, and German 
firms), found that 91%, 72% and 71% of these firms use IFR. The results indicated that 
US companies provided better investor relations information via the Internet than their 
counterparts in the UK and Germany. Geerings et al. (2003) investigated investor 
relations activities on the Internet for companies listed on the Euronext Stock Exchange; 
screening the websites of the fifty largest listed companies in each of the countries. 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands were screened for investor relations items and 
more developed Internet practices were observed in France and the Netherlands than in 
Belgium. 
 
A further study involved two Asian countries. Iqbal (2005) compared the IFR of 
Malaysian listed companies with those in Singapore, using a standard web browser to 
survey the websites of listed companies and collect data. One of the survey findings was 
that listed companies in Singapore have a greater web presence than those in Malaysia. 
Another major finding was that Singapore companies were more effective at utilising 
the potential the Internet had to offer when compared with companies based in 
Malaysia.  
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Oyelere et al. (2007) contributed to IFR research by examining and comparing the 
extent and variety of IFR practices among companies listed on the Muscat Securities 
Market (MSM) in Oman and the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) in Bahrain. In total, 
142 companies listed on the MSM and 51 companies listed on the BSE were 
investigated to ascertain whether they maintain websites, and/or if these sites were 
being used to communicate financial information. Only 124 of the listed companies in 
both markets were found to operate websites, with far fewer (only sixty-three) engaging 
in IFR. The results of this study indicate that IFR is still in the embryonic stages in 
Oman and Bahrain, and that there are multiple opportunities and challenges raised by 
corporate reporting for all stakeholder parties.  
 
The review of the descriptive studies revealed great improvements in the use of IFR in 
the last decade, with the number of companies using IFR growing rapidly. Moreover, a 
significant number of companies in developed countries use the Internet for disclosing 
their financial information on websites, however, the study also showed that in some 
developing countries, the use of IFR is still in the embryonic stages. It is accurate to 
state that the use of the Internet to communicate financial information varies across 
countries.  
 
The descriptive research reviewed has provided an overview of the current use of the 
Internet to communicate financial information and differences in Internet practices 
across countries. However, this data includes little theoretical grounding upon which to 
base an analysis. To add further depth, the explanatory studies carried out previously by 
scholars will be introduced next. 
 
3.3 Explanatory research 
 
3.3.1 Explanatory research in different countries 
Explanatory researchers seek to explain the origins of findings by identifying systematic 
differences; their approach provides a theoretical background for their analysis and 
considers differences in practice, focusing on linking independent variables to aspects 
associated with the voluntary disclosure of financial information on the Internet. A wide 
range of independent variables are typically examined in explanatory studies, including 
size, profitability, leverage, free floating equity capital, foreign listings, the need for 
new equity capital, ownership and a corporate governance structure. These include 
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studies in the USA: Ashbaugh et al. (1999), Ettredge et al. (2002), and Kelton and Yang 
(2008). Studies conducted in the UK include: Marston and Leow (1998), Craven and 
Marston (1999), Abdelsalam and Street (2007) and Hegazy and Hegazy (2010). 
Marston and Polie (2004) provide a study of Germany. Studies in Spain include: Larrán 
and Giner (2001), Gandía (2008), Álvarez, et al., (2008) and García Sánchez et al., 
(2011). Studies in France include: Boubaker et al., (2012), Botti et al., (2013). 
Abdelsalam and EI-Masry (2008) provide a study of Ireland. Oyelere et al., (2003) 
provide a study of New Zealand. Studies in India include: Abdelsalam et al., (2004), 
Crag and Gakhar (2010), Manjinder (2013). Barako and Tower (2008) provide a study 
of Indonesia. Aly et al. (2010) provide a study of Egypt. Alali and Romero (2012) 
provide a study of Argentina.  International studies include: Debreceny et al., (2002), 
Allam and Lymer (2003), Bollen et al., (2006), Pervan (2007), Ojah and Mokoaleli-
Mokpteli (2012).  
 
Table 3.2 illustrates the explanatory research conducted by scholars. Some of the 
studies concentrated on firm-specific characteristics, explaining IFR disclosure in a 
single country, whereas the others conducted international research comparing 
countries. They tested firm size, firm age, firm beta, leverage, liquidity, profitability, 
industry type, listing age and whether foreign listings relate to IFR disclosure or not. As 
the author explains below, the findings offer mixed results. The majority of researchers 
depict size and profitability as the most significant variables explaining IFR practice. 
However, some research has extended the literature by linking corporate governance 
factors with levels of IFR disclosure. Additionally, Gul and Leung (2004) suggest that 
failure to include governance variables in earlier studies when examining levels of 
voluntary disclosure could have contributed to mixed findings. Some of the research 
conducted by scholars is described below: 
 
A single country study was carried out by Oylere et al. (2003), who investigated the use 
of IFR by identifying company characteristics that influenced IFR by 229 companies 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX). The results indicate that some 
determinants of traditional financial reporting; i.e. firm size, liquidity, industrial sector 
and spread of shareholding, are determinants of voluntary adoption of IFR. However, 
other firm characteristics, such as leverage, profitability and internationalisation do not 
appear to influence the decision to use the Internet as a medium for corporate financial 
reporting. 
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Table 3.2 Prior explanatory research 
 
Author(s) Date of Data 
Collection 
Sample Number of 
Checklist Items 
Dependent Variables Significant Independent 
Variables 
Marston and Leow 
(1998) 
November 1996 U.K. FTSE-100 2 Presence of website 
Disclosure of any financial 
information on website 
Size (+) 
Ashbaugh et al. (1999) November 1997 
through January 
1998 
290 U.S. 
companies 
(criticized by 
AIMR) 
3 Websites provide: 
Comprehensive set of financial 
statements (including foot notes 
and auditor report) 
Link to annual report elsewhere 
on the Internet 
Link to U.S. SEC’s Electronic 
Data gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) system 
Size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
AIMR highly ranked firm (+) 
Craven and Marston 
(1999) 
July 1998 206 largest U.K. 
companies 
2 Presence of website 
Disclosure of any financial 
information on website 
Size (+) 
Pirchegge and 
Wagenhofer (1999) 
December 1997 
and December 
1998 
26/20 Austrian 
companies 
1998/1997 
German DAX-
30 1998 only 
38 7-Content 
5-Timeliness 
14-Technology 
12-User support 
Size (+) 
Free Float (--) 
(both for Austrian companies 
only) 
Ettredge et al. (2001) February 
through May 
1998 
402 U.S. 
companies( 
AIMR rated, 
Bio-technology, 
and Computer 
technology) 
17 6- Accounting information items 
11- other financial information 
items 
Size (+) 
Industry (petroleum highest 
and homebuilding lowest) 
Debreceny et al.(2002) November 1998 660 large 2 1-Presentation (type of website) Size (+) 
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(IASC sponsored) through 
February 1999 
companies in 22 
countries (30 
largest market 
cap companies 
listed in each 
country in Dow 
Jones Global 
Index) 
1-Content (amount of disclosure) U.S. Listing (+) 
Growth prospects (Market 
value to book value) (--) 
For presentation: 
Size (+) 
U.S. Listing (+) 
General cross listing (--) 
Level of technology 
(particularly being in 
pharmaceutical industry) (+) 
Disclosure environment 
Ettredge et al. (2002) Late 1997 
through early 
1998 
193 U.S. 
companies 
(AIMR  rated) 
17 4-Financial information items 
required in SEC filings 
12- items of voluntary disclosure 
For both Size (+) 
Correlation annual earnings 
and returns (--) 
For voluntary disclosure only: 
Raising equity capital (if 
stock issued during 1996 or 
1997) (+) 
Quality (AIMR measure) (+) 
Oyelere et al. (2003) Not specified 229 N.Z. 
companies (123 
with websites; 
90 included 
Internet financial 
reporting) 
8 Financial and non-financial 
information provided on 
corporate website 
Size (+) 
Liquidity (+) 
Ownership spread (higher 
proportion of shareholding by 
top 40 percent of 
shareholders, lower the 
probability of disclosure) 
Industry (primary industry 
group sector: oil and gas and 
forestry highest) 
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Marston (2003) 1998 plus 
follow up in 
May 2001 
99 top Japanese 
companies 
13 Whether company had a website 
Whether any English website on 
homepage 
Whether 11 items of financial 
information disclosed in Website 
Size (+) 
Industry (+) (both related to 
existence of website but not 
extent of disclosure on web) 
 
Allam and Lymer 
(2003) 
End of 001 and 
early 2002 
250 companies 
(50 largest in 
advanced capital 
markets; U.S., 
U.K., Canada, 
Australia and 
H.K.) 
36 12- General attributes 
24- Financial /Annual report 
attributes 
Size (+) ( only for Australia) 
Abdelsalam et al. 
(2004) 
July 2004 20 Indian 
companies on 
BSE Senex 
114 64-Content 
50- Usability 
For overall and content 
disclosure: 
Big 4 auditor 
Free float (+) 
Gearing (--) 
PE (profitability) (--) 
U.S. listing /filing (+) 
Industry (manufacturing) ( 
overall only) (--) 
None significant for usability 
Marston and 
Polei(2004) 
July 2000 and 
May/June 
50 German 
companies ( top 
quartile and 
bottom quartile 
of DAX 100) 
53(2000) 
71(2003) 
Content (16- investor related , 
accounting and financial 
information, 5- Timeliness, 5- 
Contract details , 14 Corporate 
governance and 5-Social 
Responsibility) 
For 2000: 
Size (+) 
Free Float (+) 
For 2003 
Size (+) 
ROE (--) 
Foreign Listing (+) 
State Share Ownership (-) 
Bollen et al. (2006) December 2001 
and October 
2002 
270 listed largest 
companies in six 
different 
33 Content -16 
Presentation-15 
Size (+) 
Level of internationalization 
(+) 
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countries 
(Australia, 
Belgium, 
France, 
Netherlands, 
South Africa and 
U.K.) 
Industry (level of technology) 
(+) 
Growth rate (+) 
Performance (--) 
Growth rate(--) 
Abdelsalam et al. 
(2007) 
Mid-2005 110  London-
listed companies 
143 Content-74 items 
Usability-69 items 
Size (+) 
Profitability (+) 
Industry (+) 
Growth rate (+) 
Analysis following (+) 
Director holding (+) 
Director independence (+) 
CEO duality (+) 
Abdelsalam and 
Street(2007) 
February 2006 115 UK 
companies listed 
on London 
Stock Exchange 
11 11 Timeliness information Cross directorship (+) 
More experience and length 
in director service (+) 
Bard Independence (--) 
Analyst following (+) 
Block ownership (--) 
CEO duality (---) 
Abdelsalam and EI-
Masry(2008) 
 44 listed 
companies on 
Ireland Stock 
Exchange 
13 Timeliness information 13 Size (--) 
Auditor fee (--) 
Profitability (--) 
Managerial ownership (+) 
Blockholder ownership (--) 
Independent directors (+) 
CEO duality (--) 
Álvarez, et al. (2008) December 2005 117 largest 
companies listed 
on Madrid Stock 
Market 
44 Content (11 financial 
information, 11corporate 
governance, 9 Corporate social 
responsibility, 5 Intangible, 8 
Size (+) 
Industrial sector (energy 
sector) (+) 
Profitability (--) 
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strategic information) Leverage (--) 
Barako  and Tower 
(2008) 
2006 343 Indonesia 
Listed 
companies on 
the  Jakarta 
Stock Exchange 
1 1Whether the companies have 
websites or not 
Size (+) 
Leverage (--) 
Profitability (--) 
Company Age (+) 
Ownership Structure (--) 
Independent of directors (--) 
Independence  of audit 
committee(--) 
 
Ezat and El 
Masry(2008) 
December 2006 50 listed 
companies on 
the Cairo and 
Alexandria 
Stock Exchange 
 
11 Timeliness information-11 Size (+) 
Type of industry (+) 
Liquidity (+) 
ownership structure (+) 
board composition (+) 
board size (+) 
CEO duality (--) 
Gandía  (2008) 1st of June, 2003 92 Non financial 
companies listed 
on Spanish 
National  
Securities 
Market 
32 32ARCGD (annual report 
corporate governance disclosure 
index) 
32CNMV (information on the 
Web site of   Spanish National 
Securities Market Commission) 
32 ICGD ( Internet based 
corporate governance disclosure 
index) 
Size (+) 
Firm performance (+) 
Listing age (+) 
Board Size (--) 
CEO duality (--) 
Free float share (--) 
Media visibility (+) 
Analyst Following(+) 
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Kelton and Yang 
(2008) 
2003 284 companies 
listed on 
NASDAQ 
national Market 
46 Format -12 
Content -36 
Size (+) 
Growth (--) 
ROE (--) 
Equity (--) 
Correlations between 
earnings and returns (--) 
BIG 4(+) 
Shareholder rights 
Managerial ownership (+) 
Block ownership (--) 
Board composition 
(independent directors) (+) 
CEO duality (--) 
Audit committee Financial 
expertise (+) 
Audit committee meeting 
frequency (+) 
Hegazy and Hegazy 
(2010) 
2008 FTSE 100 UK 
listed companies 
15 15 Size (+) 
Board Composition (+) 
Audit meeting (+) 
Aly et al. (2010) 
 
October 2005 to 
January 2006 
Top 100 most 
active-traded 
companies  
listed in the 
Egyptian Stock 
Exchange 
100 Content -59 
Presentation-31 
Profitability (+) 
Foreign listing (+) 
Industry type 
(communications and 
financial services) (+) 
Size (--) 
Leverage (--) 
Liquidity (--) 
Auditor type (--) 
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Crag and 
Gakhar(2010) 
January, 2008 200 companies 
of BSE-index in 
India 
119 items Financial reporting index Size (+) 
Profits (--) 
Age (--) 
Nature of industry (+) 
Liquidity (--) 
Ownership spread (--) 
Leverage (+) 
García  Sánchez et 
al.(2011) 
December, 2005 117 
companies  liste
d on the Madrid 
Stock Market 
8 items Strategic information index Size (no affect) 
Industrial sector (+) 
Profitability (--) 
Leverage (+) 
Ownership diffusion 
CEO duality (+) 
Board activity (+) 
Board size (+) 
Independence of the Board of 
Directors (--) 
Blockholders (--) 
Alali and 
Romero(2012) 
Mid-March to 
mid June 2009 
84 listed 
companies on 
Buenos Aires 
Stock Exchange 
in Argentina 
53 items Internet Disclosure Index(IDI) Size (+) 
Leverage (+) 
ROA (--) 
Growth (--) 
Big 4(+) 
Merval25(+) 
Industry (--) 
(Mining) (+) 
Bourbaker et al. 
(2012) 
October and 
November, 
2005 
529 French –
listed companies 
101 Content –68 (8 General 
information 
17 Investor related information 
Size (+) 
Ownership structure 
Industry (+) 
41 
28 Financial Information 
10 Corporate Governance 
6 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Presentation –26 
Timeliness –7 ) 
Equity (+) 
 
Botti et al. (2013) December  2007 32 companies of 
French CAC40 
index 
71 items Content-48items 
Presentation-23 items 
Board size (+) 
Board independence (+) 
Board Meetings (+) 
Board Diligence(+) 
Manjinder (2013) November, 
2007 
181 companies  
of BS-1000 
database in India 
56 items General information- 9 items 
Financial statements and reports-
6 items 
Specific information-41 items 
Size (+) 
Leverage (--) 
Profitability (--) 
Age (--) 
Ownership dispersion (+) 
 
Note: Various measures of size have been used, including market capitalization, Sales/turnover, number of employees, total assets. Results generally 
support any measure of size as being appropriate, but market capitalization is the most commonly used (Modified table based on Abdelsalam et al., 
2007). 
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Examining IFR across a three-year timeframe Marston and Polei (2004) investigated the 
use of the Internet for financial information disclosure by German companies in 2000 
and 2003, and identified factors influencing IFR. The initial sample was the top 25 and 
the lowest 25 DAX 100 companies according to market capitalization. They found 
company size was the only variable explaining financial disclosure during the period 
investigated. Foreign listing was only associated with the level of disclosure in 2003 
and free float appeared to be the only variable related to the level of disclosure in 2000. 
Systemic risk and profitability had no predictive value for the IFR in the case of the 
sample companies.  
 
In 2002, Larrán and Giner studied Spanish companies’ use of IFR, sampling 144 
companies from those quoted on the Continuous Market of the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
Their results showed that size was the main factor, explaining not only the quantity but 
also the quality of the financial information. The leverage, return on equity, foreign 
listing, industry and book to market ratios were not significant variables for describing 
the disclosed financial information. Other scholars, for example, García et al. (2011), 
have carried out research in Spain. They investigated a sample of 117 companies listed 
on the Madrid Stock Exchange, and reported that size and industry concentration was 
associated with a high level of financial disclosure; whilst leverage and profitability had 
no significant effect. 
 
Most studies focus on the biggest companies in a country. In one study, García et al. 
(2005) investigated 816 Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Spain. They observed a 
clear relationship between possessing a website and the size of the sector. Manager’s 
education and training, having previous contact with clients and/or suppliers via the 
Internet, and businesses’ technological tradition and the importance given to the quality 
of products as well as the commercial distribution process were also contributory 
factors.  
 
A few studies have attempted to expand their analysis to include specific industries 
among other potential determinants of Internet disclosure. For example, Gowthorpe and 
Amat (1999), Ettredge et al. (2001), Debreceny et al. (2002), Bonson and Escober 
(2006), Alvarez et al. (2008) and Boubaker et al. (2012) all explored the relationship 
between financial reporting through the Internet across various industries. Debreceny et 
al. (2002) found high tech companies tended to disclose more information on their 
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websites and that the banking and energy sectors have a positive attitude it IFR. 
Similarly, Oyelre et al. (2003) identified primary sector positively correlated to IFR, 
while Bonson and Escober (2006) reached the same conclusion for the financial sector. 
In addition, Boubaker et al. (2012) found IT industry firms use the web extensively to 
disclose information to shareholders.  
 
Conducting research in less developed countries, Barako et al. (2008) analysed all the 
Indonesian companies on the Jakarta Stock Exchange in terms of their ability to 
communicate via the Internet. They reported statistical differences regarding the size 
and age of the firms. Larger and older firms were far more likely to have websites, and 
the findings from this study show that internet communication with external 
stakeholders regarding financial reporting data is still not at an optimal level, especially 
from the perspective of foreign investors who are more likely to rely on web 
technology. 
 
In terms of corporate governance influence, Ajinkya et al. (2005, p371) suggested that 
“promoting stronger governance could promote transparent disclosure”. Accordingly, 
some research has examined the association between governance and disclosure 
transparency in the IFR environment.  
 
Abdelsalam and Street (2007) studied the timeliness of IFR in 115 UK companies. 
Multivariate analysis results provided evidence of a significant association between 
timely IFR and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board 
independence. Follow-up analysis provided additional evidence of a significant 
association between the timeliness of corporate Internet reporting and board experience. 
The evidence indicated that role duality and block ownership are associated with less 
timely IFR. In a similar vein, Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) investigated the 
timeliness of IFR by 44 Irish-listed companies. Multivariate analyses results offered 
evidence that the timeliness of IFR is positively associated with board of director’s 
independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership. The findings suggest that 
board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s timeliness regarding IFR 
behaviour. 
 
In the US, Kelton and Yang (2008) examined 284 companies listed on the NASDAQ 
National Market in 2003. Their results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, 
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a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent 
directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee 
members considered financial experts are more likely engage in IFR. These results 
suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure 
and lead to improved disclosure transparency via IFR in the context of the US.  
 
Boubaker et al. (2012) undertook a study analysing the determinants of web-based 
corporate reporting among 529 French-listed firms. The firms featuring a dispersed 
ownership structure, appear to use the web extensively to disclose information to their 
shareholders.  
With regard to less developed countries, Ezat and EI –Masry (2008) examined the key 
corporate governance factors that affect the timeliness of IFR amongst Egyptian listed 
companies. Multiple-regression results identified a significant relationship between the 
timeliness of IFR and firm size, type of industry, liquidity, ownership structure, board 
composition and board size. These results also indicate that firms with a high proportion 
of independent directors, a large number of board directors and a high free float disclose 
information on their websites in a more timely manner.  
3.3.2 International explanatory research 
Unlike most of the explanatory studies mentioned above, which examine a single 
country, one of the studies covered five developed countries. Allam and Lymer (2003) 
reviewed the analysis across five developed countries, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, 
the UK and the US.  This study focused on the largest companies in the five countries 
and addressed the relationship between the size of the companies and their reporting 
practices. Another international study of IFR was conducted by Debreceny et al. (2002), 
who examined the presentation and content of IFR at 660 large companies in 22 
countries, to identify the firm and environmental determinants of IFR. The study 
revealed that firm size, listing on US Stock Exchanges and technology were firm 
specific determinants of IFR. However, leverage and listing companies overseas on the 
securities markets were not significant. Similarly, Bollen et al. (2006) carried out a 
multinational empirical analysis, extending prior research on the use of IFR activities by 
investigating the quality determinants of IR websites in six countries (Australia, 
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, South Africa and the UK). Again, company size, 
level of internationalisation (foreign listing and foreign revenue), proportion of shares 
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available to individual investors and disclosure environment were all found to be 
significantly related to the extent of IR activities on the Internet.  
 
In research in less developed counties, Pervan (2006) investigated IFR practices on 
stock-market listed Croatian and Slovenian companies. A subsequent regression 
analysis showed that majority foreign ownership had a positive effect on IFR scores. 
For the Slovene sample, comprising 30 firms, the size, profitability and number of 
stockholders were not significant variables. However, official listing, proportion of 
market capitalisation and ratio of market to book values of shares were statistically 
significantly, and positively correlated with the IFR score.  
 
3.3.3 Other factors that determined the IFR 
Many prior studies have determined what factors determine IFR practice by conducting 
content analysis. However, a limited number of studies describe the influence of other 
parties, such as the stakeholders or the management team. Some additional studies 
applied questionnaires or interviews to understand the factors that motivate companies 
to disclose IFR from a stakeholder’s perspective, and these studies examined the 
reasons why affected companies’ decide not to disclose financial information on their 
websites.  
 
FASB (2000) offered a list of potential motives for companies to provide financial 
information on the Internet: 
• Reducing the cost of and time to distribute information; 
• Communicating with previously unidentified consumers of information; 
• Supplementing traditional disclosure practices; 
• Increasing the amount and type of data disclosed; and 
• Improving access to potential investors for small companies. 
 
Ettredge et al. (2001) also provided evidence based on the results of interviews with IR 
directors who see websites as a way of reducing administrative costs, and believe that 
online disclosure helps provide a common level of disclosure for all stakeholders. 
 
Héroux (2006) examined how different stakeholders and contextual factors influence 
structures related to website content management. The results obtained suggested that 
stakeholder orientation, structures related to website management, the size of the 
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organisation, and business sector, influence web content. Top management support, the 
resources allocated to websites and the size of the organisation also determine to what 
extent such structures develop (Héroux, 2006).  
 
Ali Khan and Ismail (2012b) used a survey questionnaire with four different use-
groups: academics, students, managers, and Bank offices in Malaysia. The outcome of 
the analysis revealed that three factors that are perceived as important for determining 
whether firms are likely to engage in IFR: the desire to enhance corporate image, having 
a technology development, and having competitors in the industry. One researcher (Ali 
Khan and Ismail, 2012a) focused on Bank officer’s views of IFR in Malaysia, they also 
collected data using a survey questionnaire of 110 bank officers. The results were 
similar to those of Ali Khan and Ismail (2012a, b). Additional research by Ali Khan and 
Omar (2013) examined 100 auditors’ views on IFR using questionnaires. They found 
three factors influenced companies to engage in IFR: desire to enhance corporate image, 
perceived stability and improvement in share prices, and the actions of competitors in 
the industry.  
 
Yap and Saleh (2011) interviewed ten senior managers in Malaysia using semi-
structured and in-depth questionnaires to ascertain their views and opinions on IFR. 
They identified 7 principal motivations for companies’ practice of IFR as follows: 
companies choosing to be more transparent about communicating company 
information, promoting products and services to create a good brand name in the 
industry, a strong belief in good corporate governance best practices, to compete for 
finance, to set a good example for other listed companies to follow, to project a good 
corporate image, and wanting to be known by all, and not just being an item on the 
Stock Exchange.  
 
Abu Ghazaleh et al. (2012) conducted interviews to examine attitudes towards 
companies disclosing IFR, many factors influencing top management’s decisions were 
highlighted. These factors included improving communication with stakeholders, 
improving companies’ images and reputations, industry practice, level of competition in 
the market, overseas activities and affiliations, the role of top management and the work 
environment, and re-branding. 
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3.4 Economic consequences of IFR 
The relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is an important 
topic in accounting theory and practice. Disclosure can refer either to mandatory or 
voluntary release of information about firms’ financial positions and performance. The 
literature on corporate disclosures suggests that corporations disclose information to 
lower the cost of capital, to affect stock prices and/or to reduce information asymmetry 
(FASB, 2001). Cooper (2006) note that greater disclosure could increase value because 
it causes investors to increase their estimates of expected cash flows.  
From a theoretical perspective, two distinct lines of research support the hypothesis that 
there is a negative connection between disclosure level and cost of equity capital: stock 
market liquidity and an estimation risk perspective (Hail, 2002). On the one hand, firms 
try to overcome the reluctance of potential investors to hold shares in illiquid markets 
by revealing private information and thereby reducing the cost of capital. On the other 
hand, firms provide better disclosure to reduce potential investors’ risk estimation with 
regard to the parameters of a security’s future return or payoff distribution (Hail, 2002). 
However, it is unclear to what extent accounting information or firm disclosures reduce 
non-diversifiable risks in economies with multiple securities (Lambert et al., 2007).  
The literature characterises ‘estimation risk’ as an additional element of risk that arises 
when investors are uncertain about the parameters of a security’s return or payoff 
distribution. First, estimation risk is non-diversifiable, such that the cost of equity 
capital is higher for low information (i.e. high estimation risk) securities. Second, 
traditional analysis of optimal portfolio choices and equilibrium pricing ignores 
estimation risk by treating the estimated parameters as if they are true (Botosan, 2006). 
As a result, estimation risk is not captured by market beta. Ultimately, this debate 
spurred Clarkson et al. (1996) to conclude that ‘the extent of the impact of estimation 
risk remains, fundamentally, an empirical question’ (p.79).  
Empirical support for the suggested link between disclosure quality and equity 
financing costs arises from a growing body of recent studies. Voluntary disclosure 
literature studies firms’ disclosure decisions and their effect on the type of information 
disclosed (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). Studies argue that there are potentially three 
types of capital market effects for firms that make extensive voluntary disclosures: 
improved liquidity for their stock in the capital market, reduced cost of capital, and 
increased information intermediation (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy et al., 
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1999). An experimental study from Bloomfield and Wilks (2000), showed that in a 
laboratory financial market, improved disclosure quality leads investors to demand 
shares at higher prices, thereby implicitly lowering the cost of capital (Graham et al., 
2005), and triggering increases following financial analysis (Healy and Palepu, 2000).  
However, proprietary costs (Wagenhofer, 1990) states that companies limit voluntary 
disclosure of information to financial markets because of the existence of disclosure- 
related proprietary costs. These costs include not only the expense incurred when 
preparing and disseminating information but also the costs derived from disclosing 
information that could be used by competitors and other parties in a way that is harmful 
to the reporting company. Accordingly, managers favour non-disclosure of information 
that might affect the competitive position of their company in the market, even if this 
might increase the associated cost of capital (Campbell et al., 2001). The existence of 
proprietary costs introduces some noise into the equilibrium model. According to 
Verrecchia (1983), the higher the proprietary costs associated with disclosure, the less 
negatively investors react to the withholding of relevant information, thus the less likely 
companies are to voluntarily disclose information. 
A number of quantitative studies have tested the relationship between level of 
disclosure and economic consequences, by examining data from several countries. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) concluded that type of disclosure influences cost of capital. 
They found positive, negative and insignificant associations between the cost of capital 
and various types of disclosure. Francis et al. (2008) found that firms with high earnings 
quality had more expansive voluntary disclosures than firms with poor earnings quality; 
and that there was no empirical link between the cost of capital and voluntary 
disclosure, when controlling for quality of earnings. Hassan et al. (2009) suggest that 
mandatory disclosure had a highly significant but negative relationship with firm value 
on the Egypt Stock Exchange (ESE), while voluntary disclosure had a positive but 
insignificant association with firm value. Both types of disclosure were considered 
together in the test, which resulted in a negative significant impact on firm value.  
Wang et al. (2008) found no evidence that Chinese listed companies benefit from 
extensive voluntary disclosure from having a lower cost of debt capital. In the same 
vein, Lan et al. (2013) suggested no significant relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the cost of equity in China. Similarly, Wang and Ali (2013) examined 
the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm value, and concluded that during 
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the financial crisis, voluntary disclosure continued to increase, although firm value had 
decreased. Chen et al. (2014) also found a negative relationship between firm value and 
voluntary disclosure for firms that relied heavily on connections in their value creation. 
Hence, when summarising the evidence from the above studies, the effect of disclosure 
upon firm value and cost of capital was still an empirical issue.  
Furthermore, several studies have investigated the economic consequences of IFR. In 
comparison with the paper-based disclosure, IFR has lower dissemination costs, 
improves the accessibility of information for all stakeholders, and increases the 
timeliness of public disclosures (Gerring et al., 2003). Despite these advantages, stock 
market failure to respond fully to the potential of IFR can be explained as evidence that 
the market believes traditional information sources already supply sufficient 
information to make investment decisions. Additionally, companies voluntarily disclose 
IFR to provide timely information to investors; thus, lack of timely information or a 
reputation for not providing precise and accurate information consistently, can lead to 
investors under-pricing a firm’s stock (Graham et al., 2005).  
 
This section will review studies that examine the impact of IFR on firm value, cost and 
capital and stock share prices. Silva and Alves (2004), Cormier et al. (2009a), Ezat 
(2010) and Garay et al. (2013) examined the relationship between level of IFR score 
and firm value (firm value measured by Tobin’s Q). Froidevaux (2004), Cormier et al. 
(2009b), Orens et al. (2010) and Ojah and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2012) examined the 
relationship between the level of IFR score and cost of finance. Hunter and Smith 
(2009), Lai et al. (2010) and Rahman (2010) investigated how IFR impacts stock prices.  
 
3.4.1 IFR and firm value 
Several researchers have examined IFR and firm value, and the majority of those tested 
the relationship between the IFR index and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Silva 
and Alves (2004) investigated the existence of an association between IFR by Latin 
American companies (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and Tobin’s Q. Multivariate 
analysis has made apparent the existence of a significant association between the 
voluntary disclosure of financial information and a firm’s value. Similarly, Garay et al. 
(2013) examined the relationship between an Internet-based corporate governance 
disclosure index in 2006, 2008 and 2010 and Tobin’s Q and firm performance (ROA) in 
Argentina, Brazil-Bovespa and Novomercado-Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The 
50 
result of Random-Effects (RE) and Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) show a 
positive and strong relationship between the corporate governance index and Tobin’s Q 
for firms in Latin American.  
 
Similarly, Cormier et al. (2009a) provided evidence on the impact of web-based social 
and human capital disclosure on firm value in Canada, and the results of simultaneous 
equation modelling indicated quantitative disclosure increases Tobin’s Q. Another study 
conducted by Ezat (2010) in Egypt examined the relationship between self-constructed 
Internet disclosure index and firm value. In this study, the Internet disclosure index 
contains content, timeliness disclosure, presentation and usability. Bivariate analysis 
and multivariate analysis also provides empirical evidence that corporate Internet 
reporting impacts positively on Tobin’s Q and Market/book ratio. 
 
3.4.2 IFR and cost of capital 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between voluntary disclosures and cost 
of capital, and the majority of their evidence supports the idea that voluntary disclosure 
reduces the cost of capital, with a number of exceptions (Francis et al., 2008; Wang et 
al., 2008; Lan et al., 2013). This section discusses some of these studies, considering the 
link between IFR and cost of capital. Froidevaux (2004) examined the investor relation 
section on US companies’ websites of to gain insight into the relation between the 
disclosure level of information and cost of equity capital. For 141 non-financial 
companies, Froidevaux (2004) found a negative and highly significant association 
between cost of equity capital and level of IFR.  
 
Similarly, Orens et al. (2010) examined the association of Web-based non-financial 
disclosure and a firm’s cost of finance in North American (Canada and the US) and 
Continental Europe (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands). Bivariate 
analysis and multivariate analysis provided empirical evidence of a negative association 
between the level of Web-based non-financial disclosure and the implied cost of equity 
capital in North American and Continental Europe. However, Continental European 
firms with higher levels of Web-based non-financial disclosure also appear to benefit 
from a lower information asymmetry and lower cost of capital; whereas, North 
American does not accrue the same benefit (Orens et al., 2010). Ojah and Mokoaleli-
Mokoteli (2012) investigated IFR and its economic impact in 44 developed and 
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developing countries, and found that increased IFR does enhance market efficiency, 
ultimately reducing the cost of capital.  
 
3.4.3 IFR and Stock prices 
Some studies have also investigated how IFR affects firm’s stock prices. Most of these 
studies used event study methods. The earliest study was by Hunter and Smith (2009), 
who used the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) to test the effects of two economic 
events on the market returns in firms that engage in IFR in emerging markets. They 
conducted a survey on Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa for different 
companies between 1991 and 1997. Using bivariate analysis, the findings reveal 
positive dispersions in market price and volume around the event dates. It can be 
concluded that the market performance of securities listed on emerging market Stock 
Exchanges improves as business reporting on the Internet becomes more popular.  
 
Another study by Lai et al. (2010) also investigated whether IFR provides financial 
information that has a significant impact on stock prices in Taiwan, an event study was 
used in this research and multiple regressions were used to analyse the data. The results 
show that the lag lengths of the firms with IFR are significantly less than those without 
IFR. Additionally, the results from the event study methodology showed cumulative 
abnormal returns of firms with IFR are significantly higher than those of firms without 
IFR (Lai et al., 2010).  
 
Similar results were also found by Rahman (2010), who examined the impact of IFR on 
stock prices at public companies incorporated on the Kompas 100 index on Indonesia’s 
Stock Exchange. This study employed an event study and multiple regressions to 
analyse the data. The results showed the level of IFR has a significant positive impact 
on abnormal return. However, the hierarchical regression test suggests an insignificant 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms on IFR companies’ stock prices  
3.5 Stakeholder’s perceptions of IFR 
 
3.5.1 Benefits of adopting IFR 
The dissemination of financial information using the Internet is already common 
practice for an increasing number of listed firms worldwide (Lymer at al., 1999). There 
are numerous benefits to adopting IFR, such as the ability of the Internet to supply 
timely and more thorough information at relatively low cost. Xiao (2002) argues that 
52 
the Internet enables both standardisation and customisation. It is a global network that 
makes physical and national boundaries less meaningful and is, thus, a seamless 
information delivery channel; it supports powerful hypertext and hypermedia 
presentations (Xiao et al., 2005). In addition, the Internet has the ability to provide 
information interactively. According to Beattie and Pratt (2003, p3), “Sophisticated, 
user-friendly software agents provide the user with effective decision-support facilities. 
Information can be made available more quickly, potentially, on a real-time basis. 
Moreover, the use of the Internet means there is no longer any significant technological 
or cost constraint on the amounts of information that can be disseminated”.  
 
Ali khan and Omer (2013) suggested the three benefits to IFR are that it helps users in 
decision-making process, provides accessibility to users and increases timeliness and 
efficiency. According to Hodge et al. (2006), technologies that allow alternative 
presentation formats for financial information could facilitate investor information 
gathering, improve disclosure transparency, and influence the investor decision making 
process. The IFR process currently used by businesses worldwide is known as ‘first 
level digital reporting’ (ICAEW, 2004); however, the second generation digital 
reporting technology currently in development is XBRL, which is anticipated to be 
more able to deliver on its potential (Dunne et al., 2013).  
 
3.5.2 Issues that arise when adopting IFR 
The use of IFR raises a number of additional issues, which include the resources 
required to develop and maintain websites, and the fact that information on websites can 
be vast and disorganised, blurring the line between audited and unaudited information, 
equity and efficiency of access, introduction of errors, security and integrity of 
information, and additional professional concerns (Oyelere et al., 2003).  
 
Ismail et al. (2007) identified potential problems associated with IFR. These problems 
can be particularly troublesome in cases where reporting objectives are poorly designed, 
where the data is improperly formatted, if the system is fraudulent, or if users are unable 
to utilise the data. Moreover, Lai et al. (2010) stated that there are no international 
accounting standards to regulate this kind of reporting; hence, the practice of financial 
reporting on the internet is based on common practices (Budisusetyo and Almilia, 
2008). Yap and Saleh (2011) concluded that issues associated with IFR are: lack of 
regulation of reporting, website security and timeliness of reporting.  
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Although there has been an increase in both the number of companies and types of 
information provided on the Internet, the quality of IFR from the perspective of users 
has improved only a little; this problem has been compounded because auditors have 
minimal control over web content or the changes that can be made to audited 
information (Khadaroo, 2005). A common feature of corporate websites is that 
unaudited information is incorporated with audited information in such a way that it is 
difficult for users to discriminate between the two (Fisher et al., 2004). Hodge (2001) 
investigated links from audited and unaudited information and found that users 
frequently misclassified unaudited information as audited, when moving between 
audited and unaudited information using hypertext. Another issue was the omission of 
audit reports. Hussey et al. (1998) reveals 15 percent of 63 UK FTSE companies 
omitted audit reports, offering no indication of whether the information presented had 
been audited. Ettredge et al. (2000) found evidence in a US study of selective omission 
of information pertaining to audited financial statements. 
 
Fisher et al. (2004) revealed that a numbers of factors specifically associated with IFR 
have significant implications for auditors, such as the appropriate responsibilities of 
auditors and the nature of audit reporting in this environment. There appears to be a 
strong argument for auditors to become responsible for checking that audited financial 
statements correspond with those published on corporate websites. Lymer and 
Debreceny (2003) found various audit standards bodies recognise the need for further 
guidance to auditors on the implications of IFR.  
 
In respect of XBRL development: once XBRL technology is adopted by the majority of 
listed companies and required, investors are likely to demand assurances on the tagging 
process. Although there has been growing awareness surrounding assurance issues 
related to XBRL, current audit practices and standards do not provide the necessary 
guidance for the provision of assurance of XBRL related documents (Boritz and No, 
2009). 
 
3.5.3 Stakeholder’s perceptions of IFR 
More recently, a number of studies have focused on users’ perspectives (Debreceny et 
al., 2001; Beattie & Pratt, 2003; Dull et al., 2003; Gowthorpe 2004; Hodge & Pronk, 
2006; Hassink et al., 2005; Quagli et al., 2007; Ghani & Jusoff, 2009; Rowbottom & 
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Lymer 2009, 2010). These studies examine users’ information needs, format reporting 
preferences and decision-making perspectives, as well as stakeholder’s perceptions of 
IFR.  
 
Debreceny et al. (2001) investigated what attributes the end-user of financial-reporting 
websites considers most important. In terms of content, respondents rated traditional 
content elements more highly than forward-looking information. Quagli et al. (2005) 
examined expert’s behaviour when visiting websites to acquire financial information 
about listed companies, and found that financial news websites play an important role in 
expert user’s behaviour. Rowbottom and Lymer (2009) suggest professional users 
characterised by professional investors, creditors, accounting firms and lawyers make 
greater use of Annual reports, but less use of sustainability reporting information and 
other online disclosures. In another study carried out by Rowbottom and Lymer (2010), 
they found key financial statements, notes, and segmental analysis generate the most 
information requests and narrative reporting information tends to be more popular 
among online users than management commentaries or more detailed narratives.  
 
Bell and Tang (1999) conducted a study to discover the views of users regarding 
companies’ websites. In general, the survey found that those websites that rated highly 
(above average) were characterised by ease of access, content and structure. Debreceny 
et al. (2001) propose that financial reporting websites should present information 
primarily in text and graphical format. Uses of multimedia, such as audio and video 
clips, are of secondary importance. Users might also like a table of contents to navigate 
within the website. Furthermore, a hypertext system of information, such as electronic 
financial statements, provides users with the ability to aggregate disaggregated data. 
 
Beattie and Pratt (2003) reported the findings of a UK study into the views of various 
user groups, preparers and auditors regarding specific proposals for change and newly 
emerging practices. All groups found navigational aids, search aids and file formats at 
least partially useful; especially global navigation aids. Preferences for certain file 
formats varied across the groups. Hodge and Pronk (2006) found professional investors 
prefer to view PDF-formatted quarterly reports and tend to rely directly on financial 
statements, compared with nonprofessional investors who prefer to view HTML-
formatted reports and have a tendency to rely more on management’s discussion of 
quarterly results. 
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Ghani and Jusoff (2009) examined another aspect of IFR; that was, whether public 
accounting practitioners’ work experience and familiarity with presentation formats 
influences their preferred presentation format. Their results demonstrated that 
familiarity with the two presentation formats, Portable Document Format (PDF) and 
Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL), does not influence users’ 
preferences; however, familiarity with Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML) was an 
important determinant of preference for HTML.  
 
To discover how the presentation format of information affects user’s decisions, Dull et 
al. (2003) examined the effect of different presentation formats on users’ judgements by 
studying the effect of hypertext links on their decisions and predictions. They reported 
no differences when using financial statements prepared with or without hypertext links; 
however, for small companies, significant differences were found in terms of 
predictions, the amount of information accessed, and the time taken to make decisions. 
These findings imply that under some circumstances, the use of hypertext links in 
financial statements can affect users’ judgement processes (Dull et al., 2003). 
 
With regard to the effectiveness of IFR, Gowthorpe (2004) studied the usefulness of the 
Internet for communicating corporate financial information to stakeholders. Assessment 
of stakeholder requirements produced random results, but was informed in many cases 
by an intention to correct long-standing inequities in the provision of corporate data. 
Since the assessment of needs is largely intuitive, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness 
of the Internet as a mechanism for communicating financial information. 
 
Another study by Hassink et al. (2007) explored the capacity of the Internet to act as a 
mechanism to enhance communications between companies and investors. Their results 
suggested that even the largest companies in the six countries they reviewed encounter 
serious difficulties when adopting email as a mechanism for symmetrical 
communication with individual investors. The results of this study showed that the 
company did not fully benefit from the Internet as a mechanism for restructuring 
communications with investors.  
 
Adams and Frost (2006) examined the use of the web as a means of stakeholder 
engagement, and as part of a strategy for communicating to stakeholders. They observed 
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only limited understanding of the advantages offered when using the web as a 
communication strategy to cover all aspects of corporate performance. The study also 
found that the lack of resources made available for web-based communication limited 
its potential. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) investigated stakeholder’s perceptions of IFR 
practice in Jordan by interviewing 12 heads of different departments listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange. The interviewees pointed out the importance of having a 
website as a tool for building relationships with stakeholders, suggesting this is 
generally perceived as a way to strengthen relationships that already exist.  
 
A few of the researchers explained why some companies are yet to adopt IFR, despite 
its relative acceptance. Moradi et al. (2011) suggest financial managers are unwilling to 
guarantee the availability of timely financial information, and that this is one of the 
reasons behind the failure to set up IFR. Additional explanatory factors raised include 
the lack of a legal obligation to release information on Stock Exchange based 
companies’ websites, the lack of a standard for IFR, some managers’ unfamiliarity with 
the advantages of IFR, and problems related to tendering internet services such as low 
internet speed, internet disconnections, etc.  
 
Ali Khan and Ismail (2012a) examined the lack of IFR practices in survey 
questionnaires sent to scholars in Malaysian, they concluded that three factors inhibit 
firms from engaging in IFR; the need to keep information updated to be of use, the 
absence of legal requirement, and an unwillingness to be transparent. Ali Khan and 
Ismail (2012b) also investigated the four users’ group using questionnaires and found 
required expertise from the company, the need for updated information to be of use, and 
concern over the security of information are the top three factors inhibiting firms from 
engaging in IFR. Ali Khan and Omer (2013) examined auditor’s views with regard to 
IFR, and concluded that the top three factors discouraging companies that do not engage 
in IFR are: it requires expertise, concerns over disclosure of propriety information, and 
concerns over security of information. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) identified further 
reasons why companies do not disclose IFR using semi-structured interviews. These 
suggest the absence of legal requirements, and the fact that top management are not 
convinced that the Jordanian community is ready to depend on the Internet for the 
acquisition of information.  
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3.6 Research of IFR in China 
There are several studies regarding voluntary disclosure in China, and these will be 
evaluated in this section. Ferguson et al. (2002) examined the impact of international 
capital market pressure on voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of formerly wholly 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). 
They found that SOEs disclosed significantly more strategic and more financial 
information than other HKSE firms. Wang et al. (2008) also investigated the 
determinants and consequences of voluntary disclosure in China; finding that the level 
of voluntary disclosure relates positively to the proportion of state ownership, foreign 
ownership, firm performance measured by return on equity, and the reputation of the 
engaged auditor. However, these studies were not concerned with voluntary reporting 
on the Internet. 
With regard to voluntary disclosure on the Internet, the number of studies in China is 
limited. There is one descriptive study, which focused on China listed companies and 
was carried out by Feng and Xu (2008), and two international comparison studies by 
Shukla and Gekara (2010) and Feng and Wan (2013). A further three explanatory 
studies were carried out by Xiao et al. (2004), He and Zhang (2007), and Chou (2008).  
Feng and Xu (2008) investigated items of relevance to Investor Relations on the 
websites of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange. A website-based investor relations index, 
WEIBX, was constructed to compare IR efforts between companies in all three markets. 
WEIBX considered both IR-related format and content item numbers, with different 
weights assigned to each items. Data were collected from 50 Companies listed on the 
SHSE, 50 Companies on the SZSE, and 50 companies on the HKSE (all blue chip 
companies) between December 2007 and February 2008. The results showed that, 
despite some rapid progress, both in formats and content, sample companies from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are generally underdeveloped compared to 
those from Hang Seng companies.  
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Table 3.3 Prior IFR research in China 
 
Author(s) Date of Data 
Collection 
Sample Number of 
Checklist Items 
Dependent Variables Significant Independent 
Variables 
Xiao et al. (2004) August 2002  300 largest Chinese 
list companies 
82 39 CRSC-required items  
17 voluntary items 
24 Presentation 
For the 203 companies   with the 
website 
Size (+) 
Leverage (+) 
IT Industry (+) 
Legal person Ownership (+) 
Auditor type (+) 
Independent directors (+) 
Government 
agency’s share ownership (--) 
State share ownership (--) 
ROA (--) 
FSHARE (--) 
He and Zhang (2007) August and 
November, 2004 
774 A-share 
companies list in 
CSSE 
18 8 CRSC-Required  
6 Voluntary 
4 Format 
For 596 companies with website 
Size (+) 
 Management share (+) 
IT Industry (+) 
Auditing type (+) 
Auditing opinion (+) 
Biggest shareholder (--) 
Circulating shareholder (--) 
Independent director (-) 
ROA/ROE(--) 
Feng and Xu (2008) December 2007 
to February 2008 
50 Companies list in 
SHSE, 50 Companies 
in SZSE, and 50 
Companies in HKSE 
32  10 stage 1, web presence 
14 stage 2, investor interested 
ones 
9 stage 3, internet featured and 
no 
59 
(All blue chip 
companies). 
interactive ones 
 
Chou (2008) October 2006 to 
February 2007 
1057 companies list 
in SHSE and SZSE 
(816 companies with 
website) 
34 10 CSRC-required  
22 Voluntary  
2 Web management 
 
For 816 companies with website  
Size (+) 
Companies growth Tobin 
Q (+) 
Performance (+) 
Leverage (--) 
Stock return (--) 
State- share ownership (--) 
Private block shareholders (+) for 
low privatization companies but 
not for highly privatized 
companies (--) 
Independent director (--) 
 
(Note: The above table was created by the author) 
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In addition, Shukla and Gekara (2010) carried out an international comparative study to 
investigate the utilisation of web-based facilities by companies in India and China for 
communicating information. They surveyed Fortune 500 companies listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the National Stock Exchange (NSE) in India and the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in China, from 1st September 2008 to 5th November, 2008. 
A scoring scheme, including 20 attributes, was developed to measure the level of IFR 
and check the degree of IFR across the various sectors. Of the 500 sample companies, 
416 (83.20%) Indian companies had active websites and of those 409 (93.31%) 
disclosed their current year’s annual report on their websites. Furthermore, 125 
(30.05%) also included auditors’ reports from the previous year. In the other case, 402 
(80.40%) of the Fortune 500 companies in China had active websites, 400 (99%) 
disclosed their current year’s annual reports on their websites and 23 (5.72%) also 
included auditors’ reports from the previous year. The study shows web based corporate 
reporting is relatively high in Asia’s two emerging economies.  
 
Another comparative study was carried out by Feng and Wan (2013), who examined the 
largest 30 company websites listed in the US (Dow Jones Industry), UK (FTSE100), 48 
listed companies in Hong Kong (Han Seng) and 40 listed companies in Mainland China 
(SSE/SZSE). A WIR level evaluation index comprising 82 items was constructed. 
Website data was collected from January to July 2012. The results indicated listed 
companies’ WIR levels were very similar between Hong Kong and mainland China, as 
well as between the US and UK; meanwhile, companies listed in the US and UK have 
much higher levels of WIR.  
 
With regard to explanatory studies, Xiao et al. (2004) surveyed IFR use for the 
dissemination of financial information by the 300 largest Chinese listed companies. 
Seven hypotheses were generated based on agency theory, signalling theory, 
institutional theories, and innovation diffusion theory. The authors developed a 
disclosure index of 82 items, including 58 items of disclosure content and 24 items 
regarding presentation format. Content items included disclosure of information 
required by the CSRC and non-CSRC required items. Presentation format items concern 
how the information is presented and its convenience (Xiao et al., 2004). Xiao et al. 
(2004) analysed the factors behind Chinese listed companies’ voluntary adoption of 
Internet-based financial reporting, and the extent of their disclosure. The influence of 
share ownership, independent directors, auditor type, foreign listings, industry and the 
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influence of CSRC was assessed. Univariate and multivariate analysis demonstrated 
positive effects for foreign listing, the auditor and industry, the proportion of 
independent directors, and legal person share ownership. However, no link was found 
between the state owned share and voluntary disclosure on the Internet, and the results 
were not in line with Ferguson et al. (2002) or Wang et al. (2008).  
 
Another explanatory study was carried out by He and Zhang (2007), to examine IFR 
among Chinese listed companies. An IFR disclosure index, encompassing 14 items of 
disclosure content and four items of format was created. The sample consisted of 774-
A-Share companies listed on the SHSE during August and November 2004. In total, 
596 firms were found to have websites on which financial information is disclosed. 
Firm size, auditing type, industry type (IT industry), and corporate governance, 
including independent directors and managerial ownership, were also significantly 
related to IFR. Profitability and stock structure were not found to be indicators of IFR. 
 
The final explanatory study presented was carried out by Chou (2008), to examine the 
association between ownership structure and IFR disclosure by 1,056 listed companies 
at different stages of privatisation in China. Data available on the Internet, and related to 
1,056 companies listed on the Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen Exchange of 2006 was 
collected. A total of 22 disclosure items, including four categories, were obtained for 
content analysis. The results show that state ownership will curtail the extent of Web 
disclosure in the post-privatisation stage, and that private block shareholding is 
positively correlated with Web disclosure for low-privatisation firms, but not for highly 
private companies. The findings indicate that state and private block holders have 
diverse Web reporting policies during ownership evolution, and that information 
asymmetry may exist in the post-privatisation stage.  
 
This research showed IFR is increasing rapidly, although usage varies between 
countries. Feng and Xu (2008) concluded that despite some rapid progress, both in 
format and content, SSE 50 index companies and Shenzhen components index 
companies are generally underdeveloped relative to Hang Seng companies. A 
comparative study conducted by Shukla and Gekara (2010) offered an international 
comparison of IFR in China and India, and the US, UK, Hong Kong and China. Shukla 
and Gekara (2010) suggested Indian companies and Fortune 500 companies in China 
are at similar stage, with regard to IFR on their websites. Conversely, Feng and Wan 
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(2013) concluded that US and UK listed companies have much higher levels of IFR 
than mainland China and Hong Kong listed companies.  
 
With regard to explanatory studies, the size of a firm is a consistent factor relating to 
IFR in all three studies. Xiao et al. (2004) and He and Zhang (2007) both concluded that 
industry type, auditor type, and the proportion of independent directors are significantly 
related to IFR, but not the performance of the companies. Xiao et al. (2004) and Chou 
(2008) both suggested leverage is significant when related to IFR in China. Firms’ 
performance was not found to be significant by Xiao et al. (2004) or Chou (2008). The 
determinants of IFR overlap those found to influence IFR practices of the companies in 
the previous studies (firm size, industry type, auditor type), and additional factors offer 
no support as determinants of IFR (firm performance). With respect to the unique 
institutional factors that affect IFR in China, Xiao et al. (2004) and Chou (2008) 
investigated how ownership structure determines IFR on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
Xiao et al. (2004) reported negative efforts due to state ownership, but there are positive 
impacts on IFR from legal person ownership and foreign share ownership. Similarly, 
Chou (2008) concluded that state ownership will reduce the extent of IFR at the post-
privatisation stage and private block shareholding is positive relative to IFR for low 
privatisation firms, but not for highly privatised companies.  
 
3.7 Research gaps from prior studies 
Gaps in previous studies can be categorised according to three main areas. Firstly, a 
large number of descriptive and explanatory studies have dealt with IFR in developed 
countries. However, little research has examined IFR in China (Xiao et al., 2004; He 
and Zhang, 2007). Xiao et al. (2004) surveyed IFR use for the dissemination of financial 
information by the 300 largest Chinese listed companies in 2001, but ignored smaller 
and medium sized Chinese listed companies. He and Zhang (2007) examined the IFR 
by 774 Chinese listed companies in 2004; however, He and Zhang (2007) created an 
IFR disclosure index which encompassing 14 items of disclosure content and four items 
of format. There is a dearth of studies covering more comprehensive samples and a new 
approach is used to assess the level of IFR on their websites. Empirical studies confirm 
the role of corporate governance in determining corporate transparency (Beasley, 1996; 
Gul et al., 2010). To entirely reform the capital market, the Chinese government has had 
to implement procedures to convert state-owned shares to tradable shares (CSRC, 
2005). Thus, this unique setting in China provides an excellent perspective from which 
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to examine the relationship between corporate governance and IFR empirically in a 
market dominated by state owned enterprises. There are also limited recent empirical 
studies in the Chinese context. Findings from this study could therefore contribute to the 
development of corporate transparency.  
Secondly, prior research suggests the return required by investors on their investments 
reduces correspondingly with improvements in the voluntary disclosure of valuable 
information by the firms in question (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Silva and Alves 
(2004) and Garay et al. (2013) reported on the existence of a significant association 
between IFR and firm value in Latin America. Conversely, some recent studies have 
indicated that voluntary disclosure lowers the cost of capital and increases firm value, 
and that this may not apply to all stock markets. Lai et al. (2010) examined the 
economic consequences of IFR in Taiwan, and found that the stock prices of IFR firms 
change more quickly than those of non-IFR firms. There is a lack of studies concerning 
the economic consequences of IFR in the context of main land China.  
Finally, the literature review of prior literature reveals the majority of studies have 
applied quantitative techniques to identify the factors influencing IFR. Only recently, 
few researchers have applied qualitative techniques to IFR studies. AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2012) investigated stakeholder’s perceptions of IFR practice in Jordan by interviewing 
12 heads of different departments listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. That left scope 
for research on IFR to include qualitative analysis to investigate the perception of 
persons positioned to influence IFR in the context of China. Personal interviews with 
market participants have identified the factors influencing IFR. This results in factors 
being not so easily captured from quantitative analysis. Information obtained in 
interviews could provide further insight into those factors influencing IFR practice.  
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This chapter reviewed previous studies of companies’ IFR. It identified four types of 
IFR research: IFR descriptive studies, IFR explanatory studies, the economic 
consequences of IFR disclosure, and stakeholder perceptions of IFR. IFR studies in 
China were also reviewed and the gap in previous studies in this area was identified. As 
the majority of studies have focused on the largest companies on the Stock Exchanges, 
this current study aims to address these by examining the use of the Internet for 
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disseminating financial information amongst the 150 biggest and smallest companies 
listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange. It will investigate a more comprehensive range 
of variables in association with IFR in China; especially corporate governance factors. 
A disclosure index will be created to measure IFR practices, which include total, 
content, presentation, timeliness, and usability. The review of prior literature reveals the 
majority of IFR studies have applied quantitative techniques to identify those factors 
that determine IFR, and leave room for the current study to extend this by examining 
additional management factors determining IFR disclosure qualitatively. The literature 
review suggests a lack of studies in regard to the economic consequences of IFR, 
especially on Chinese Stock Exchanges; thus, the economic consequences of IFR 
disclosure will be examined in this study. Furthermore, the current study will 
investigate participants’ perceptions of IFR, which will contribute to a better 
understanding of IFR behaviour.  
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Chapter 4 Theories and Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and explains relevant theoretical frameworks regarding IFR 
research. Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 150) state that:  
The study of accounting is a social science. An accounting theory that seeks to 
explain and predict accounting cannot divorce accounting research from the 
study of people. The contracting approach to studying accounting requires 
researchers to understand the incentives of contracting parties. 
 
Accounting theories aim to provide a coherent and systematic framework for 
investigating, understanding and/or developing various accounting practices (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2011). This study uses agency theory, signalling theory, a cost and 
benefit approach, and institutional theory, to explain and predict IFR. Based on those 
theories, the researcher developed 11 hypotheses to examine the factors informing IFR 
in relation to Chinese listed companies. After which 1 hypothesis, covering the 
economic consequences of IFR and its effect on Chinese listed companies, were 
generated. Finally, a summary will be presented.  
 
4.2 Theories 
 
4.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory has been widely used by scholars in the fields of accounting, economics, 
finance, marketing, political science, organisational behaviour and sociology. The 
origins of agency theory date to the 1960s and early 1970s, when economists explored 
risk sharing problems, noting that they arise when cooperating parties have different 
attitudes toward risk (Arrow, 1971). Agency theory broadened risk-sharing literature to 
include the agency problems that occur when cooperating parties pursue different goals 
and divisions of labour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory is most concerned 
with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first agency 
problem arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict, and (b) 
when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually 
doing (Eisenhardt, 1989). Table 4.1 provides an overview of agency theory: 
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Table 4.1 Agency Theory Overview 
 
Key idea  Principal-agent relationships should reflect 
efficient organisation of information and risk-
bearing costs 
Unit of analysis  Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions  Self-interest assumptions, Bounded rationality, 
Risk aversion 
Organisational assumptions  Partial goal conflict among participants 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and 
agent 
Information assumption  Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problem Agency (moral hazard and adverse problems 
selection), Risk sharing 
Problem domain  Relationships in which the principal and 
domain agent have somewhat differing goals 
and risk preferences (e.g. compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression 
management, whistle-blowing, vertical 
integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
In the context of accounting, agency theory is a key theory applied to help explain and 
predict manager’s selection of particular accounting methods, such as voluntary 
disclosure, voluntary appointment of auditors, and corporate lobbying about proposed 
accounting standards (Kelly, 1983). According to Lambert (2001), agency theory has 
been attractive to accounting researchers, as it makes it possible to incorporate conflicts 
of interest, incentive problems, and mechanisms for controlling incentive problems 
explicitly.  
 
Agency theory is concerned with the principal agent problem, as associated with the 
separation of ownership and control of a firm, and includes an explanation for how 
equity ownership by managers aligns managers’ interests with those of owners (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling defined the agency relationship (1976, 
p.308) thus: “A contract under which one or more (principals) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent”. Within agency theory, it is assumed that 
individuals always act with self-interest; thus, precipitators of conflicts incur agency 
costs, which they then have an incentive to reduce (Morris, 1987). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) discussed three types of agency costs: (1) the bonding expenditures of the agent; 
(2) the monitoring expenditures of the principals; and (3) the residual loss, which 
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represent the differences in wealth between the agent and principals. Morris (1987) 
observed two sets of agency costs: the first is the decline in a firm’s value when 
shareholders perceive that managers are not pursuing their interests, especially in 
situations where managers are acting inefficiently or choosing insufficiently profitable 
projects, and secondly, the costs of monitoring managers and insuring they pursue 
shareholders’ interest. It is apparent that the agency costs of debt are borne by equity 
holders, and that these include problems of excess dividend payments, the issue of 
senior ranking debt, asset substitution, and underinvestment (Smith and Warner, 1979), 
together with bankruptcy and reorganisation costs.  
 
When applying agency theory, a well-functioning firm is one that monitors and 
minimises its agency costs. Devices for monitoring and bonding managers include the 
production of accounting reports, writing of restrictive covenants in debt contracts, and 
management bonus plans geared to reported profits (Morris, 1987). Fama (1980) 
discussed the role of efficient capital and labour markets as information mechanisms 
used to control the self-serving behaviour of top executives. Belkaoui and Karpik 
(1989) suggest that agents have an incentive to disclose more information in order to 
reduce interference from principals. In addition, when agents perform well, they may 
also use disclosure as a way to improve their status. Increased shareholder monitoring 
or controlling of shareholder activities could reduce agency problems. As a result, 
managers are expected to disclose more information so that the agency costs involved in 
monitoring activities can be reduced (Schipper, 1981). In addition, voluntary disclosure 
can also mitigate the agency problem, as managers can then disclose more voluntary 
information, thereby reducing agency costs (Barako et al., 2006) and also convincing 
external users that managers are acting in an optimal way (Watson et al., 2002). IFR 
includes voluntary forms of disclosure, which help reduce agency costs by 
disseminating timely information, and using different presentation types as readily 
accessible tools. 
 
Even though agency theory addressed an issue which has been central to the 
organisation since the late 19th century, it has received a number of criticisms, 
especially regarding its primary assumptions, and ontological and epistemological 
issues (Armstrong, 1991). Tinker et al. (1982) have commented that agency theory does 
not take into account the institutional background. Ogden (1993) also adds that agency 
theory seems to oversimplify complex business relationships. Agency models derive 
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from normative implications and are not bias-free, especially in terms of the bias 
associated with researcher’s opinions (Whittington, 1987). 
4.2.2 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory originated as an explanation for how decision-makers interpret and 
respond in settings where information is incomplete and asymmetrically distributed 
between the parties to a transaction (Spence, 1973, 1974). Spence (1976) explains 
information asymmetry as having two aspects. The first aspect concerns difficulty 
differentiating high quality products from other products. This may result in the 
withdrawal of products from the market by sellers of high quality items. The second 
aspect is a signalling process, which represents the efforts of sellers when conveying 
information to buyers about the superiority of their products. This theory relies on the 
premise that one firm, such as a seller, has a comprehensive body of information, while 
external parties, such as buyers, rely on what the seller is willing to share (Nelson, 
1970). According to Morris (1987), signalling theory addresses problems of information 
asymmetry in the markets, and uses information signalling to demonstrate how this 
asymmetry can be reduced.  
Signalling theory is similar to agency theory in that it recognises the separation of 
ownership and control in modern corporations and that market pressures on 
management will motivate management to disclose information material to investors 
(Ross, 1979). However, one of the assumptions of this theory, which makes it slightly 
different from agency theory, is that there are signalling costs that are inversely related 
to the quality of information (Morris, 1987). In the financial market, some players have 
access to better quality information than others. Consequently, the best informed players 
are in a superior position from which to make economic decisions, as they have the 
necessary information to obtain greater benefits than other players from contractual 
relationships (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Verrecchia (1983) suggested that 
companies signal certain information to investors to show their superiority in the 
market, to attract further investments and enhance a favourable reputation. Trueman 
(1986) argues that this incentivises talented mangers to make voluntary earnings 
forecasts. 
Voluntary disclosure is one means of signalling, and can be a way to measure a 
company’s quality and performance. Frequently, companies disclose more information 
than is mandatory by law to signal that they are better (Campbell et al., 2001). 
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Similarly, Xiao et al. (2004) conclude that signalling theory suggests voluntary 
disclosures are one means by which companies or managers can distinguish themselves 
from others in regard to such dimensions as quality and performance. Corporation 
information can be used as a mechanism (signal) to provide markets with additional 
information about the economic reality of a company, so that investors’ expectations 
can be consequently changed. Voluntary disclosure is one possible way of achieving 
this distinction (Kelly, 1994). When a company believe its shares are mispriced, it may 
rely on signalling incentives, and disclose information that is more detailed, to adjust 
the share price to its ‘true’ value; thereby avoiding undervaluation by the market (Healy 
and Palepu, 1993). Companies may suffer from a devaluing of their reputation if they 
fail to disclose bad news in a timely manner (Skinner, 1994).  
 
In respect of IFR, companies can disclose more information on their websites to 
distinguish themselves from their competitors. The Internet, in particular, provides 
companies with a platform to disclose information in a timely manner to meet investor’s 
needs. In addition, Craven and Marston (1999, p. 323) state that: “The very use of the 
Internet might itself be a signal of high quality”. Growing belief that online disclosure is 
a sign of high quality and good performance may encourage additional firms to use the 
same procedures and disclose information to their stakeholders (Ezat, 2010).  
 
Morris (1987) concluded that a considerable amount of overlap exists between agency 
theory and signalling theory; for example, rational behaviour is common to both. 
Information asymmetry in signalling theory is implied by positive monitoring costs in 
agency theory. Quality can be defined in terms of agency theory variables, and 
signalling costs are implicit in some bonding devices associated with agency. However, 
information asymmetry is a necessary condition of signalling theory, although it is not a 
necessary condition of agency theory. Furthermore, signalling theory differs from 
agency theory, in that there are signalling costs, which are inversely related to the 
quality of the information provided (Morris, 1987). Signalling theory suggests that 
managers tend to present quality information to minimise signalling costs. 
 
Disclosures can have public relations benefits. Investors and creditors gain an 
impression of a firm’s openness and forthrightness (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). 
Companies may improve their image and reputation by disclosing more voluntary 
information.  
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4.2.3 Cost and benefit approach 
 
Boardman et al. (2005, p18) described the Cost and Benefit Analysis approach as:  
Providing a framework for measuring efficiency, it can be thought of as a 
situation in which resources, such as land, labour, and capital, are developed in 
their highest valued uses in terms of the goods and services they create. In 
situations in which analysts care only about efficiency, the Cost and Benefit 
Analysis approach provides a method for making direct comparisons among 
alternative policies.  
 
Additionally, Gray and Roberts (1989) noted that disclosure choices are usually 
determined by managerial assessments of the costs and benefits of proposed alternative 
disclosures, therefore, managers’ decisions to voluntary disclose supplementary 
information depends on balancing the incentives (benefits) and the constraints (costs) of 
increasing information disclosure. The major costs and benefits derived from 
information disclosure can be summarised as follows: 
 
1) Cost of capital: Firms benefit when disclosure reduces their capital costs. 
Disclosure accomplishes this by enabling investors and creditors to understand the 
economic risk of investment (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). Sweeney (1994, p286) 
argued that many companies “realise that institutional investors prefer to put money 
into companies that provide lots of information and that good investor relations can 
help their stock prices.” Bushman and Smith (2001) suggested financial accounting 
information also enhances financial performance. Financial information assists 
investors and managers in recognising and realising investment opportunities, 
leading to value creation with less error, thereby reducing estimation risks and the 
cost of capital. Companies might also increase voluntary disclosure to raise capital 
more cheaply from the markets (Marston, 1999). This is because voluntary 
disclosure helps mitigate information asymmetries among informed and uniformed 
investors.  
 
2) Cost of developing and presenting disclosure: Firms pay for the costs of disclosure, 
including the costs of gathering, processing, auditing and disseminating 
information. Since costs affect cash flow, firms have an interest in minimising the 
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costs of disclosure, especially for voluntary disclosure such as IFR. On the other 
hand, one of the main benefits of IFR is the savings made in the costs of production 
and distribution as associated with print-based annual reports (Oyelere et al., 2003).  
 
3) Political costs: The political cost theory suggests that managers are concerned with 
political considerations, including preventing explicit or implicit taxes, or other 
regulatory actions (Watts and Zimmermann 1978). According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), political costs depend on a firm’s size. Larger companies with 
high profits are more likely to increase their level of voluntary information 
disclosure to enhance their corporate reputation and public image, as they are more 
publicly visible.  
 
4) Litigation costs: Litigation can arise from allegations of insufficient information 
disclosure, or from allegations of misleading disclosure (Elliott and Jacobson, 
1994). The threat of shareholder litigation can have two effects on managers’ 
disclosure decisions: First, legal actions taken against managers for inadequate or 
untimely disclosures can encourage firms to increase their voluntary disclosure. 
Second, litigation can potentially reduce managers’ incentive to provide disclosure, 
particularly in terms of forward-looking information (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Wagenhofer (2007) stated that additional disclosure on the Internet can result in 
legal concerns.  
 
5) Proprietary costs: Some researchers have suggested that firms’ decisions to disclose 
information to investors are influenced by the concern that disclosures can damage 
their competitive position in the market (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990; 
Gigler, 1994). Such information can include details about technological and 
managerial innovation, strategies, plans and tactics, and information about 
operations, etc. Verrecchia (2001) and Dye (2001) stated that the proprietary costs 
hypothesis assumes no conflicts between managers and shareholders; thus, 
predicting voluntary disclosure is always credible. Verrecchia (1983) shows that 
proprietary costs increase the range of possible interpretations drawn by investors 
from a manager’s decision not to disclose information. Similarly, Hayes and 
Lundholm (1996) predict that managers also mitigate the potential cost of 
proprietary information through non-disclosure. Linsley and Shrives (2000) assume 
non-disclosure can be explained by proprietary cost theory, recognising that 
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companies will not disclose information if they judge it useful to their competitors. 
Armitage and Marston (2008), in their study of general corporate disclosure 
practices, also found that companies prefer not to disclose information that could be 
useful to their competitors.  
Table 4.2 Cost and benefit framework  
Theories Cost  Benefit  
Cost of capital  Lower cost of capital 
Cost of developing and 
presenting disclosure 
Financial cost  
Political costs Political costs  
Litigation costs Litigation costs  
Proprietary costs Proprietary costs  
 
According to the cost and benefit approach, the decisions made by companies to 
disclose IFR are based on multiple factors. As IFR is one type of voluntary disclosure, a 
companies’ decision to disclose IFR, is generally taken according to the benefits and 
costs anticipated. Gray and Roberts (1989) mentioned that companies might make a 
voluntary disclosure if the weighted benefits exceed the weighted costs. This was 
confirmed by Bhushan and Lessard (1992, p152), who stated, “It is now generally 
recognised that a cost-benefit analysis is required, weighting the benefits of additional 
disclosure to investors against the costs, both direct and indirect, to issuers”. Similarly, 
Cooke (1992) assumes that when companies make a voluntary disclosure this means 
that the benefits of disclosure exceed anticipated costs. Healy and Palepu (1993) 
acknowledge this trade off, stating that managers must decide about how much 
information comprises sufficient disclosure. Companies must balance their provision of 
IFR, as there is a potential benefit to reducing the cost of capital, while ensuring that 
they do not divulge too much information about political costs, litigation costs and costs 
that damage their competitive position.  
 
4.2.4 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory seeks to investigate how norms, routines, rules, attitudes, and 
structures become engrained within an organisation. Scott (2008, p 460) states: 
Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It 
considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and 
routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. 
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It is understood that institutional theory has a long history in areas such as economics, 
sociology, and political science (Scott, 2008). Old institutionalism emphasises the 
political aspects, which result in organisations being impacted more by the vested 
interests of parties than a sense of legitimacy (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Conversely, new institutionalism examines legitimacy as a key factor of interest to 
organisations, finding a need to develop practices to address this concern (Selznick, 
1996). New institutionalism is a development in organisational theory, with great 
relevance for accounting research (Carruthers, 1995). New institutionalists view 
accounting practices as one aspect among a larger set of features that can legitimise 
organisations through the construction of an appearance of rationality and efficiency. 
New institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is 
based on the premise that organisations respond to pressures from their institutional 
environments and adopt structures and/or procedures, which are socially accepted as 
appropriate organisational choices.  
 
Institutional theory ((Meyer and Rowan (1977); DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Zucher 
(1977, 1987)) has been adopted by some accounting researchers, and provides a 
complementary perspective to researchers who investigate voluntary corporate reporting 
practices, in understanding how organisations understand and respond to social change 
and institutional pressures and expectations, it explains that managers will be subject to 
pressure to change, or adopt, certain voluntary corporate reporting practices. (Deegan 
and Unerman, 2011, p. 296).  Institutionalisation of management practices may also be 
viewed as “a process entailing the creation of reality” (Scott, 1995, p 505). In their 
study of organisations and institutional theory, DiMaggio and Powell discussed the fact 
that adoption of new technologies is intended to improve performance; although, others 
adopt a similar plan to gain legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
Institutional isomorphism is concerned with the fact that all organisations are aware of 
what other organisations are doing (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Indeed, 
“Organisations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power 
and institutional legitimacy; for social as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983, p150). Dillard et al. (2004, p.59) explain, “Isomorphism refers to the 
adoption of an institutional practices by an organisation”. DiMiggio and Powell (1983) 
identified three different isomorphic processes (i.e. processes whereby institutional 
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practices such as voluntary corporate reporting adapt and change): coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism. 
 
Coercive isomorphism concerns the way in which organisations are subjected to 
external pressures from organisations upon which they are dependent, or from general 
cultural expectations (Carruthers, 1995). According to Tuttle and Dillard (2007), 
coercive isomorphism occurs when external powers, such as customers, stakeholders 
and governments impose conformance demands. Coercive isomorphism examines the 
way in which regulatory and other external forces cause organisations to conform and 
resemble one another. Organisations will only change their institutional practices in 
response to pressure from stakeholders, upon whom the organisation is dependent. 
According to this explanation, a company is coerced into adopting voluntary corporate 
reporting practices, to bring it into line with the expectations and demands of powerful 
stakeholders. With regard to IFR practice, companies may act to disclose IFR on their 
websites to meet their stakeholders’ expectations and demands.  
 
Mimetic isomorphism involves organisations frequently considering a reference group; 
looking to kindred organisations, and seeking to emulate or improve upon the 
institutional practices of other organisations (Carruthers, 1995). DiMiggio and Powell 
(1983, p152) observe,  
Organisations tend to model themselves after similar organisations in 
their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful, the 
ubiquity of certain kinds of structural arrangement can more likely to 
be credited to the universality of mimetic processes than to any 
concrete evidence that the adopted models enhance efficiency.  
 
Mimetic isomorphism concerns how organisations conform through the adoption of 
similar approaches. Unerman and Bennett (2004) explain this in the context of a study 
investigating stakeholder dialogue in corporate social reporting. They conclude that 
organisations operating within a similar sector adopt similar policies and procedures to 
those adopted by leading organisations in their sector. This is also true in respect of IFR, 
as companies make decisions based on what other companies are doing.  
 
Professionals play a major role in normative isomorphism (Carruthers, 1995).  
DiMiggio and Powell (1983) specified that normative isomorphism proceeds from 
group norms, which impose a pressure to adopt particular institutional practices. 
Normative isomorphism can be linked to the professions and how they create 
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organisations that resemble one another as members of professions with similar 
training. In terms of voluntary reporting practices, normative isomorphic pressures 
could arise from less formal group influences, and from the range of both formal and 
informal groups, to which managers belong, such as related to the culture and working 
practices developed within the work place. This could then produce collective 
managerial opinions in favour of, or contrary to certain types of reporting practices; e.g. 
financial reporting on the Internet. 
 
Another dimension of institutional theory is decoupling. Decoupling implies that, while 
managers might perceive a need for their organisation to be seen to be adopting certain 
institutional practices, and might even institute formal processes aimed at implementing 
these practices, actual organisational practices differ from formally sanctioned and 
publicly pronounced processes and practices (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). In terms of 
voluntary corporate reporting practices, decoupling can be linked to insights proceeding 
from legitimacy theory.  
 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) argue that institutional theory is complementary to 
economic theory. Based on the above explanations, institutional theory can further 
understanding of why companies post IFR on their websites, and of what motivations 
and routines may have been institutionalised within the company’s management 
department. Institutional theory can also be used to assist in understanding internal 
practices, such as why organisations create, maintain and alter their websites, and the 
external forces placing pressure on them. It explains that managers will be likely to be 
subject to change, or to adopt, certain voluntary disclosure practices, for instance IFR.  
 
In addition to agency theory, signalling theory, cost and benefit approach and 
institutional theory, stewardship theory can also be used to explain IFR practice. 
Stewardship Theory has been framed as the organizational behaviour counterweight to 
rational action theories of management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This theory arises 
as an important counterweight to agency theory, the essential assumption underlying the 
prescriptions of stewardship theory is that the behaviours of the manager are aligned 
with the interests of the principals. Davis et al. (1997) suggested that: a steward protects 
and maximizes shareholders wealth through firm performance, because by doing so, the 
steward’s utility functions are maximized. Stewardship theory places greater value on 
goal convergence among the parties involved in corporate governance than on the 
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agent’s self-interest (Van Slyke, 2007). In case of IFR, stewardship theory predicts that 
managers act in the best interests of the company and shareholders, and as such, they 
would influence IFR practice to achieve transparency. 
Table 4.3 Theoretical framework of this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Hypotheses regarding the factors that determine IFR 
The theoretical literature provides complementary explanations for factors that explain 
why companies disclose IFR on their websites. Based on agency theory, signalling 
theory, cost benefit approach, institutional theory and innovation diffusion theory, 11 
hypotheses have been developed to examine the factors determining Chinese listed 
companies’ adoption of IFR and its components.  
 
4.3.1 Company specific factors 
Firm size  
Firm size functions as a proxy for a number of corporate characteristics. Agency theory 
suggests that large firms exhibit higher agency costs, due to information asymmetry 
between the market participants (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To reduce agency costs, 
large firms disclose corporate information. Hossain et al. (1995) attributes the positive 
association between size and disclosure to the increasing potential benefits of disclosure 
for mitigating agency costs. In reference to signalling theory (Kelly, 1994), larger firms 
Sources of factors 
Agency theory
Signalling theory
Cost and benefit 
approach
Institutional theory
Factors
Firm Size
Profitability
Leverage
Industry type
Auditor type
State ownership
Legal person ownership
Foreign ownership
CEO duality
Board size
Independent directors
Impact on IFR 
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may be found to have a greater incentive to signal quality by means of improved 
disclosure.  
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) and Buzby (1975) describe three reasons for the association 
between disclosure and size. Firstly, disclosure costs may be generally lower in larger 
firms. Secondly, larger firms make more extensive use of the capital markets; thus, they 
can obtain capital more easily and more cheaply by offering disclosure that is more 
extensive. Lastly, larger firms believe full disclosure of information does not endanger 
their competitive position, as compared to smaller firms.  
 
Several studies confirm a link between firm size and IFR (Marston and Leow, 1998; 
Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 1999; Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; 
Ettredge et al., 2002; Debrecency et al., 2002; Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston and Polei, 
2004; Bollen et al., 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Barako and Tower, 2008; Kelton and 
Yang, 2008; Aly et al., 2010; Alali and Romero, 2012; Manjinder, 2013). Studies in 
China, including those by Xiao et al. (2004), He and Zhang (2007) and Chou (2008) 
also show similar results.  
 
In the case of China, larger firms might tend to disclose more IFR for several reasons. 
For example, revealing more information may reduce agency costs, and that as larger 
firms are more in public spotlight more than smaller firms, they have a greater incentive 
to signal quality by improving disclosure. In addition, larger firms have more financial 
resources than smaller companies to prepare, collect, analyse and present information 
on their websites. Thus: 
 
H1: Firm size  
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s size.  
 
Profitability 
Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985) state that managers prefer to release only information 
that increases their current firm value: 
From the perspective of the agency theory, it could be assumed that managers 
of highly profitable companies will be more prone to provide more detailed 
information, therefore the quantity of the information disclosed may be linked 
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to profitability of the company, this can be seen as a mechanism to improve the 
image of the company, reinforce the director’s own job security and contribute 
to increase their remuneration. (Inchausti, 1997). 
Signalling theory suggests profitable firms have an incentive to distinguish themselves 
from less successful firms, and to raise capital at the lowest possible price (Grossman & 
Hart, 1980). Voluntary disclosures on the web are one way to achieve this.  
 
However, Wagenhofer (1990) and Prencipe (2004) analysed a likely negative 
relationship associated with proprietary costs theory. Higher profitability may spur rival 
companies to enter a company’s market place. It is therefore essential to consider the 
influence of competitive costs, which could increase as profitability increases.  
 
Several IFR studies have tested this hypothesis and obtained various results. Pirchegger 
and Wagenhofer (1999) and Aly et al. (2010) found an association between profitability 
and IFR; however, this was not in line with other research (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., (1999); 
Ettredge et al., (2002); Oylere et al., (2002); Marston and Polei (2004); Abdelsalam et 
al., (2004); Alali and Romero (2012)). Xiao et al. (2004) found no association between 
profitability and IFR in China. Because of this conflict, it is relevant to test the above 
hypothesis in a different context. Thus: 
 
H2: Profitability  
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s profitability.  
 
Leverage  
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) suggests, “Agents will increase disclosure 
to their principal to reduce information asymmetry, thus, agency costs. Companies with 
higher leverage can be expected to disclose more information to reduce agency costs by 
reassuring debt holders that their interests are protected”. Schipper (1981) asserts that, 
“Explicit restrictive covenants could mitigate the potential conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders. Management could voluntarily disclose for monitoring 
purposes and help reassure debt holders about the ability of the company to pay its 
obligations”. Companies may use IFR to allow shareholders and bondholders to monitor 
the affairs of the company continuously and in great detail (Debreceny et al. 2002).  
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IFR studies by Brennan and Hourigan (2000), Debreceny et al. (2002), Oyelere et al. 
(2003), Alali and Romero (2012), Manjinder (2013) tested this hypothesis and found no 
association. However, other study (García Sánchez et al, 2011) revealed a positive 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and leverage in the capital structure of a 
company. Meanwhile, based on research conducted in China, Xiao et al. (2004), Chou 
(2008) found no association between leverage and IFR. Thus: 
 
H3: Leverage 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s leverage ratio. 
 
Industry type 
Wallace et al. (1994) suggest industry effects might explain the different levels of 
disclosure between firms. Jensen and Meckling (1995) found a positive relationship 
between the amount of specific knowledge in an industry and the agency cost to that 
industry. Signalling theory argues, “If a company fails to adopt the same disclosure 
strategy as other corporations in the same industry, the market could interpret this as 
bad news” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Political cost theory suggests industry 
membership may affect the political vulnerability of firms (Inchausti, 1997; Craven and 
Marston, 1999). Firms in industries that are more politically vulnerable may use 
voluntary disclosure to minimise political costs, such as regulations or the break-up of 
the industry.  
 
According to the OECD (1999) framework, low-technology firms arise in industries 
that employ less sophisticated technologies and are less vulnerable to change; medium-
technology firms are found in industries where there are more sophisticated 
technologies, and are generally stable; and high-technology firms are those in industries 
with higher technological sophistication but greater vulnerability to changes in 
technology. These include companies in the computer, electronics, pharmaceutical and 
telecommunications industries.  
 
Some IFR studies have found an association between industry type and voluntary 
disclosure (Ettredge et al., 2001; Oylere et al., 2003; Bollen et al., 2006; Aly et al., 
2010; Crag and Gakhar, 2012; Alali and Romero, 2012), whilst others have not reported 
a statistically significant relationship (Craven and Marston, 1999; Marston, 2003; 
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Abdelsalam et al., 2004). Xiao et al. (2004) and He and Zhang (2007) identified a 
relationship between the IT industry and IFR by Chinese listed companies. Thus: 
 
H4: Technology 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s being in a high 
technology industry.  
 
Auditor type 
Agency theory maintains that auditing helps alleviate conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that larger audit firms 
were less likely to be associated with clients disclosing lower levels of information in 
their annual reports, because they had more to lose from any damage to their 
reputations. The signalling literature suggested larger auditing firms are more likely to 
be hired by companies with greater potential gains from external monitoring, because 
such companies are aware of the larger audit firm’s need to demand higher quality 
disclosure; moreover, the choice of such auditing firms signals their acceptance of 
demands (Craswell and Taylor, 1992). Verrecchia (2001) suggested that the credibility 
of a firm's financial statements is enhanced when the firm hires a brand name auditor, or 
applies high quality accounting standards.  
 
IFR studies by Abdelsalam et al. (2004), Al-Shammari et al. (2007) Bonsón and 
Escobar (2006) found that the amount and presentation of information for investors 
disclosed on a company’s website positively related to the company’s use of a Big-4 
auditor. Xiao et al. (2004) and He and Zhang (2007) found an association between use 
of a big-4 auditor and IFR in China.  
In the case of China, firms hire a big-4 as auditor to gains from external monitoring, this 
can reduce their agency cost and less information asymmetry, thus to improve their 
credibility and reputation. It is expected that IFR positively related to the company’s use 
of a Big-4 auditor in the context of China. Thus: 
 
H5: Auditor 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and the company’s use of a Big-4 
auditor. 
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Share ownership  
There are three main types of share ownership in Chinese PLCs: state ownership, legal 
person ownership, individual private ownership, and individual foreign ownership. A 
salient institutional feature is that state ownership dominates the types of listed 
companies in China (Sun & Tong, 2003). Ferguson et al. (2002) argue that State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) are likely to present significantly greater adverse selection and 
moral hazards. SOEs receive significantly greater incentives when voluntarily 
disclosing additional information, as they can ease investor concerns regarding 
management quality and the role of the government as a major shareholder. Yang et al. 
(2011) state that the main agency problem that arises under a diffused ownership 
structure is the conflict between management and shareholders, whereas the central 
agency problem under a concentrated ownership structure is exploitation by controlling 
shareholders. Given that state ownership leads to the problem of “one dominant 
shareholder” and “insider control” in China, companies with higher state ownership are 
expected to lack the motivation to practice IFR for the following reasons. First is 
suggested that state shareholders can obtain information using internal resources (Xiao 
et al., 2004), and second, disclosure of financial information on the stock market will 
enable public investors to monitor management’s related party transactions more 
closely (Qu et al., 2013). Research by Xiao et al. (2004) suggests companies with higher 
state ownership are inclined toward lower disclosure on their websites. Thus:  
 
H6: State ownership  
There is a negative relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s proportion of 
State Owned Corporation (SOC) ownership. 
 
Compared to state shareholders, legal person shareholders are more economically 
orientated and geared towards profit maximisation (Tang and Wang, 2004). Legal 
person shareholders are focused on profit-making, rather than on fulfilling political and 
social goals (Xiao et al. 2004); thus, shareholders have more resources and expertise to 
monitor listed firms. In respect of the corporate governance of listed companies, legal 
person shareholders can monitor management more effectively than domestic public 
investors can, through their participation on boards of directors and through the 
selection of corporate officers (Xu and Wang, 1999). Thus, it is expected that legal 
person ownership will play a significant role in demanding transparent information for 
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the purpose of managing shareholders’ equity stakes (Qu et al., 2013). Xiao et al. (2004) 
found a positive relationship between disclosure and legal personal ownership. Thus: 
 
H7: Legal person ownership 
There is a negative relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s proportion of 
legal person ownership. 
 
Debreceny et al. (2001) suggested IFR will be particularly effective in circumstances 
where information can be efficiently disseminated to a large and widely dispersed 
audience. In China, the development and opening up of the Chinese stock market has 
led to a significant increase in individual investor shares, including domestic and 
foreign shares. Foreign investors in the Chinese stock market are international financial 
institutions, and as equity stakeholders of listed companies, these foreign investors 
behave as effective external agents (Qu et al., 2013). Foreign shareholders are more 
likely to face a higher level of information asymmetry, given the language barrier and 
their lack of access to corporate information. This, therefore, implies that Chinese 
companies must offer transparent disclosures that are suited to foreign investors, in 
order to raise and retain foreign funds (Wang et al., 2008). As the ownership of a 
company is dispersed between an increasing numbers of investors, the Internet is now 
an increasingly effective and efficient way to communicate with those shareholders. 
Thus, it is anticipated that foreign ownership would have a positive impact on IFR.  
 
Pervan (2006) identified a positive relationship between IFR and companies with major 
foreign ownership, when researching Croatia and Slovenia. Xiao et al. (2004) found a 
positive relationship between IFR and foreign shares ownership in China. Thus:  
 
H8: Foreign ownership 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s proportion of 
foreign shares ownership.  
 
4.3.2 Corporate governance factors 
Corporate governance aims to resolve conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders, and between large shareholders and minority shareholders; thereby 
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mitigating agency costs (Tang & Wang, 2012). Corporate governance mechanisms are 
useful for monitoring and determining a firm’s overall information disclosure policy 
(Kelton & Yang, 2008). Financial transparency, operational transparency, and 
information disclosure are crucial elements of corporate governance. Companies that 
adopt good corporate governance practices typically apply a high level of financial and 
operational transparency, and disclose high quality information. Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
and Cheung et al. (2006) also state that promoting stronger governance can ensure 
transparent disclosure. Companies might improve their disclosure transparency by 
voluntary disclosing IFR on their websites. Therefore good corporate governance leads 
to better IFR practices. In this section, corporate governance factors, including CEO 
role duality, board size and board independence are discussed, to assess the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on IFR practice.  
 
CEO role duality refers to a situation in which the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Board. According to agency theory, CEO duality creates a strong individual power base, 
which can impair board independence and erode a board’s ability to execute its 
oversight and governance roles (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory supports the 
separation of these two roles, to provide checks and balances for management 
performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Ever since the Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992), codes have been introduced recommending avoidance of CEO duality. 
However, stewardship theory supports the view that managers act in the best interest of 
the company and shareholders, therefore, role duality may enhance boards’ 
effectiveness (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), consequently resulting in improved 
reporting quality (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). IFR studies have found a negative 
relationship between IFR and CEO duality (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Abdelsalam & 
Street, 2007; Abdelsalam & EI-Masry, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry 2008; Gandía, 2008; 
Kelton & Yang, 2008). However, no previous study has yet examined the relationship 
between CEO duality and IFR in China.  
 
In China, traditional SOEs do not have boards of directors, and the government directly 
appoints and supervises CEOs. New joint-stock companies are required to have boards, 
thereby creating the problem of who chairs the board. The Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China (CSRC, 2002), which legally mandates the 
necessity to appoint outside directors, is conspicuously silent concerning whether the 
CEO should (or should not) be appointed as board chair. CEO duality result in the threat 
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of lack of independence and alertness among the board. Therefore, the board cannot 
monitor its top management team effectively or protect shareholders’ interest, leading to 
agency problems or agency loss. Thus, agency theory would suggest a combination of 
CEO and chairman positions would weaken board control, and negatively affect IFR 
practice. Thus: 
H9: CEO Duality 
There is a negative relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s CEO duality. 
 
The majority of good governance codes suggest a board must be formed by “a 
reasonable” number of members. This supposed optimal number would then inform 
efficiency in the fulfilment of the board’s supervisory functions (Gandía, 2008). Chiang 
(2005) considered the size of the board as a factor that positively affects the disclosure 
of information, since increased disclosure provides a more positive impression of a 
company, as it represents the decisions of the members of the board. Ezat and El-Masry 
(2008), and García et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between IFR and board 
size in Egypt; however, Gandía (2008) found no relationship between IFR and board 
size in Spain. No previous study has examined the relationship between board size and 
IFR in China.  
 
Bigger boards may be constructive for companies, as they provide diversity that would 
otherwise help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental 
uncertainties (Goodstein et al., 1994). Peng and Luo (2000) argue that Chinese firms 
with large boards are likely to benefit from a wider range of views and external 
connections. In China, company law (2006) specifically requires that the board of 
directors be composed of not fewer than 5, but no more than 19, members. It is 
anticipated that bigger boards could results in greater transparency of information, by 
disclosing IFR on their websites. Thus: 
 
H10: Board Size 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s board size. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) proposed that in the presence of independent directors, more 
effective monitoring of boards of directors can be carried out; thereby limiting 
managerial opportunism, and resulting in increased disclosure. Beasley (1996) argues, 
and provides evidence, that the proportion of independent directors positively relates to 
a board’s ability to influence disclosure decisions. A high percentage of independent 
directors on the board would therefore enhance the monitoring of managerial 
opportunism, thereby reducing management’s opportunity to withhold information 
(Kelton and Yang, 2008). However, empirical results are mixed. Some studies report a 
positive association between corporate disclosure and board independence (Chen & 
Jaggi, 2000; Xiao et al., 2004). Meanwhile, other IFR studies have found an association 
between board independence and voluntary IFR disclosure (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; 
Kelton & Yang, 2008; Abdelsalam & EI-Masry, 2008; Ezat & El-Masry, 2008), whilst 
others have found a negative relationship (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007). Xiao et al. 
(2004) identified a positive relationship between board independence and IFR in China. 
 
In the case of China, the CRSC has issued “Guidelines on establishment of Independent 
directors systems in listed companies” (CRSC, 2003). According to these guidelines, by 
the end of June, 2003, at least 1/3 of board members were required to be independent 
directors. Although independent directors do not normally have an equity stake in listed 
companies, nor relationships with the management and employees, they do provide 
companies with tangible and intangible resources, monitor senior management and 
should be responsive to shareholders (Hong & Wang, 2001). Fan et al. (2007) found 
that independent directors have a positive effect on CEO monitoring in China. 
Therefore, it is predicted that a high percentage of independent directors on the board 
would enhance the monitoring of managerial opportunism and reduce management’s 
opportunity to withhold information; such a requirement would then improve IFR 
practice in China. Thus: 
H11: Proportion of independent directors 
There is a positive relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and a company’s proportion of 
independent directors to total directors. 
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4.4 Hypotheses relating to the economic consequences of IFR 
The literature on corporate disclosures suggests corporations disclose information to 
lower the cost of capital, to influence stock prices and/or to reduce information 
asymmetry (FASB, 2001). Corporate finance theory implies shareholders endogenously 
optimise disclosure policy, management incentives, and corporate governance to 
maximise firm value (Core, 2001). Balsam et al. (2003) find the nature of the 
disclosure, whether mandated or voluntary, influences how firms measure stock-based 
compensation expenses, an item that then significantly affects earnings and, ultimately, 
firm value (Aboody et al., 2004). Hassan et al. (2009) suggests disclosure of more 
information may increase the value of the disclosed companies, either by decreasing the 
cost of capital, or increasing the cash flow accrued for shareholders or both.  
 
According to agency theory, firms tend to make voluntary disclosures to reduce 
information asymmetry and to reduce the cost of external financing by means of 
limiting information risk. Voluntarily disclosing additional information, on the Internet, 
delivers greater information transparency, thereby reducing information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent, which can in turn affect the costs of capital 
(Botoson, 1997), firm value (Frankel et al. 1999) and market liquidity (Welker, 1995). 
Disclosing more information via the Internet can reduce the uncertainty surrounding a 
firm’s future performance and its value (Hunter and Smith, 2009). Signalling theory 
explains that the use of the Internet to disclose information about a company signifies a 
good quality company (Rahman, 2010). According to the cost and benefit framework, 
the decision to use corporate websites to disclose available information may depend on 
the manner in which the companies expect to benefit from complete and timely business 
reporting; indeed, companies may disclose more information on their websites to 
improve public relations, lower capital costs and increase firm value.  
 
Conversely, some recent studies have indicated that the belief that voluntary disclosure 
has the benefit of lowering the cost of capital and increasing firm value may not hold 
true for all stock markets. In Canada, Richardson and Welker (2001) found the cost of 
equity was significant and positively related to social disclosures. Orens et al. (2010) 
examined the association of Web-based non-financial disclosure and a firm’s cost of 
finance in the international context, they suggested firms in North America show no 
significant negative association with Web-based non-financial disclosure and cost of 
capital. Using a dataset comprising 110 Chinese listed companies, Wang et al. (2008) 
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investigated the effects of voluntary disclosure, and reported no evidence that 
companies benefitted from extensive voluntary disclosure through lower cost of capital. 
Lan et al. (2013) examined 1066 Chinese listed companies and also provided no 
evidence that extensive voluntary disclosure benefits listed companies in China in the 
form of lower capital costs. The above evidence highlights the impact of international 
institutional differences on the economic relevance of IFR.  
 
Some IFR studies report an association between IFR and firm value. Silva and Alves 
(2004) reported the existence of a significant association between IFR and firm value in 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, according to Tobin’s Q. Ezat (2010) found a positive 
relationship between the IFR index and Tobin’s Q, and the market and book ratio in 
Egypt. Garay et al. (2013) found that an increase of 1% in the IFR index causes a 
0.1592% difference in the Tobin’s Q and increase of 0.0119% in firms ROA in seven 
stock markets in Latin America. Based on the above argument, it is interesting to 
explore whether there is any impact from IFR and its components on the Chinese listed 
firm value. Thus:  
 
H12: Firm valuation 
There is a significant relationship between the level of IFR and its components (total 
score, content, presentation, timeliness and usability) and firm valuation in China. 
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter first reviewed agency theory, signalling theory, cost and benefit approach, 
and institutional theory, table 4.4 presents the expected direction and related theory of 
each hypothesis. Agency theory suggests that agents will increase IFR to their principal 
to reduce information asymmetry. Signalling theory suggests IFR is one means by 
which to measure a company’s quality and performance. The cost and benefit approach 
provides a framework to assess the motivations of a manager when determining level of 
online IFR disclosure. Further, institutional theory provides a complementary 
perspective, from which to investigate IFR practices; it can help us better understand 
why companies post IFR on their websites, and what motivations and routines are at 
work.  
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Table 4.4 The expected direction and related theory of each hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variables Predicated sign Related Theory 
H1 Size + Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
Cost and benefit 
approach 
H2 Profitability (ROA) + Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
H3 Leverage + Agency theory 
H4 Industry type + Signalling theory 
H5 Auditor type (Big 4) + Signalling theory 
Institutional theory 
H6 State ownership _ Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
H7 Legal person ownership _ Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
H8 Foreign share 
ownership 
+ Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
H9 CEO Duality _ Agency theory 
H10 Board size + Agency theory 
H11 Independent directors + Agency theory 
 
After the theoretical review, 11 hypotheses were developed to examine the factors that 
might determine IFR and its components among Chinese listed companies. Factors 
identified for testing are firm size, profitability, leverage, industry type, auditor type, 
state ownership, legal person ownership, foreign ownership, CEO duality, board size, 
independent directors and firm valuation. In respect of the relationship between IFR and 
firm value, additional 1 hypotheses concerning the economic consequences of IFR and 
its components on Chinese listed companies is provide in this Chapter. The next chapter 
introduces and discusses the research methodology and methods that will be applied in 
this study.  
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Chapter 5 Research methodology and method 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the research methodologies applied 
in this research project. It is useful to consider the full spectrum, from the theoretical 
determinants of the research through to its practical conclusions, as perceived in the 
relationship between ‘epistemology’, theoretical perspectives, methodology and 
research methods (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, in this chapter, section 5.2 presents 
epistemological considerations; section 5.3 covers ontological considerations; section 
5.4 discusses inductive and deductive methodology; sections 5.5 and 5.6 examine 
research type and research strategy respectively; section 5.7 examines the practical 
application of the research strategy and the approach adopted in order to achieve the set 
objectives. Subsequently, details of the sample selection and data collection, as applied 
for both the quantitative and qualitative research are presented in sections 5.8 and 5.9 
respectively. Finally, section 5.10 provides a summary of this chapter.  
 
5.2 Epistemological considerations 
Research methodology is distinguishable from research methods, the practical means of 
undertaking research, and concerns the actual approach taken as influenced by the 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives adopted by the researcher (Gray, 2009). 
Delanty and Strydom (2003) define epistemology as the investigation of the possibility, 
limits, origin, structure, methods and truthfulness of knowledge and of how knowledge 
can be acquired, validated and applied. Indeed, Maynard (1994) specified that: 
“Epistemology is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding 
what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both 
adequate and legitimate” (p.10). 
 
Researchers can select from a number of research philosophies to shape their 
methodology, including positivism and interpretivism. “Positivism is an epistemological 
position that advocated the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond” (Bryman, 2004, p.28). However, the term positivism 
extends beyond this principle, although the constituent elements vary between authors. 
Realism shares two features with positivism: a belief that natural sciences and the social 
sciences can, and should, apply the same methods to the collection of data and its 
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analysis; including a commitment to belief in an external reality that scientists can 
uncover (Bryman, 2004). Meanwhile, interpretivism provides a contrasting 
epistemology to positivism:  
 
“Interpretivism is a term that usually denotes an alternative to the 
positivist orthodoxy that has held sway for decades. It is predicated upon 
the view that a strategy is required that respects the difference between 
people and the objectives of the natural sciences and therefore requires 
social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action.”(Bryman, 
2004, p.24) 
 
In addition to its influence on the methodology applied to the research process, 
epistemology can also have a major impact on data collection choices (Hitchcock & 
Hughes, 1995). For the purpose of this thesis, both positivism and interpretivism were 
applied. 
 
5.3 Ontological considerations 
As a philosophy, ontology is concerned with assumptions about a variety of real world 
phenomena. Ontology refers to the ‘nature of reality’ (Hudson & Ozanne, 1998). There 
are two positions within ontology, which are frequently referred to respectively as 
objectivism and constructionism:  
 
“Objectivism is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena 
and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors. 
It implies that social phenomena and categories that we use in everyday 
disclosure have an existence or separate from actors” (Bryman, 2004, 
p.32).  
 
Whereas, constructionism is an alternative ontological position; it asserts that social 
actors are continually accomplishing social phenomena and effecting their meanings. 
This implies that social phenomena and categories are not only a consequence of social 
interaction, but are also in a constant state of revision (Bryman, 2004, p.33). 
Furthermore, constructions exist in the mind of individuals and the role of the inquirer is 
to understand, reconstruct, analyse and critique participants’ viewpoints, in a way that 
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leads to the construction of meaningful findings/outcomes (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). For 
the purposes of this thesis, both objectivism and constructionism were applied. 
5.4 Induction and Deduction 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), induction is a scientific research method that 
results in the formulation of a theory; it achieves an understanding of the meaning 
humans attach to events. In contrast, deduction is a scientific research method that 
involves the development of theory by collecting data and subjecting it to rigorous 
testing. The principal characteristics of deduction include the generation of research to 
explain the causal relationship between variables; the independence of the researcher 
from what is being observed; and the possibility of generalisation (Saunder et al., 2007). 
Marshall (1997) illustrated the theoretical use of both terms (inductive and deductive) as 
follows: 
When researchers first begin to open up any new line of enquiry there 
will be no useful theories available from which to deduce propositions for 
testing. Knowledge has to begin with collecting facts and then trying to 
find some order in them. This is known as induction. Deduction is the 
technique by which knowledge develops in more mature fields of 
enquiry. It involves a sort of logical leap. Going a stage further than the 
theory, data is then collected to test it. (p.17)  
 
The research methods employed in this thesis combine both inductive and deductive 
approaches. 
 
5.5 Research type 
At this point, it is necessary to clarify the type of research undertaken. In order to so, we 
will consider the nature of the research questions and objectives (Yin, 2009). The 
objective of the study is to investigate the use of the internet for disseminating financial 
reporting and to examine the determinants that explain inter-company variations, and 
the economic consequences of IFR and the IFR perceptions in China. According to 
Bennett (1991), current research into accounting is concerned with solving problems, 
investigating relationships and building a body of knowledge. In this area, four levels of 
research have been identified as follows: 
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1) Description: Descriptive studies have the objective of illustrating an accurate 
profile of persons, events or situations and document the phenomenon of 
interest (Saunders et al., 2007; Marshall & Rossman, 1995).  
2) Classification: Still descriptive, but reducing the reporting process, and 
highlighting similarities and clustering through grouping and classifying.  
3) Explanation: An attempt to make sense of observations by explaining the 
relationships observed and attributing causality based on some appropriate 
theory.  
4) Prediction: Going beyond the understanding and explaining of the prior stage, 
to model observations in a way that allows testable predictions to be made of 
unknown events.  
 
The current study was conducted using a combination of descriptive, classification 
based, explanatory and predictive research. First, it illustrated the current situation 
regarding Internet financial reporting in Chinese listed companies, identifying the 
similarities and differences between the bigger companies and smaller companies. 
Secondly, it attempted to explain the relationship between internet financial disclosure 
and firm size, profitability, leverage, industry type, auditor, share ownership, board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, and predict how IFR impacts firm value.  
 
5.6 Research strategy: quantitative and qualitative research 
[A] Research strategy is a general plan of how successful you will be in 
answering the research question you have set. It will contain clear 
objectives derived from your research questions, specify the sources from 
which you intend to collect data and consider the constraints, which you 
will inevitably have (Saunders et al., 2007, p.75). 
 
The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research relies concerns 
methodology. Bryman (2004) discussed the fundamental differences between 
qualitative and quantitative research approaches according to the orientation of their 
role as set out in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Fundamental differences between quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies 
 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Principal orientation to the 
role of theory in relation to 
research 
Deductive; testing the theory Inductive; generation of 
theory 
Epistemological orientation Natural science model, in 
particular positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
Source: Bryman (2004) 
 
Hussey and Hussey (1997) state that a quantitative approach provides objective and 
unbiased results not influenced by the researcher. Moreover, according to Bryman 
(2004): 
“quantitative research can be constructed as a research strategy that 
emphasises quantification in the collection and analysis of data that: 
• Quantitative research entails a deductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research, in which the accent is 
placed on the testing theory; 
• Quantitative research has incorporated the practices and norms of 
the natural scientific model and of positivism in particular;  
• Quantitative research embodies a view of social reality as an 
external, objective reality.” (p.36) 
 
Moreover, Bryman (2004) outlines several criticisms of quantitative research, which are 
as follows:  
1) Quantitative researchers fail to distinguish people and social institutions from 
“the world of nature”.  
2) The measurement process possesses an artificial and spurious sense of precision 
and accuracy. Arguably, the connection between the measures developed by 
social scientists and the concepts they are supposed to be revealing is assumed 
rather than real.  
3) The reliance on instruments and procedures hinders the connection between 
research and everyday life.  
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By contrast, Bryman (2004, p.36) defines qualitative research as a research strategy that 
emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data; thus:  
• Qualitative research predominantly emphasises an inductive approach to the 
relationship between theory and research, placing emphasis on the generation of 
theories.  
• Qualitative research rejects the practices and norms of the natural scientific 
model, positivism in particular, preferring to explore the ways in which 
individuals interpret their social world; and  
• Qualitative research embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting 
emergent property created by individuals. 
 
Collis and Hussey (2003) define qualitative research as “a subjective approach which 
includes examining and reflecting on perhaps in order to gain an understanding of social 
and human activities”. Creswell (2003) identifies the following characteristics with 
qualitative research: 
1) The natural setting provides the data source directly; the researcher goes to the 
participants’ place of work to conduct the research. 
2) Qualitative data is collected in the form of words or pictures. 
3) Qualitative research is not tightly prefigured, but is emergent. New questions 
may arise during the interviews or collection process. 
4) The researcher offers a personal interpretation of the data. 
5) Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding how things occur, and 
focus on the process that is occurring, as well as outcome. 
6) Qualitative research focuses on participants’ experiences. 
7) Qualitative methods permit the researcher to study the selected issues in depth 
and in detail (Patton, 2002). 
 
However, Bryman and Bell (2003) clarified that a combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative research methods can be ideal, as the findings resulting from each method 
can support those from the other. Therefore, researchers may wish to adopt quantitative 
research practices in order to explore specific issues in which they have an interest, 
whilst also employing qualitative research techniques to gain access to their 
participants’ perspectives. Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) observed that researchers 
have increasingly applied a combination of methods to the same research project.  
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5.7 Research strategy for this study: triangulation method 
The initial step was to choose a research method to determine an approach. This step is 
considered crucial, because the selection of the most appropriate research approach 
enables the researcher to make clear decisions concerning the research design, and 
promotes awareness of the constraints of the research within a particular approach 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Significantly, Yin (2009) stated that researchers may 
adopt several strategies when approaching their research, and Saunders et al. (2007) 
identified two major advantages of utilising multiple research methods:  
1)  Different methods may be used for different purposes.  
2) Different data collection methods may be used to provide convergent 
evidence (a process referred to as triangulation). 
 
Previously, the majority of IFR studies have employed a quantitative approach as the 
research method. However, the intention of the present study was to combine 
quantitative and qualitative methods to assess IFR practices. A mixed methods research 
approach is recognised as one of the three major ‘research paradigms’ (Johnson et al., 
2007). Triangulation entails using more than one method or source of data in the study 
of social phenomena, and is also defined as the use of different research approaches and 
techniques within the same study (Collis & Hussey, 2003); it can be used to strengthen 
the assertions of the research findings (Arksey & Knight, 1999). Moreover, Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) reasoned that both forms of data are useful and can supplement each 
other to increase understanding of what is being studied. Therefore, triangulation is a 
strategy that can be used to strengthen the certainty of the research findings (Arksey & 
Knight, 1999). Denzin (1970) identified multiple types of triangulation for use within 
the same investigation; these include: 
1) Methodological triangulation – the use of multiple methods to collect data.  
2) Data triangulation – the use of a variety of data sources in a study, concerning 
person, time and space. 
3) Investigator triangulation – whereby multiple researchers are employed to 
investigate the same problem. 
4) Theoretical triangulation –approaching the research with varied perspectives 
and hypotheses. 
 
In addition, Flick (1998) stated that the use of multiple methods within a research 
project reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. 
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Furthermore, a combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, 
perspectives and observations in a single study is inherently a strategy that adds rigour, 
breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry (Flick 1998). Likewise, the use 
of multiple methods assists data triangulation, whilst simultaneously providing an 
effective way to overcome the majority of the intrinsic weaknesses in each method 
employed (Gray, 2009). Therefore, an overall approach for this study is one that 
combines qualitative and quantitative research, and the adoption of mixed methods 
research allows this thesis to achieve data triangulation and complementarity.  
 
5.8 Sample selection and data collection for quantitative research 
In accordance with the objectives of this thesis, a strategy utilising Internet surveys was 
considered appropriate, since, according to Marsh (1982), an online survey facilitates 
the collection of a large amount of quantitative data in an economical way.  
 
Likewise, considering the time limitation of the research, a cross-sectional design was 
selected, in which information could be elicited from the web for a single period of 
time. The advantage of conducting a cross-sectional study is that it is relatively 
inexpensive and requires less time to conduct the research. However, the greatest 
disadvantage was that the data collected only supplies a snapshot, thus providing no 
indication of the sequence of events. This being so, it is impossible to generate causal 
inference. In addition, the data could be susceptible to the influence of historical events 
(Saunders et al., 2007).  
 
The research for this thesis employed content analysis.  Berelson (1952) described 
content analysis as a research technique commonly used for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. It is also defined 
as a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1969). Similarly, according to 
Krippendorff (2004), content analysis is a method for making inferences from published 
media in a systematic manner, and has been used in empirical social science research 
for many years, mainly in the field of communication research. It is a widely used 
research technique in accounting literature; in particular, for analysing financial 
accounting research and voluntary disclosure in corporate reports (Unerman, 2000). 
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According to Bryman and Bell (2011), the advantage of content analysis is that it is a 
very transparent research method, since the coding scheme and sampling procedures can 
be clearly set out to enable feasible replications and follow up studies. This transparency 
explains why content analysis is often referred to as an objective method of analysis. It 
can facilitate a certain amount of longitudinal analysis with relative ease. Furthermore, 
content analysis is often referred to favourably as an unobtrusive method; a term 
devised by Webb et al. (1966) to refer to a method that does not entail participants in a 
study having to take the researcher into account, hence it is a nonreactive method. 
Moreover, it is a flexible method, which can be applied to a wide variety of different 
kinds of unstructured information. Significantly, content analysis can enable the 
generation of information concerning social groups to which it would otherwise be 
difficult to gain access.  
 
However, it is not always possible to achieve full transparency with content analysis 
(Beattie & Thomson, 2007), and there are some limitations in terms of investigating 
disclosures. According to Unerman (2000), the limitations of content analysis methods, 
which need to be taken into consideration, relate to subjectivity in connection with the 
coding process. Furthermore, Milne and Adler (1999) suggest two reliability issues:  
1) Demonstrating that the data produced from the analysis is reliable.  
2) Verifying that the applied coding instrument is reliable.  
 
Likewise, content analysis can only be as good as the documents on which the 
practitioner works. It is almost impossible to devise coding manuals that do not entail 
some interpretation on the part of coders. Furthermore, Unerman (2000) argues that 
quantification is a major concern when applying this research method, because the 
application of different methods inevitably leads to different impressions of the relative 
importance of chosen themes. Particular problems are likely to arise when the aim is to 
impute latent rather than manifest content. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain the 
answers to ’why’ questions through content analysis (Bryman, 2004). Furthermore, 
content analysis is acknowledged to be a means of attaining details of quantity of 
disclosure rather than quality of characteristics. However, quantity of disclosure does 
not indicate what is being disclosed. 
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5.8.1 Sample selection 
The initial task, in order to answer the question and fulfil the content analysis, was to 
select the samples. The sample companies were selected from the SHSE and SZSE and 
are the top one hundred and fifty and the bottom one hundred and fifty in terms of 
market cap by 2010 year end. In order to establish whether each of these companies has 
a website, five approaches were used: CSRC official website, SHSE official website, 
SZSE official website, CNINFO website (designed by the CSRC for disclosing 
financial information), and search engines such as Google and Baidu (the most popular 
Chinese search engine). Finally, if these approaches failed, direct contact was made by 
telephone to determine whether they had established a corporate website. The data for 
company size, leverage, profitability, growth ratio and firm value, as well as corporate 
governance factors was obtained from the Company Guide published by the SHSE, 
SZSE and the Wind financial database website; all other data was obtained from the 
companies’ websites.  
 
There were several reasons for deciding upon this sample. Firstly, as the sample was 
composed of the one hundred and fifty largest listed companies and one hundred and 
fifty small and medium size listed companies, separate cases would be used for each 
size of company due to the differences in financial reporting practices (and perceptions) 
between the large, small and medium sized companies (Ettredge et al., 2001). Secondly, 
the sample companies offered a good comparison between the two group samples. The 
third reason is that the sample size was representative enough to fulfil the purpose of 
this study. Finally, the study of the sample enabled the researcher to reach conclusions 
about the set of hypotheses. 
 
Since website content and design are frequently updated, it was important to analyse the 
content and usability of all the samples’ websites on a specific date (Abdelsalam et al., 
2007). In accordance, the aim of this project was to use Offline Explorer software to 
download all the sample websites in a single day. Offline Explorer software is a 
Microsoft Windows offline browser that enables the downloading of an unlimited 
number of websites for later offline viewing, searching, browsing or updating. In order 
to test the reliability of the software, thirty sample websites were randomly downloaded 
in mid-November 2010 and mid-December 2010, with a specified starting page using 
the URL address of the company, directing the programme to download all files linked 
to the starting page, from the starting server up to level five. Following the 
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downloading, the results were compared to the thirty sample websites in order to 
observe whether any items were missing in the downloaded folder. Significantly, there 
were a relatively high percentage of items missing in this pilot study (possibly caused 
by the Chinese web server not being open to public users). Hence, full data collection 
continued to be reliant on checking the companies’ live websites between January 2011 
and June 2011.  
 
Table 5.2 Illustrating the process of the final sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.8.2 Data collection for variables  
5.8.2.1 Development of IFR checklist  
According to Beattie et al. (2004, p210), there are difficulties when assessing disclosure 
directly, “disclosure index studies assume that the amount of disclosure on specified 
topics as proxies for the quality of disclosure”. The creation of an index is a form of 
content analysis, and one of the main techniques used to study information provided by 
companies (Álvarez et al., 2008). A disclosure index is a research instrument to measure 
the extent of the information reported in particular disclosure vehicle(s) by a particular 
entity, according to a list of selected items of information. In many cases, a simple 
binary coding scheme is used, whereby the presence or absence of an item is recorded. 
Other coding schemes incorporate ordinal measures, to allow the “quality” of the 
specific disclosure to be assessed.  
 
In spite of the contributions made by various existing indices to measure disclosure 
practices, they suffer a number of drawbacks. Marston and Shirves (1991, p195) note 
the index score “can give a measure of the extent of disclosure but not necessarily the 
quality of disclosure”. Nevertheless, they have concluded that while the construction of 
disclosure indices inevitably involves subjective judgement, it has proven to be a 
valuable tool and will continue to be used for as long as company disclosure is the focus 
of research.  
Sample selection 
Original sample 300 
No web address 9 
Firms having a web address 291 
Page cannot be displayed 7 
Firms having web address 284 
Final sample 284 
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The first step in the construction of a disclosure index is the selection of items (Marston 
& Shrives, 1991). Therefore, a disclosure checklist was created to carry out the analysis. 
To ensure that the procedure for constructing the IFR checklist in a study is reliable, 
certain criteria are developed to guide the selection of disclosure items. The criteria are 
as follows: a) There should be theoretical or empirical support for including such items; 
b) items have to be applicable to the IFR of Chinese listed companies; c) items are not 
to be associated with any specific group of users; d) there should be acceptable 
variability in disclosure of such items among different companies; and e) items are not 
biased according to difference in periods of time in the dataset. The disclosure checklist 
was compiled based on existing literature (Abdelsalam et al., 2007; Marston & Polei 
2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Debreceny et al., 2002) and amended to suit Chinese 
companies. All the websites of Chinese companies were checked, and financial 
information or items relevant to this study made available on the websites of the 
Chinese companies. 
To consider whether the disclosure index captures all aspects of disclosure in this study, 
and in order to achieve a more comprehensive disclosure checklist, the checklist was 
used to develop a total score, to assess the content, timeliness, presentation and usability 
of the website. FASB (2002) describes IFR in terms of content and presentation. The 
timeliness, presentation format and usability of content are all equally important, 
because they encompass the timeliness device, which is likely to improve the quality of 
the disclosed information (Debreceny et al., 2002). CONTENT examines the specific 
disclosure items that provide corporate governance information and social and 
environmental data to investors, while other items can be found elsewhere, such as in 
the firm’s annual report or on a third party’s website. Kelton and Yang (2008) suggested 
that by voluntarily disseminating information on their corporate websites, even though 
the information may be located elsewhere, companies are choosing to make disclosures 
more salient to investors and are increasing disclosure transparency. The Internet 
enables companies to voluntarily communicate share prices, press conferences and other 
information via emails and webcasts to a large global audience of current and 
prospective investors (Abdelsalam and Street, 2007). Thus, TIMELINESS examines 
companies’ ability to provide investors with up-to-date, timely information. This could 
significantly influence the decisions made by the potential or existing investors and 
other stakeholders (Hanafi et al., 2009). Presentation format can provide disclosures that 
are more transparent by enhancing the readability, accessibility, and understandability 
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of financial information (FASB, 2000). Therefore, PRESENTATION examines IFR 
presentation formats and options provided on a company’s website that are not available 
in the traditional paper format (Kelton and Yang, 2008). USABILITY examines the 
ease of access to information for all users and the user friendliness of the website. 
Therefore, the disclosure checklist in this study captures all aspects of Internet 
disclosure for the Chinese companies.  
5.8.2.2 Scoring method 
The study focused on verifying issues concerning information disclosure on websites 
using binary values. All of these items can be measured on a simple yes/no basis, 
encoded as 1 and 0, respectively. Companies are awarded 1 if they disclose a certain 
item, and 0 if they do not disclose it, when that item is applicable. Companies were not 
penalised for items that are irrelevant to them. Therefore, there are two different scores 
for non-disclosure, either 0 if the item is relevant to that company or no score if it was 
not applicable (N/A). Determining the applicability of the item concerned is an 
important procedure (Meek et al., 1995). In order to determine the non-applicable items 
correctly, a disclosure item is coded as N/A after the IFR disclosure had been examined 
(Cooke, 1996). Each dependent variable was calculated based on the ratio of the actual 
IFR comprehensiveness index score obtained by the company relative to the maximum 
possible index score (based on for the number of applicable IFR comprehensiveness 
index items). For each company a disclosure index was calculated, where the index Ij 
for a set of accounts is defined as:  
Ι = 	
	


 
where nj = number of relevant items for jth firm, nj ≤ 104  
          Xij = 1 if ith item disclosed  
                = 0 if ith  item is not disclosed, so that 0 ≤ Ij ≤1  
The dichotomous variable ENGWEB reflects whether a company has an English 
website. The dichotomous variable FWEB reflects whether a company has financial 
information on their website. The weighting scheme weights each of the items equally, 
respectively. The mains reasons to choose a weight for each of the items equally is that 
subjectivity could arise when assigning weights if users’ preferences are unknown 
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(Meek et al., 1995), and prior studies using weighted and un-weighted scores show 
similar results (Xiao et al., 2004). 
The developed disclosure index was composed of a comprehensive checklist of one 
hundred and four content items, including sixty-seven items relating to disclosure 
content, fourteen items concerning corporate governance disclosure, eleven items for 
social and environmental disclosure, ten items regarding timeliness, fourteen items 
concerning presentation format, and thirteen usability items (see Appendix 1). 
Following Haniffa and Cooke (2002), the final scoring sheet consisted of 104 IFR 
disclosure items after removing items not disclosed by 95% of the companies.  
There are nine dependent variables with regards to disclosure (see Table 5.3). The eight 
disclosure indexes measure the level of the web-based corporate reporting: 
1) TOTALSCORE indicates the total score including all one hundred and four 
collected items  
2) CONTENT indicates the total score for the sixty-seven items  
3) TIMELINESS indicates the total score for the ten timeliness items  
4) PRESENTATION indicates the total score for the fourteen presentation 
items  
5) USABILITY indicates the total score for the thirteen items  
6) CG is the total score for the fifteen corporate governance disclosure items  
7) SOCIAL indicates the total score for the eleven social and environmental 
disclosure items  
8) ENGWEB indicates a company that has an English version website. 
9) FWEB indicates a company that has financial information on its website. 
 
5.8.2.3 Firm value variables 
In order to test the economic consequences of IFR, two widely used measures of the 
valuation of listed companies were applied in this study: Tobin’s Q and the Market to 
Book ratio. Tobin (1969) originally introduced Tobin’s Q ratio in an attempt to explain 
aggregate investment behaviour in the economy, arguing that if Tobin’s Q exceeded 
unity firms would have an incentive to invest, since the value of their new capital 
investment would exceed its cost. In another words, Tobin (1969) theorised that the 
economy-wide rate of capital goods investment was related to the ratio (Q) of the 
market value of assets to the replacement costs of those assets. However, since then 
slightly different formulations of Tobin’s Q have been implemented, in an effort to 
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capture the theoretical argument that relates market value to the cost of replacing those 
assets. Therefore, this empirical study follows the definition of Tobin’s Q based on the 
methodology of Lindenberg and Ross (1981), who assumes that the replacement values 
of assets equals book value. Moreover, a similar method was applied to calculate 
Tobin’s Q in research by Lang and Stulz (1994), Ezat (2010) and Shan and Xu (2012). 
The advantage of using this methodology is that it utilises only basic financial and 
accounting information, thereby avoiding the data availability problems created by the 
estimation of the more theoretically correct model. 
 
The approximation is defined as follows: 
 
Tobin’s Q = (Market value + Preferred stock+ Debt)/ Book value  
 
Where,  
Market value = the year-end market value of the firm’s common stock; 
Preferred stock = the year-end book value of the firm’s preferred stock; 
Debt = the year-end book value of the firm’s debt; 
and Book value = the firm’s year-end book value of total assets. 
 
As no preferred stock exists in China, the above formula reduces to:  
 
Tobin’s Q = (Market value + Debt)/ Book value in 2010 and 2011  
 
Alternatively, the Market-to-Book ratio (MBR) is widely used in the literature, and is 
taken to indicate the value that the market places on the common equity or net assets of 
a company (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Lee & Makhija, 2009), or as a reflection of the ability of 
managers to use assets effectively and to grow the firm. The ratio is largely used to 
indicate the premium that the market pays for the net assets; a high MB ratio is taken to 
indicate a high marginal efficiency of capital (rate of return) and reflects high added 
value by the management over the replacement cost of net assets. For the purposes of 
this study, the approximation is defined as follows: 
 
Market to Book Ratio (MBR) = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Equity in 2010 
and 2011.  
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5.8.2.4 Explanatory variables  
 
The explanatory variables include the firm characteristics: SIZE is measured as the 
natural logarithm of capitalisation at 2011, the PROFITABILITY is the average return 
on assets in 2010, and LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets in 2010. 
STASHARE and LEGSHARE measure the percentage of shares owned by state owned 
corporations or legal persons, respectively. Furthermore, FSHARE includes the 
percentage of all the other shares held by foreign investors, including B shares and H 
shares. BIG 4 indicates a company audited by a Big-4 international audit firm, and the 
INDUSTRY indicates whether the company is in the high technology category, on a yes 
and no basis, coded as 1 and 0, respectively (for high technology industry classification, 
see Chapter 4.3.4). Corporate governance factors include BOARDSIZE, which is the 
number of board directors, CEODUALITY (1 for CEO and the chairman positions 
occupied by one person, 0 indicates otherwise), and INDEPDIR (measured by the 
proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors). All these variables 
were obtained from the sample companies’ publicly disclosed reports for 2010 (with the 
exception of the Size) - see Table 5.3. 
 
Following the data collection and coding, an overview of the use of the Internet for 
disseminating financial information will be provided; both univariate and multivariate 
analytical approaches are employed in the descriptive study. Furthermore, sensitivity 
analytical approaches will be used to test different ways to measure the size of the 
company (total assets, turnover, and employee numbers).  
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Table 5.3 Explanations of dependent and independent variables 
Dependant variables Description of variables Source of information 
TOTAL SCORE Total score for all 104 disclosure items Company website 
CONTENT Total score for 67 content items Company website 
TIMELINESS Total score for the 10 timeliness items Company website 
PRESENTATION Total score for 14 presentation item Company website 
USABILITY Total score for the 13 usability items Company website 
CG Total score for 15 content items Company website 
SOCIAL  Total score for 11 content items Company website 
ENGWEB 1 if the company has an English website, 0 
otherwise 
Company website 
FWEB 1if the company has financial information on its 
website, 0 otherwise 
Company website 
 
FIRM VALUE 
Tobin’s Q (Market Value of Equity + Book Value 
of the Total Debt)/ Book Value of Total Assets in 
2010 and 2011  
Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE  
MBR in 2010 and 2011 Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
Explanatory variables   
SIZE  Natural logarithm of market capitalization in 2010 Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
PROFITABILITY 
(ROA) 
Rank transformed average return on assets in 2010 Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
LEVERAGE The ratio of current liabilities to current assets in 
2010 
Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
BOARDSIZE The number of board directors in 2010 Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
STASHARE Share held by state-owned corporations as 
proportion of total shares in 2010 
Wind financial database 
LEGSHARE Share held by legal persons as proportions of total 
shares in 2010 
Wind financial database 
FSHARE Share held by foreign shareholders in 2010 Wind financial database 
BIG 4 1 for companies audited by a big-4 auditing firm in 
2010, 0 otherwise 
Wind financial database 
INDUSTRY 1 for companies in high technology industry in 
2010, 0 otherwise 
 
Company guide by 
SHSE/SZSE 
INDEPDIR Independent directors as a proportion of totals 
directors in 2010 
Wind financial database 
CEODUALITY  1 for CEO and the chairman positions occupied by 
one person in 2010, 0 otherwise 
Wind financial database 
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5.8.3 Reliability assessment and validity assessment 
Reliability concerns the extent to which an experiment, test or any measuring procedure 
yields the same results in repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller, 1991). Reliability is 
defined as “whether an instrument can be interpreted consistently across different 
situations” (Field, 2009, P.12). It concerns the ability of measurement instruments to 
reproduce consistent results in repeated measurements (Hassan and Marston, 2010). 
Sekaran (2003) reports on the reliability of a measure as an indication of both the 
stability and consistency of measuring the concept using the research instrument. 
Stability refers to the ability of the measure to remain the same over time and to repeat 
the same results when used by another researcher (Marston and Shrives, 1991), while 
consistency indicates the homogeneity of the checklist items as one set in measuring a 
concept (Sekaran, 2003). 
 
There are three common forms of reliability: test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and 
internal consistency (Hassan and Marston, 2010). This study used test-retest to ensure 
the reliability of the project. After collecting the data from the web in September 2011, 
a colleague of the author’s randomly checked 50 sample websites to ensure the 
reliability of the research. The test-retest measures the stability of the results obtained 
from a measurement instrument over time (Hassan and Marston, 2010) and by different 
parties.  
 
Validity is defined as “the extent to which any measuring instrument measures what it is 
intended to measure” (Carmines and Zeller, 1991, P.20). There are three common types 
of validity: criterion validity, content validity and construct validity (Hassan and 
Marston, 2010). Correlation coefficient and Cronbach’s alpha are commonly used tests 
of internal reliability. Cronbach’s alpha essentially calculates the average of all possible 
spilt-half reliability coefficients. A computed alpha coefficient will vary between 1 
(denoting perfect internal reliability) and 0 (denoting no internal reliability). The figure 
of 0.7 is typically employed as a rule of thumb to denote an acceptable level of internal 
reliability. Cronbach’s alpha calculation is used in this research. In order to check the 
validity of the research, the author used Cronbach’s alpha test on the five dependent 
variables (TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION and 
USABILITY). The result of Cronbach’s alpha is .753, which ensured the internal 
reliability of the research (Table 5.4 and 5.5). 
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Table 5.4 Cronbach’s Alpha A 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
0.753 0.951 5 
 
Table 5.5 Cronbach’s Alpha B 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value 0.803 
N of Items 3a 
Part 2 Value 0.763 
N of Items 2b 
  Total N of Items 5 
  Correlation Between Forms 0.868 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient   Equal Length 0.929 
Unequal Length 0.932 
  Guttman Split-Half Coefficient 0.295 
a. The items are: TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, and TIMELINESS. 
b. The items are: PRESENTATION, USABILITY. 
 
5.9 Sample selection and data collection for qualitative research 
It was not possible to obtain all the information necessary to accomplish the aim of this 
study by means of content analysis. Therefore, the decision was taken to incorporate 
semi-structured interviews, to allow for variation and to elicit more information 
concerning IFR practices. The benefits of interviews are that they allow the researcher 
to gain insights and understanding into the issues and complexities associated with a 
phenomenon, which would be difficult to obtain via archival methods (Beasley et al., 
2009). These insights can include data concerning information not yet evidenced in 
theory (Lillis, 2006), such as key omitted variables (Lillis, 2008). Interviews also 
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provide rich insights for exploring, identifying, and understanding viewpoints, attitudes, 
and influences (Healy & Perry, 2000). Moreover, they allow flexibility (Silverman, 
1993), and can elicit highly detailed data such as insights into participants’ experiences 
(Cohen et al., 2002). 
There are three possible types of interview: structured interview, unstructured 
interviews and semi-structured interviews. Structured interviews, sometimes called 
standardised interviews, are usually conducted according to a face-to-face format or via 
telephone, using a standard set of questions to obtain data that can be aggregated, 
because identical questions have been asked of each participant. The nature of the 
questioning route for structured interviews is fixed, arranged in a given order, and 
standardised. The aim is for all interviewees to be questioned in exactly the same way. 
Conversely, unstructured interviews are conducted using a face-to-face format and 
generally aim to encourage participants to share stories. The researcher begins from the 
position of wanting to be sensitive to how participants construct their views and 
perspectives. Therefore, a key goal is to allow the participants to dominate and structure 
the interview process. The nature of the questioning route involves asking questions to 
encourage participants to discuss constructs/variables of interest with the researcher.  
 
Finally, semi-structured interviews can cover a wide range of instances. These typically 
refer to contexts in which the interviewer arranges a series of questions in the general 
form of an interview schedule, but is free to vary the sequence of these questions when 
conducting the interview. Moreover, the questions asked in semi-structured interviews 
are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of reference than those typically 
included in a structured interview schedule. Flick (1998) suggests that in a semi-
structured interview “more or less open-ended questions are brought to the interview 
situation in the form of an interview guide” (p.94). In addition, the interviewer usually 
has some latitude to ask additional unprepared questions in response to any replies that 
are perceived as significant. According to Marston (1999), semi-structured interviews 
“afford respondents the freedom to answer questions without restricting their responses, 
while the use of interview framework or agenda, may prevent excessive deviation from 
the research questions and issues” (p12).  
 
Therefore, the semi-structured interview format was chosen as the most appropriate for 
this study. The interviews will help the researcher to reveal and understand ‘what’ and 
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‘how’, while emphasising ‘why’ questions (Saunders et al., 2007). There has been no 
previous research undertaken concerning the area of perceptions of IFR research in 
China. The semi-structured interview combines the advantages of both fixed response 
and open-ended interviews, by establishing a main theme to be covered, whilst allowing 
for the sequence and the content of the interview to be flexible (Freebody, 2003). 
Furthermore, Weetman (1994) concluded that there are several advantages to such 
interviews when compared with questionnaires: specific and detailed answers by 
interviewees, clarity of answers, and the participation of interviewees in the soft “cross-
examination” process can unravel truthful information and insights. 
 
5.9.1 Sampling of respondents for the interviews  
Initially, twenty-seven participants were identified through “snowball procedures” 
(Tremblay & Gendron, 2011). Saunders et al. (2007) recommended that the researcher 
makes initial contact with just one or two cases and asks them to identify further cases. 
This procedure was followed for the purposes of this study. In mid-December 2010 in 
China, the researcher met up with a few analysts and participants identified through 
previous job connections, and they were asked to identify other potential interviewee 
groups, including twenty-five participants from the sample companies. In total, during 
September to December 2011, 27 interviews were carried out with the companies, 
comprising 14 face-to-face interviews and 13 telephone interviews. These included: 15 
interviews with companies with websites that include financial information; 7 
interviews with companies that have websites but do not include financial information; 
3 interviews with companies without websites, 2 interviews with regulators (Table 8.1). 
14 interviews were conducted in person and 13 by telephone, with the interview 
questions being identical in both cases. 8 of the 14 interviews conducted face-to-face 
were taped with the interviewees’ consent, along with explanatory notes. 6 of the face-
to-face interviews, and 13 of the telephone interviews, were not taped, but detailed notes 
were taken.  
 
5.9.2 Development of interview instrument  
Once the interview groups were confirmed, the interview themes were sent to them. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), providing participants with a list of interview 
themes prior to the actual interview may help to promote the credibility of the 
interviewers. Additionally, it may ‘promote reliability and validity by enabling the 
interviewee to consider the information being requested’. In a semi-structured interview, 
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an interview guide serves as a framework that ensures all particular sub-topics of 
interest have been covered and that more detailed or thoughtful information can be 
obtained (Arksey & Knight, 1999). For the purposes of this study, a standardised 
interview guide was used for all interviews to provide a consistent approach and 
coverage of identical themes in each interview (Beasley et al., 2009). The interview 
guide is normally designed to be a list of questions that the interviewer intends to ask 
during the interview, but from the interviewees’ perspective (Bryman, 2004).  
 
The interview questions were designed to encourage participants to “reconstruct their 
experience and to explore their meaning” (Seidman, 1998, p.76). Moreover, the 
interview questions were derived from the literature review in Chapter 3, including the 
literature concerning the motivations for constructing and maintaining websites; factors 
influencing why some companies do not disclose financial reporting on their websites 
and why some companies have no websites at all; perceptions of IFR and future 
implications for IFR. The interview guide included five themes and covered a number 
of issues that are treated as sub-themes (see Appendix 2). 
 
5.9.2.1 Reliability and validity of the research instrument 
Creswell (2003) indicated that with regard to qualitative research, reliability can be used 
to test consistent patterns of theme development amongst different investigators on a 
team. Furthermore, Hammersley (1990, p71) stated that validity means “truth: 
interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena 
to which it refers”. Validity is regarded as “strength of qualitative research”, as it is used 
to determine whether the findings are accurate from the point of view of the participants 
and the researcher. Similarly, Mason (1996) argued that reliability measures are more 
applicable to quantitative research, as they measure the consistency with which the 
same methods of data collection produce the same results. The logic behind reliability is 
that if the same phenomenon is measured more than once, using the same instrument, 
then it follows that the same results should be obtained. Therefore, qualitative 
researchers are unable to perform simple reliability tests, because the data generated 
will not have the form of a clearly standardised set of measurements. As a result, Mason 
(1996) suggested that reliability in qualitative research could be achieved by ensuring 
and demonstrating to others that the generation and analysis of data are not only 
appropriate to the research questions and objectives, but are also thorough, careful, 
honest and accurate. Therefore, researchers should demonstrate that they are not 
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careless in their recording and analysis of data and that the data was not invented or 
misrepresented. 
 
The translation of the Chinese interviews into English generates limitations. Sometimes, 
exact meanings are difficult to reproduce in a second language which has evolved in a 
different cultural context. In order to address such issues, the researcher re-contacted the 
participants to clarify any unclear matters. In addition, the researcher asked a colleague 
to review the translations of a few samples of the transcripts in order to ensure the 
validity of the translation.  
 
5.9.2.2 Ethical considerations of the research instrument 
It is necessary to exercise caution, since semi-structured interviews allow individuals to 
disclose thoughts and feelings, which are clearly private. The method relies on the inter-
personal skills of the interviewer, and their ability to establish relationships and rapport. 
These are valuable qualities, but ethically very sensitive. Therefore, at the outset of the 
interview, the types of questions to be asked, issues of confidentiality and often 
anonymity have to be thoroughly assessed and discussed (Newton, 2010). In addition, 
Creswell (2003) indicated that ethical issues should continue to be considered during 
the data analysis and interpretation, and during the actual writing and dissemination of 
the research report. For the purposes of this study, all the interviewees were assured of 
their anonymity.  
 
5.9.3 Data analysis 
Studies have demonstrated that there is no fixed method for analysing qualitative data 
(Yin, 2009). However, one of the main challenges associated with qualitative 
methodologies concerns the volume of data, and the large undertaking involved in 
processes such as: reducing the volume, identification of significant pieces of 
information and patterns, interpreting and making sense of information, and 
communicating findings (Patton, 2002). According to O’Donovan (1999), the use of 
semi-structured open-ended questions in qualitative research results in an enormous 
quantity of qualitative data. The data analysis approach undertaken involves a count of 
the frequency with each quality characteristic is mentioned by respondents. The aim of 
the analysis is to blend themes, quotes from participants, the author’s interpretation of 
these quotes, and a consideration of multiple theoretical perspectives to provide insights 
into the IFR practice (Hermanson et al., 2012).  
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The use of computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) such as 
Nvivo, offers a number of advantages (Bryman & Bell, 2011): CAQDAS enables 
researchers to deal with large amounts of qualitative data. This is possible because it 
reduces the amount of time required for the manual handling of data; it makes the 
process of coding and retrieval more efficient and faster; it enhances the ability to link, 
annotate and create relationships and, therefore, facilitates the development of 
explanations; and it can be used to count the frequency of occurrence of a certain 
viewpoint in interviews. However, the use of computer software programmes suffers 
from a few disadvantages: the possibility that the availability of computer analysis may 
lead to an emphasis on counting the frequency of categories, at the expense of 
understanding the quality of ideas and experiences (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). In 
addition, it is arguable that the critical thinking and the deep understanding about the 
data comes from the researcher, not the computer software (Omar, 1997). Therefore, in 
consideration of this, the decision was taken to analyse the transcripts manually.  
 
Initially, the data from each interview was fully transcribed and the translated 
transcripts were double checked to ensure accuracy (Kamla, 2005). Then the analysis of 
the contents of the transcripts involved organising interviewee responses into categories 
depending on the main themes presented in the interview guide. Coding schemes help to 
categorise and summarise the interview data (Beasley et al., 2009). The coding involves 
two simultaneous activities (Neuman, 2006): the mechanical data reduction and the 
analytic categorisation where the reduced data is organised, linked and pulled out 
according to the main themes. Since the data collection originated from a theoretical 
framework (see Chapter 4.2), a preliminary coding scheme was developed to reflect the 
framework, to ensure consistency between the interview data and the questions in the 
interview guide. The codes were refined into sub-categories to enable greater precision 
and to explain the initial constructs (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Based on the coded data, 
the researcher developed structured summaries for each participant and each code 
presented in the codebook. Tables and displays were developed using these summaries 
to provide a basis for comparative analysis. The aim of analysis is to present a 
combination of themes and quotes from participants, including the author’s 
interpretation of quotes, numerical results and consideration of multiple theoretical 
perspectives (Hermanson et al., 2012), to provide insight into the phenomenon of IFR 
practice.  
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5.10 Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodological decision taken and explained the overall 
procedures implemented for collecting, analysing, interpreting, and reporting the data. 
Taking into account the research purposes of this study and the general research 
question, the use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods made it 
possible to take advantage of triangulation and complementarity, and enhanced the 
validity of the overall research. 
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Chapter 6 Descriptive analysis and multivariate regression analysis of 
IFR by Chinese listed companies 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the results of the statistical analysis carried out in this study and 
is divided into three main parts. The first section describes the results of the survey of 
information from the websites and the measurement of dependent variables. The second 
section presents the results of the correlation between IFR disclosures and dependent 
variables, while the third section discusses the results of determinants of the IFR 
disclosures. Following a descriptive study, univariate and multivariate analysis were 
then used to test the hypotheses discussed in Chapter 4. The results of two logistic 
analysis test factors were affected by whether sample companies’ websites had English-
language versions or provided financial information. Additional sensitivity analysis was 
carried out using the alternative weighting system of IFR content and other components, 
the different measurement of company sizes and profitability. Conclusions are presented 
at the end of the chapter summarising the findings of the study. 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise and describe the amount and presentation of 
information on corporate websites as well as a combined measure of independent and 
dependent variables. The original sample, which consisted of 150 of the largest and 150 
of the smallest companies, was selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange; 284 (95%) of the companies had accessible websites. These 284 Chinese 
listed companies were rated based on the identified disclosure index. Table 6.1.1-6.1.7 
provide details of the number and frequency of the companies disclosing the individual 
items in the IFR checklist. Table 6.2 shows the frequency distribution of IFR total 
scores between the companies. Table 6.3 describes the categorical variables in this 
study. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 provide the descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
and independent variables, such as the mean, median, standard deviation, variance, 
skewness, kurtosis, range, minimum and maximum value. Those several descriptive 
statistics are often used to give a full picture of the data. 
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6.2.1 Disclosure frequency 
 
The disclosure checklist includes 104 items, of which 67 are content items, 10 are 
timeliness items, 14 are presentation items and 13 are usability items. In the following 
paragraphs, these content, timeliness, presentation and usability items are grouped and 
an analysis of the items in each group highlights the importance of each group in 
explaining the IFR practice by the Chinese listed companies. The highest frequency of 
companies disclosing item achieved in this survey was 100% (Graphic images) and the 
least frequency (Calendar for future financial events) was 9%. This indicates that there is a 
high degree of variation in the quality of the sample websites and the amount of 
information presented. The following sub-sections discuss the extent of disclosure 
among the groups of information, which comprises the disclosure index. 
 
6.2.1.1 Content items disclosed on websites  
 
Content, a fundamental part of any website analysis, is considered by many users to be 
the only criterion for website evaluation, provided that the site belongs to a reputable, 
credible, well-known, recognised, trusted or respected source (Tillotson, 2002). In this 
section, content disclosure, including accounting and financial information, corporate 
governance information, social responsibility information and contact details, were used 
to assess the quantity of information disclosed on Chinese listed companies’ websites. 
 
1)  Accounting and financial information 
 
Investors increasingly rely on corporate websites for periodic and annual financial 
statements (Allam and Lymer, 2003; Ettredge et al., 2000). A total of 36 accounting and 
financial information items were included in this study. It was found that the highest s 
frequency of companies disclosing item achieved in this survey was 68%, was for past 
financial highlights, whilst the lowest frequency of companies disclosing item, was 
10%, concerned earnings and sales forecasts. Some Chinese companies publish only 
their financial highlights on their websites, whilst others publish balance sheets, income 
statements and cash flow statements. This study found that about 67% of the total 
sample disclosed their current year balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow 
statement on their websites, whilst 63% of the companies disclosed their past year 
balance sheet, income statement, and 67% of past year cash flow statement. The annual 
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report is normally available about three months after the end of financial year. A total of 
62% of the sample companies in this study disclosed their current annual report and 
57% disclosed their past year annual reports. In contrast to Xiao et al. (2004), 44.3% of 
sample companies provided a current year balance sheet and current year income 
statement and 42.4% provided current year cash flow statement. A total of 63.5% 
sampled companies in Xiao et al. (2004) provided their past year balance sheet, past 
year income statement and cash flow statement. Xiao et al. (2004) also found that only 
33% of companies surveyed disclosed their current year annual report and 45.8% 
companies provided the past year annual report. These results show a steady 
improvement in the financial information disclosed on companies’ websites.  
 
The auditor’s report is an important source of credibility and reliability for annual 
reports. A formal auditor’s report must be signed and dated by the auditor. It was found 
that 60% of sampled Chinese listed companies provided auditors’ reports on their 
websites. In contrast, a study (Allam and Lymer, 2003) suggests that the availability of 
audit reports is much greater, in Hong Kong with 89.8% of a sample of 50 companies 
providing auditing data. Share price information is critical for investment decision 
making. Historical prices and past share price performance may be an indicator of future 
performance. In relation to the stock market index, 34% of companies disclosed share 
price history. Compared to the results of Xiao et al. (2004), only 5.4% of the surveyed 
companies provided share price history in their study. However, Marston and Polei 
(2004) found that 93% of German companies disclosed the same item on their websites. 
Another study by Kelton and Yang (2008) found that 62.3% of companies listed on the 
NASDAQ National Market disclosed share price history on their websites.  
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Table 6.1.1 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Accounting 
and Financial information) 
Accounting and Financial information Number Percentage 
1.1.1 Balance sheet of current year 190 67% 
1.1.2 Balance sheet of past year 179 63% 
1.1.3 Income statement of current year 190 67% 
1.1.4 Income statement of past year 179 63% 
1.1.5 Cash flow statement of current year 190 67% 
1.1.6 Cash flow statement of past year 190 67% 
1.1.7 Notes to the financial statement of current year 182 64% 
1.1.8 Notes to financial statement of past year 173 61% 
1.1.9 Auditor report of current year 170 60% 
1.1.10 Auditor report of past year 153 54% 
1.1.11 Quarterly report of current year 182 64% 
1.1.12 Quarterly report of past year 182 64% 
1.1.13 Half-year report of current year 176 62% 
1.1.14 Half-year report of past year 176 62% 
1.1.15 Annual report of current year 176 62% 
1.1.16 Annual report of past year 162 57% 
1.1.17 Top ten stockholders in the current year 185 65% 
1.1.18 Statement of changes in stockholders' equity  190 67% 
1.1.19 Management report 173 61% 
1.1.20 Share price history 96 34% 
1.1.21 Market share of key products 62 45% 
1.1.22 Share price performance in relation to stock market index 119 42% 
1.1.23 Summary of key financial ratios 193 68% 
1.1.24 Past press release 275 97% 
1.1.25 Segmental reporting 182 64% 
1.1.26 Financial statements according to China GAAP 210 74% 
1.1.27 The difference between China GAAP and IFRS 48 52% 
1.1.28 Past financial highlights/summary 193 68% 
1.1.29 Earnings or sales forecast 28 10% 
1.1.30 Industry statistics or data 43 15% 
1.1.31 Past dividends 168 67% 
1.1.32 Performance analysis 125 44% 
1.1.33 Links to financial analysts 74 26% 
1.1.34 Links to Chinese Stock Exchange 62 22% 
1.1.35 Supplement or Amendment to current year annual report 28 34% 
1.1.36 Earnings release 136 48% 
Total Accounting and Financial information 36   
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2)  Corporate governance information disclosed on websites 
Corporate governance disclosures are highly important for investors in determining the 
extent to which companies may uphold integrity and good corporate governance. The 
transparency and disclosure study conducted by S&P in 2001 and 2002 provides 
corporate ranking scores based on the quantity of governance-related disclosure (Patel 
and Dallas, 2002): ownership structure and investors rights, board and management 
structure and process and financial transparency and information disclosure. In this 
study, the index contained 15 items of corporate governance information; the level of 
disclosure varied from a maximum of 73% to a minimum of 17%. It was found that 
73% of the sample companies disclosed notice of meetings and agendas to annual 
shareholders’ meeting on their websites. A total of 61% of the companies disclosed the 
remuneration of board of directors on their websites in this study, a very high figure 
compared to the results of Boubaker et al. (2012). Only 2.45% of French listed 
companies disclosed this item on their websites. It was found that 67% of Chinese listed 
companies disclosed ownership on their websites. Similar findings were obtained by 
Boubaker et al. (2012), who found that 47.17% companies disclosed the same item. On 
the other hand, 52% of the Chinese listed companies surveyed provided the chairman’s 
message to shareholders.  
Table 6.1.2 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Corporate 
Governance information) 
 Corporate Governance information Number Percentage 
1.2.1 Notice of meetings and agenda to annual shareholders' meeting 207 73% 
1.2.2 Speeches of the management board during the AGM 170 60% 
1.2.3 Articles of Association 122 43% 
1.2.4 Code of Ethics 48 17% 
1.2.5 Board of directors names or photos  80 28% 
1.2.6 Board of directors (C. V, profiles and executives/non executives) 185 65% 
1.2.7 Remuneration of board of directors 173 61% 
1.2.8 Management Team 190 67% 
1.2.9 Chairman's message to shareholders 148 52% 
1.2.10 Organizational Structure 204 72% 
1.2.11 Ownership structure 190 67% 
1.2.12 Corporate governance principles/guidelines 102 36% 
1.2.13 Management's plan to meet objectives and strategies 161 57% 
1.2.14 Charters of audit committee 88 31% 
1.2.15 Charters of other committee 128 45% 
Total Corporate Governance information 15   
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3) Social responsibility information disclosed on websites 
Since the late 1990s, the Internet has become a key communication channel used by 
companies to disseminate corporate social responsibility information (Campbell, 2004). 
It is increasingly used by companies as the sole source of corporate social responsibility 
information; companies now provide more social responsibility information on their 
corporate websites than they do in traditional ‘hard copy’ reports (Trabelsi et al., 2004). 
In this study, the index contained 11 items of Social Responsibility Information; the 
scores of disclosure varied widely from a maximum of 99% to a minimum of 32%. It 
was found that almost 99% of sample companies disclosed their company profile on 
their websites, whilst only 32% of sample companies disclosed their corporate 
responsibility report. The customer profile could be considered important for investors 
in determining the liquidity of the company or its risk profile. In Álvarez et al. (2008), 
only 12.8% of Spanish companies disclosed environmental reports on their websites. 
Boubaker et al. (2012) found that 28.3% of French listed companies provided an 
environmental report and 32% of the companies surveyed provided corporate 
responsibility reports. Álvarez et al. (2008) found that more Spanish listed companies 
(41.9%) disclosed corporate responsibility reports on their websites. However, 
Boubaker et al. (2012) found that only 20.75% of French listed companies provided 
corporate responsibility reports in their study.  
Table 6.1.3 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Social 
Responsibility information) 
 
Social Responsibility Information Number Percentage 
1.3.1 Company profile 281 99% 
1.3.2 Company history 159 56% 
1.3.3 Employee profile/training 142 50% 
1.3.4 Human resources Information 236 83% 
1.3.5 Environmental /safety health Report 94 33% 
1.3.6 Corporate responsibility report 91 32% 
1.3.7 Mission/Vision statement 173 61% 
1.3.8 Discussing on product quality and safety 185 65% 
1.3.9 Certificate of quality assurance (ISO) or awards of best practice 
(for service Companies) 
196 
  
69% 
  
1.3.10 Donations/sponsoring to community groups 159 56% 
1.3.11 Links to products services and sales information 261 92% 
Total Social Responsibility Information 11   
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4)  Contact details information disclosed on websites 
The availability of contact details on companies’ websites is desirable as it enables 
investors to save the address in their mailing lists and to send requests at any time 
without the need to visit the company’s website. It was found that 89% of companies 
had some form of investor relations section, compared to 58.6% in Xiao et al. (2004). 
This reflected an increase in the amount of companies who disclose the existence of 
investor relations. It was found that 37% of the sampled companies provided e-mail 
contacts on their web pages, whilst Xiao et al. (2004) suggested that 15.3% of 
companies provided e-mail contact in China. This study showed an increase compared 
to Xiao et al. (2004). At the same time, companies in this study lagged behind US 
companies with regard to e-mail services. 
Table 6.1.4 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Contact Details 
information)  
Contact Details Information Number Percentage 
1.4.1 The existence of investor relations section 253 89% 
1.4.2 Name of investor relations officer 45 16% 
1.4.3 E-mail to investor relations 105 37% 
1.4.4 Phone number to investor relations 102 36% 
1.4.5 Postal address to investor relations 77 27% 
Total Contact Details Information 5   
 
6.2.1.2 Timeliness of information disclosed on websites 
Timeliness of voluntary disclosure is a necessary component of relevant financial 
information to meet the needs of users and to make decisions. The Internet enables 
companies to voluntarily communicate share prices, press conferences and other 
information via email and webcasts to large global audiences of current and perspective 
investors (Abdelsalam and Street, 2007). Fisher, Oyelere & Laswad (2004) identify 
growing user demand for the increased timeliness of IFR disclosure. With regard to the 
timeliness of information disclosed on the websites of Chinese sample companies, the 
checklist contained 10 items. A total of 98% of the companies in this study disclosed 
current press releases and news on their websites, compared to 9% of companies 
providing current share price on their websites.  
 
Almost 98% of the companies in this study disclosed current press releases and news on 
their websites, compared to 60.1% in Xiao et al. (2004). Current share price is one of 
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the most crucial information for investors to make decisions. As shown in Table 6.1, 
59% of sampled companies disclosed their current share price. A total of 93% of sample 
companies in Germany surveyed by Marston and Polei (2004) provided current share 
prices.  
Table 6.1.5 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Timeliness of 
information) 
Timeliness of information Number Percentage 
2.1 Current press releases or news 278 98% 
2.2 Current share price 168 59% 
2.3 Calendar for future financial events 26 9% 
2.4 Pages indicate the latest update 264 93% 
2.5 Hints for finding current information directly 170 60% 
2.6 Current key financial ratios 187 66% 
2.7 Current financial highlight/summary 185 65% 
2.8 Option to register for future e-mail alerts regarding press releases, 
newsletters, etc 
31 
  
11% 
  
2.9 The most recent quarterly report reports 159 56% 
2.10 Current dividends announcements 114 40% 
Total Timeliness 10     
 
6.2.1.3 Presentation of information disclosed on websites 
Presentation is a prime component in making the site easier to use (Calero et al., 2005). 
Presentation formats can provide more transparent disclosures by enhancing the 
readability, accessibility and ease of understanding of financial information (FASB, 
2000). In relation to the presentation of the sample websites, this checklist contained 13 
items of presentation information and the disclosure score varied from a maximum of 
100% to a minimum of 10%. It was found that 100% of companies have graphic images 
on their websites while 12% of companies have investor presentation on their websites.  
 
The most popular formats used in building websites are PDF (Portable Document File) 
and HTML (Hyper Text Mark-up Languages). Each has its own advantage and 
disadvantage. PDFs can be used to create exact representations of the original printed 
documents, with all the elements of the printed document captured as an electronic 
image. It was found 62% of Chinese companies disclosed their annual reports in PDF 
format, whilst 17% disclosed their annual reports in HTML format on their websites. 
About 8% of the sample used both formats on their websites. Xiao et al. (2004) reported 
that 28.6% of companies disclosed their annual reports in PDF format and 49.3% in 
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HTML format. In Thailand, Davey and Homkajohn (2004) report that 49% of Thai 
companies disclose this item in PDF format and 94.5% disclose it in HTML format.  
 
Webcasting events over the Internet are a relatively new technology that allows many 
investors and analysts with an Internet connection to obtain access to live events, such 
as conference calls, analysts and road-show meetings regardless of their location (Allam 
and Lymer, 2003). Only 10% of companies in this study disclosed webcast events on 
their websites. In contrast, a survey by Allam and Lymer in 2003 found only 4% of 
companies in Hong Kong provided webcasts in 2003. None of the Indian companies 
surveyed by Malhotra and Makkar (2012) provided webcasts on their websites.  
 
About 73% of the companies in this study have translated their web pages into English, 
which could indicate that they wish their website to be accessed by existing and 
potential shareholders anywhere in the world as part of their focus on globalisation. 
Compared with Xiao et al. (2004), 47.3% Chinese listed companies provide English-
language versions of their websites. In contrast, 96% of German companies had an 
English-language version of their home page in 2000 (Marston and Polei, 2004). 
Table 6.1.6 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Presentation 
information) 
 
Presentation Number Percentage 
3.1 Annual report in PDF-format 176 62% 
3.2 Annual report in HTML-format 48 17% 
3.3 Any financial statements in PDF format 182 64% 
3.4 Any financial statements in HTML format 54 19% 
3.5 Graphic images 284 100% 
3.6 Flashes (moving pictures) 264 93% 
3.7 Sound files 45 16% 
3.8 Video files 139 49% 
3.9Webcast events 28 10% 
3.10 Clear boundaries between the annual report and other information 179 63% 
3.11 Change to printing friendly format possible 196 69% 
3.12Ability to download information 201 71% 
3.13 Investor presentation 34 12% 
3.14 English language of home page 207 73% 
Total Presentation 14     
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6.2.1.4 Usability of information disclosed on websites 
Usability is an important aspect of website design that allows users to more easily 
acquire most of the information they require (Calero et al., 2005). Increased usability 
enables website users to achieve their goals effectively, efficiently and satisfactorily 
(Andrés et al., 2009). In this study, there were 17 items in the checklist relating to 
website usability. The highest score is next/previous/top buttons to navigate 
sequentially, which scored 97%, and the lowest score is help site, which scored 10%.  
Table 6.1.7 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies (Usability 
information) 
Usability Number Percentage 
4.1 Link to annual report on home page 45 16% 
4.2 Help site 28 10% 
4.3 Pull-down menu 182 64% 
4.4 Internal search box 168 59% 
4.5 Next/previous/top buttons to navigate sequentially 275 97% 
4.6 One click to get to investor relations information 204 72% 
4.7 Site Map 136 48% 
4.8 Feed Back 94 33% 
4.9 Table of contents 99 35% 
4.10 Privacy statement 119 42% 
4.11 Legal statement 113 40% 
4.12 FAQ (in the Investor relation page) 48 17% 
4.13 External links (other than Chinese Stock Exchange) 193 68% 
Total Usability 13     
 
6.2.2 Frequencies of IFR total scores 
Table 6.2 presents the frequencies of the IFR total scores disclosed by Chinese listed 
companies. Only 2.8% of companies disclosed over 90 items on their websites. These 
very high scores suggest that a few companies disclose very comprehensive information 
on their websites and thus take nearly full advantage of IFR. About 62% of companies’ 
scores were above 50%, which indicates effective usage of the Internet as a 
disseminating tool in the Chinese context. At the same time, about 17.2% of the 
companies’ scores were between 11 and 20, and 11.3% between 21 and 30. This 
indicates that some of sample companies still disclose relatively little information online 
and do not make effective use of the Internet. The wide variation in results can be 
examined using multivariate analysis (see 6.4.2).  
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Table 6.2 Frequencies of IFR total scores 
Max no. of items disclosed  Number of companies Percentage 
0-10 1 0.4% 
11-20 49 17.2% 
21-30 33 11.3% 
31-40 9 3.1% 
41-50 17 6% 
51-60 19 7.1% 
61-70 63 22.5% 
71-80 48 16.6% 
81-90 37 13% 
Over 90 8 2.8% 
TOTAL 284 100% 
 
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
6.2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables 
Table 6.3 shows that of companies with accessible websites, 207 (73%) had an English-
language version, whilst 14 (5%) companies had multi-lingual versions. Xiao et al. 
(2004) found that 47.3% of companies had English-language websites. This study 
therefore shows that the number of companies offering English-language websites has 
increased. It was found that 206 (72.9%) of companies provided financial information 
on their websites. Similarly, Allam and Lymer (2003) found that 96% of companies in 
five developed countries surveyed disclosed financial information on their websites. 
Marston and Polei (2004) found that 99% of sample companies disclosed financial 
information on their websites. Bollen et al. (2006) found that 100% of companies 
surveyed in Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, South Africa and the UK 
disclosed financial information on their websites. About 70% of companies in Kuwait 
disclose financial information (Al-Shammari et al. 2007) on their websites. This study 
indicated that, although there are now relatively large numbers of companies disclosing 
financial information on their websites, the number is smaller than in developed 
countries. 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Categorical variables 
 
Dependent Variables Number (N=284) Percentage of sample (%) 
ENGWEB 207 73 
FWEB 206 72.9 
Independent Variables    
CEODUALITY 56 19.7 
INDUSTRY 40 14.1 
BIG4 61 21.5 
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This study found that 56 (19.7%) of companies’ CEO and the chairman positions 
occupied by one person, This figure is relatively low compared to Kelton and Yang 
(2008), who found that 59% of CEOs in their sample companies were also the chair of 
the board of directors. About 40 (14%) were considered to fall under the high-
technology industry category. Only 61 companies (approximately 22%) were audited by 
the Big-4 in this study. Xiao et al. (2004) found that 17.2% companies were audited by 
the Big-5 in their study. On the other hand, Kelton and Yang (2008) suggested that 97% 
of the sample companies had a Big-4 auditor in the US in 2003.  
 
6.2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
Table 6.4 shows that the means of 104 disclosure scores, 67 content items, 15 corporate 
governance items, 11 social responsibility items, 10 timeliness items, 14 presentation 
items and 13 usability items are 0.53, 0.54, 0.52, 0.63, 0.56, 0.51, and 0.46 respectively. 
The mean total score is therefore 0.53 (range 0.07 to 0.95) and the median score is 0.61 
of a total disclosure score. Compared to Chou et al (2008), the mean score for all items 
(44) across the 1057 companies in the disclosure index was 0.28 (range: 0.00 to 0.75). 
The mean scores for the 15 corporate governance items was 0.52 in this study, 
compared to Chou et al (2008), the mean sore for 10 corporate governance items was 
0.41 respectively. This therefore shows that although the sample companies included 
135 of the smallest companies, the information disclosed appears to have improved.  
 
The skewness values of TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, TIMELINESS, and 
PRESENTATION were -0.37, -0.40, -0.24, -0.30 and -0.27 respectively. Positive 
skewness values indicate a positive skew, whilst scores clustered to the left indicate low 
values. The negative skewness values indicate a clustering of scores at the high end, 
whilst a negative value indicates that the score is piled up on the right of the 
distribution.  In this study, the skewness values of TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, 
TIMELINESS, and PRESENTATION were negative, which indicate that the scores for 
these items accumulated on the right of the distribution. On the other hand, the 
skewness values of SOCIAL and USABILITY are positive, which indicates that the 
scores accumulated on the left of the distribution. 
 
The kurtosis values indicate TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION and USABILITY were   -1.30, -1.38, -1.28, -1.13, -1.25, -0.72 and    
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-0.43. Positive kurtoses indicate that distribution is rather peaked; kurtosis values below 
0 indicate that a distribution is relatively flat, which indicates a heavy-tailed or a peaked 
distribution (Fields, 2009). In this study, the kurtoses of all variables were negative 
which indicates that the distribution was relatively flat. With reasonably large samples, 
skewness will not “make a substantive difference in analysis” (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001, p.75). Kurtosis may result in an underestimate of the variance, but the risk is also 
reduced with a large sample (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001, p.75). 
 
6.2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
Descriptive Statistics show that the largest company had a market capitalisation of 
1.85E+12(RMB¥1.85 Billion). The minimum company market capitalisation was 
3.65E+08(RMB¥36.5 Million), and the average was 5.48E+10(RMB¥54.8 thousand 
million). The variables of size (named LNSIZE) were logarithmically transformed to 
handle situations in which a non-linear relationship exists between the independent and 
dependent variables. Using the logarithm of one or more variables rather than the un-
logged form makes the effective relationship non-linear while still preserving the linear 
model. Logarithmic transformations are also a convenient means of transforming a 
highly skewed variable into one that is closer to normal.  
 
Descriptive Statistics show that the range of STASHARE was 82.66%, the minimum 
percentage 0%, the mean of percentage 10.30% and the median percentage 0%. The 
range of LEGSHARE was 100%, the minimum percentage 0%, the mean percentage 
8.066% and the median percentage 0%, which is slightly smaller than STASHARE. For 
FSHARE, the range was 96.16%, the minimum percentage 0%, the mean percentage 
5.53% and the median percentage of FSHARE was 0%. All the independent variables 
have positive skewness except LEVERAGE. Positive skewness values indicate positive 
skew, with scores clustered to the left having low values. All the independent variables 
had positive kurtosis with the exception LEVERAGE, which indicates that distribution 
is rather peaked 
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Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 
 
Note: All the variables are defined in Table 5.3. 
 
  N Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis Range Minimum Maximum 
TOTALSCORE 284 0.53 0.61 0.25 0.06 -0.37 -1.30 0.88 0.07 0.95 
CONTENT 284 0.54 0.64 0.29 0.08 -0.40 -1.38 0.92 0.03 0.96 
CG 284 0.52 0.60 0.31 0.10 -0.24 -1.28 1.00 0.00 1.00 
SOCIAL 284 0.63 0.64 0.25 0.06 0.04 -1.13 0.91 0.09 1.00 
TIMELINESS 284 0.56 0.60 0.26 0.07 -0.30 -1.25 0.90 0.10 1.00 
PRESENTATION 284 0.51 0.57 0.21 0.04 -0.27 -0.72 0.93 0.07 1.00 
USABILITY 284 0.46 0.46 0.19 0.04 0.31 -0.43 1.00 0.00 1.00 
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6.2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables for comparison between bigger 
companies and smaller companies 
 
Table 6.6 compares the 149 bigger and 135 smaller companies in the sample, which 
provides a clear picture of the differences in independent variables between the two 
groups. The highest total score was 0.95 for the bigger companies and 0.75 for the 
smaller. The lowest total score for the bigger companies was 0.13 and the lowest score 
for the smaller companies was 0.07. The mean score for the bigger companies was 
0.663 compared to 0.388 for the smaller companies, and the median of the IFR score for 
the bigger companies was 0.726 compared to 0.373 for the smaller companies. These 
results indicate that bigger companies have better IFR scores than smaller companies. 
The skewness value for the bigger companies was -1.25; whereas, the skewness value 
for smaller companies was 0.186. This indicated that the scores for total IFR items for 
the bigger companies were accumulated on the right side of the distribution, and those 
for the smaller companies were on the opposite side.  The Kurtosis value found for the 
bigger companies was 0.664 and for the smaller companies it was -1.578. A positive 
kurtosis value indicates that the distribution of IFR scores for bigger companies was 
relatively flat; whereas, on the other hand, the distribution of IFR scores for the smaller 
companies was rather peaked. 
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Table 6.5 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
  N Mean Median Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Skewness Kurtosis Range Minimum Maximum 
SIZE 284 5.48E+10 2.98E+10 1.51E+11 2.28E+22 8.131 82.071 1.85E+12 3.65E+08 1.85E+12 
LNSIZE 284 23.1795 24.1185 1.88476 3.552 0.188 -1.395 8.53 19.71 28.25 
ROA 284 5.9935 4.6826 6.30425 39.744 0.814 2.471 51.37 -18.8 32.56 
LEVERAGE 284 0.5116 0.5181 0.23541 0.055 -0.111 -0.518 1.08 0.01 1.1 
STASHARE 284 10.3012 0.00 21.41064 458.416 1.961 2.417 82.66 0.00 82.66 
LEGSHARE 284 8.066 0.00 19.62784 385.252 3.065 9.103 100 0.00 100 
FSHARE 284 5.5307 0.00 12.96065 167.979 2.863 10.428 96.16 0.00 96.16 
BOARDSIZE 284 12.72 12 4.602 21.178 1.054 0.778 23 5 28 
INDEPDIR 284 36.1239 33.33 8.82539 77.887 0.943 1.958 63.33 16.67 80 
 
Note: All the variables are defined in Table 5.3. 
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Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics of dependent Variables for comparison between bigger companies and smaller companies 
  N Mean Median Std. Deviation Variance Skewness Kurtosis Range Minimum Maximum 
TOTALSCOREA 149 0.663 0.726 0.206 0.042 -1.25 0.664 0.83 0.13 0.95 
TOTALSCOREB 135 0.388 0.373 0.214 0.046 0.186 -1.578 0.69 0.07 0.75 
CONTENTA 149 0.681 0.761 0.237 0.056 -1.338 0.696 0.88 0.07 0.96 
CONTENTB 135 0.381 0.349 0.252 0.063 0.24 -1.574 0.79 0.03 0.82 
CGA 149 0.662 0.733 0.252 0.064 -0.688 -0.457 0.93 0.07 1.00 
CGB 135 0.354 0.267 0.296 0.088 0.341 -1.35 0.93 0.00 0.93 
SOCALA 149 0.765 0.818 0.244 0.059 -0.772 -0.601 0.91 0.09 1.00 
SOCIALB 135 0.486 0.455 0.172 0.03 0.226 0.284 0.91 0.09 1.00 
TIMELINESSA 149 0.684 0.700 0.215 0.046 -0.971 0.245 0.90 0.10 1.00 
TIMELINESSB 135 0.417 0.400 0.228 0.052 0.227 -1.521 0.70 0.10 0.80 
PRESENTATIONA 149 0.619 0.643 0.166 0.027 -0.52 0.533 0.86 0.14 1.00 
PRESENTATIONB 135 0.394 0.357 0.186 0.035 0.047 -1.274 0.71 0.07 0.79 
USABILITYA 149 0.548 0.539 0.188 0.035 -0.19 -0.257 1.00 0.00 1.00 
USABILITYB 135 0.366 0.385 0.133 0.018 0.294 -0.384 0.62 0.08 0.69 
Notes: A indicates the scores for 149 bigger companies, B indicates the scores for 135 smaller companies.
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6.3 Univariate analysis 
Both Pearson's product moment correlation as a parametric test and Spearman’s rank 
order correlation, as a non-parametric test, were run to measure the relationship between 
all the components of IFR and independent variables. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is the most widely used measure of correlation between two variables. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient is a measure of the strength of the linear relationship 
between two normally distributed variables. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is a 
nonparametric (distribution-free) rank statistic proposed as a measure of the strength of 
the association between two variables. It is a measure of a monotone association that is 
used when the distribution of data makes Pearson’s correlation coefficient undesirable 
or misleading. Unlike Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient, it does not 
require the assumption that the relationship between the variables is linear, nor does it 
require the variables to be measured on interval scales; it can be used for variables 
measured at the ordinal level (Hauke & Kossowski, 2011). As two different types of 
variables were used in this study: interval/ratio scale and ordinal scale data, it was 
useful to use both Pearson’s product correlation and Spearman’s rank order correlation 
test to measure the relationship between all the components of IFR and independent 
variables. The results are shown below: 
 
6.3.1 Pearson correlations 
Several significant correlations were observed among dependent and independent 
variables, as shown in Table 6.7. These suggest the potential for quite a few of the 
hypotheses to be supported. SIZE (log-transformed measurement of size of 
capitalisation) has significant correlations with TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, 
TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION and USABILITY. LN_SIZE was strongly positively 
associated with all the disclosure variables, which supports H1. LEVERAGE was 
significantly related with TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION and USABILITY, which supports H3. INDUSTRY is significantly 
related with TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION, and 
USABILITY. BIG was significantly related with TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, 
TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION, and USABILITY, which means that companies that 
are being audited by Big-4 auditors and companies in the high-technology industry tend 
to have a higher disclosure score index, supporting hypotheses H5 and H6. Both 
BOARDSIZE and INDEPDIR are significantly related to TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, 
TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION, and USABILITY, supporting hypotheses H10 and 
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H11. FSHARE is significantly related to all disclosure variables, which supports 
hypothesis H8. There were significant correlations between STASHRE, 
PRESENTATION and USABILITY, but not with TOTALSCORE, CONTENT or 
TIMELINESS. LEGSHARE is significantly related to TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, 
TIMELINESS and PRESENTATION, but not with USABILITY. Of the test variables, 
ROA and CEODUALITY were not found to significantly correlate with any of the 
disclosure dependent variables, namely TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION, and USABILITY. This does not support hypotheses H2, H9. 
ENGWEB (an indicator of having an English-language version of the website) was 
associated with SIZE, BIG4 and FSHARE. 
 
6.3.2 Spearman’s rho correlations 
There were a number of significant correlations between the dependent and independent 
variables, as shown in Table 6.8. Similarly, SIZE (log-transformed measurement of size 
of capitalisation) is significantly related to TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION, and USABILITY, suggesting hypothesis H1. LEVERAGE, 
IDUSTRY, BIG4, STASHARE, FSHARE, BOARDSIZE, INDEPDIR were all 
significantly related to TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION 
and USABILITY, which is supports H3, H4, H5, H6, H8, H10 and H11. LEGSHARE 
only has a weak relationship with TIMELINESS. In view of the results of the Pearson 
correlations, ROA and CEODUALITY were not found to significantly correlate with 
any of the disclosure dependent variables (TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION, and USABILITY). This does not tend to support hypotheses H2 or 
H9. ENGWEB (an indicator of having an English-language version of the website) was 
associated with SIZE, LEVERAGE, BIG4 and FSHARE. 
 
The differences results between the Pearson correlation test and Spearman’s test are: 1) 
there are significant correlations between STASHRE and PRESENTATION and 
USABILITY, but not TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS in the Pearson 
correlation test. However, there was a significant relationship between STASHARE and 
TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION and USABILITY in 
the Spearman test. 2) For LEGSHARE, LEVERAGE is significantly related with 
TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION and USABILITY in 
the Pearson correlation test, whilst LEGSHARE only has a weak relationship with 
TIMELINESS in Spearman’s test.  
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Table 6.7 Pearson Correlations Matrix of Independent and dependent variables  
  
TOTAL
SCORE 
CONT
ENT 
TIMEL
INESS 
PRESEN
TATION 
USABILI
TY 
ENG 
WEB 
LN 
SIZE 
ROA LEVE
RAGE 
INDUS
TRY 
BIG4 STAS
HARE 
LEGSHA
RE 
FSHA
RE 
CEOD
UALIT
Y 
BOARD
SIZE 
INDEPD
IR 
TOTALSCO
RE 
1                                 
CONTENT .993** 1                               
TIMELINE
SS 
.928** .910** 1                             
PRESENTA
TION 
.895** .859** .804** 1                           
USABILIT
Y 
.724** .658** .648** .670** 1                         
ENGWEB .244** .208** .233** .316** .316** 1                       
LNSIZE .608** .577** .572** .592** .579** .213** 1                     
ROA 0.074 0.086 0.065 0.055 -0.025 0.002 .296** 1                   
LEVERAG
E 
.248** .224** .238** .249** .309** 0.112 .383** -.404** 1                 
INDUSTRY .289** .277** .245** .275** .291** 0.036 .232** -.136* .222** 1               
BIG4 .473** .450** .430** .457** .466** .203** .561** -0.038 .346** .190** 1             
STASHARE 0.106 0.087 0.076 .203** .114* -0.018 .352** 0.082 0.036 -0.058 .146* 1           
LEGSHARE .131* -.126* -.140* -.150* -0.069 0.019 -0.115 .227** -.131* -0.081 -0.061 -0.093 1         
FSHARE .301** .284** .316** .276** .287** .159** .271** -0.098 .298** 0.113 .463** 0.002 -.140* 1       
CEODUALI
TY 
-0.013 -0.015 -0.024 -0.016 0.018 -0.103 -.163** -0.027 .209** -0.034 0.065 0.057 -.120* -0.002 1     
BOARDSIZ
E 
.225** .221** .183** .233** .176** -0.012 .345** -0.112 .451** .283** .262** 0.064 -.151* .263** -.141* 1   
INDEPDIR .198** .186** .212** .194** .182** 0.106 .147* 0.038 -0.033 0.000 .154** .118* -0.009 0 0.018 -.233** 1 
** Significant at the 0.01 level * Significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 6.8 Spearman’ rho Correlations Matrix of Independent and dependent variables  
  
TOTALS
CORE 
CONTE
NT 
TIME
LINES
S 
PRESEN
TATION 
USABI
LITY 
ENGW
EB 
LNSIZ
E 
ROA LEVER
AGE 
INDUS
TRY 
BIG4 STAS
HARE 
LEGS
HARE 
FSHA
RE 
CEO
DUA
LITY 
BOARD
SIZE 
INDEP
DIR 
TOTALSC
ORE 
1                 
CONTENT .986** 1                
TIMELINE
SS 
.908** .881** 1               
PRESENT
ATION 
.856** .807** .757** 1              
USABILIT
Y 
.762** .684** .644** .673** 1             
ENGWEB .270** .229** .236** .331** .320** 1            
LNSIZE .648** .623** .574** .569** .576** .183** 1           
ROA 0.095 0.103 0.077 0.076 0.055 0.050 .220** 1          
LEVERAG
E 
.292** .263** .277** .273** .282** .121* .349** -.425** 1         
INDUSTR
Y 
.298** .290** .239** .267** .283** 0.036 .239** -.186** .207** 1        
BIG4 .517** .504** .452** .467** .436** .203** .538** -0.044 .321** .190** 1       
STASHAR
E 
.165** .153** .122* .232** .149** 0.003 .337** 0.091 0.035 -0.061 0.112 1      
LEGSHAR
E 
-0.098 -0.097 -.140* -0.091 -0.015 -0.001 -0.126* .190** -.133* -0.002 -0.104 0.049 1     
FSHARE .416** .396** .392** .338** .355** .167** .369** -0.095 .296** 0.087 .549** .121* -0.146* 1    
CEODUAL
ITY 
0.000 0.001 -0.021 -0.003 0.011 -0.103 0.142* -0.065 .199** -0.034 0.065 0.025 -0.141* 0.014 1   
BOARDSI
ZE 
.223** .216** .190** .217** .162** -0.049 .334** -0.140* .422** .232** .234** 0.105 -0.132* .244** .175** 1  
INDEPDIR .196** .181** .199** .182** .170** 0.095 .149* 0.036 -0.033 0.024 .148* 0.07 -0.047 0.025 -
0.003 
-.263** 1 
** Significant at the 0.01 level * Significant at the 0.05 level 
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6.4 Multivariate regression analysis 
Multivariate analysis is a common technique that extends the univariate analyses by 
modelling the relationship between a dependent variable and other independent 
variables. In this chapter, three multivariate analyses were used to examine the 
association between the extent of IFR components and their explanatory variables. 
These analyses are: partly transformed data regression model, rank scores regression 
model and the normal scores regression model. The OLS regression equation used is as 
follows: 
 
Y=β0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+β5X5+β6X6+β7X7+β8X8+β9X9+β10X10+β11X1 
+Ɛ 
 
Where Y=the total scores (TOTALSCORE), the content scores (CONTENT), the 
corporate governance score (CG), the social responsibility score (SOCIAL), the 
timeliness scores (TIMELINESS), the presentation scores (PRESENTATION), the 
usability scores (USABILITY); X1=firm size as measured by market capitalisation 
(LNSIZE), X2= Profitability (ROA), X3 = leverage (LEVERAGE), X4 = companies in 
high technology industry (INDUSTRY), X5 = companies audited by a Big-4 auditing 
firm (BIG4), X6 = share held by state-owned corporations as proportion of total shares 
(STASHARE), X7 = share held by legal persons as proportions of total shares 
(LEGSHARE), X8 = share held by foreign shareholders (FSHARE), X9 = 1 for CEO is 
also the board of directors (CEODUALITY), X10 = the number of board directors 
(BOARDSIZE), X11 = independent directors as a proportion of total directors 
(INDEPDIR). 
 
The Logit regression equation used was as follows:  
 
Y=β0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+β5X5+β6X6+β7X7+β8X8+β9X9+β10X10+β11X11 
+Ɛ 
 
Where Y= ENGWEB (whether or not the company has an English-language website), 
FWEB (the inclusion of financial information on the company’s website); X1 = firm 
size as measured by market capitalisation (LNSIZE), X2 = profitability (ROA), X3 = 
leverage (LEVERAGE), X4= companies in high technology industry (INDUSTRY), X5 
= companies audited by a Big-4 auditing firm (BIG4), X6 = share held by state-owned 
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corporations as a proportion of total shares (STASHARE), X7 = share held by legal 
persons as proportions of total shares (LEGSHARE), X8 = share held by foreign 
shareholders (FSHARE), X9 = 1 for CEO who is also on chair of  board directors 
(CEODUALITY), X10 = the number of board directors (BOARDSIZE), X11 = 
independent directors as a proportion of total directors(INDEPDIR). 
 
6.4.1 Data examination and transformation 
The regression results were performed to test the hypotheses. The models used five 
scores for disclosure on the Internet (TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, 
TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION, and USABILITY). Two logit models were run to 
test whether having an English-language version of a company’s website can be 
explained by any of the explanatory variables, and whether having financial information 
on their websites can be explained by any of the explanatory variables.  
 
Two major assumptions that are related to the current study were checked before 
running the seven models. These assumptions were: sample size, normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity (Field, 2009). If any of the latter assumptions are 
violated, the results of the OLS model may be misleading for this study and therefore 
need to be treated appropriately. 
 
6.4.1.1 Sample size 
Sample size is a very important factor for generalisability. A number of different 
guidelines have been suggested concerning the number of cases required for multiple 
regressions. Stevens (1996, p72) recommends that, “for social research, about 15 per 
cent subjects per predictor are needed for a reliable equation”. Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001, p117) give a formula for calculating sample size requirements, taking into 
account the number of independent variables used: N > 50 +8*m (where m = number of 
independent variables). In this research, 284 were used. The equation 284> 50+8*11 
indicates that sample size was not a problem. 
 
6.4.1.2 Normality of residuals 
The mean of IFR index total score is 54.62 and the range is from 6 to 98, the IFR index 
is not normally distributed as indicated by standard tests on skewness and kurtosis. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were also used to test the normality assumption for the 
testing of the hypothesis. The results indicated that none of the dependent scores were 
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normally distributed, thus there is the need to transform the data before the regression 
test.  Cooke (1998) argued that the normal scores approach may be appropriate in 
accounting for disclosure studies in this context. Accordingly, three types of regression 
model - named partly transformed regression analysis, rank regression analysis and the 
normal score approach - were used to achieve reliable results.  
 
6.4.1.3 Linearity 
Linearity refers to “the degree to which the change in the dependent variable is related 
to the change in the independent variables” (Saunders et al., 2007, P. 462). Checking 
linearity can be done by plotting the residuals against the independent variables. It may 
be argued that linearity is violated when a funnel pattern is observed. In addition, 
linearity can be checked by plotting each independent variable against the dependent 
variable and depicting the regression line that explains the relationship between the two 
variables. Most of the independent variables indicate a non-linearity pattern with the 
dependent variables. This result of non-linearity is in line with the majority of prior 
disclosure studies (Cooke, 1998). 
 
6.4.1.4 Homoscedasticity of residuals 
Homoscedasticity refers to the equality of variance values for dependent and 
independent variables (Saunders et al., 2007; Field, 2009). Homoscedasticity can be 
checked by scatter-plotting the standardised residuals against standardised predicted 
variables of the dependent variable (Field, 2009). Since the variance of the residuals 
about predicted dependent variables scores should be the same for all predicted 
variables in this study, the test indicates that the current data have no heteroscedasticity 
problem. 
 
6.4.1.5 Multicollinearity diagnostics 
Multicollinearity refers to the strong linear relationship among the independent 
variables which may affect the precision of the variables’ coefficient in the regression 
model (Gujarati, 2003). There are two common means of checking multicollinearity. 
The first is the correlation matrix, which indicates whether or not there is any 
correlation between the independent variables. The second way involves using variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) with tolerance values, which are performed when running the 
OLS model. The result also shows that most independent variables are not significantly 
associated. In order to further assess this, all explanatory variables were regressed 
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against TOTALSCORE, computing tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF). All 
explanatory variables had high tolerance scores (ranging from .352 to .919) and low 
VIFs (maximum 2.841). This suggests that multi-collinearity is not a problem in these 
regressions.  
 
6.4.1.6 Endogeneity problems 
Himmelberg (2002) argued that corporate governance is determined exogenously by 
environmental factors such as legal efficiency, regulation and the rules relating to the 
market for corporate control. Coles et al. (2008) argue that firm-level governance, 
therefore, must be treated as endogenous. A large number of studies recognise that 
models containing corporate governance ownership variables suffer from endogeneity 
(Weir et al., 2002 and Coles et al., 2005). In an analysis by McKnight and Weir (2008), 
all board structure, ownership and CEO characteristics are treated as endogenous. Goh 
et al. (2011) examine how the independence of a firm’s board affects its information 
environment; they consider board independence as endogenous variables. 
 
 In order to mitigate the econometric problems caused by endogeneity, it has become 
common in accounting research to implement some type of instrumental variables (IV) 
estimation procedure. The ideal instrument is the result of a “natural experiment,” an 
event that changes the endogenous regressors, but leaves the other aspects of the 
economic system unaffected. However, it is very hard to disentangle the effect of the 
specific event from all other events occurring at the same time (Larcker and Rusticus, 
2010). Goh et al. (2011) used board connections (defined as the proportion of directors 
who also sit on at least one other firm’s board that has a majority of independent 
directors) as their instrument of board independence. In this study, a natural 
experimental condition was created to address the endogeneity issue of board 
independence. A dummy variable indicates that one-third of the independent directors 
on board are the instrument used to capture the increase in board independence.  
 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) has been proposed as a test for model specification 
that looks for a statistically significant difference between an estimator that is different 
under the null hypothesis and an estimator that is consistent under the alternative 
hypothesis. In this study, the Hausman test examined the endogeneity issue of board 
independence. It provides a formal test of whether the IV estimator differs significantly 
from the OLS estimator. Using the assumption of the appropriateness of the 
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instruments, this test can be used to determine the existence of an endogeneity problem 
and thus the appropriateness of using OLS. This test statistic can also easily be 
computed by including both the observed x and the predicted x variable from the first 
stage regression into an OLS version of the second stage regression. If the coefficient on 
the predicted x is significant, the Hausman test rejects the null of the no endogeneity 
problem. 
 
Appendix 3 presents the results of the Hausman tests, which show that the coefficient of 
the residual was not significantly different from zero. This indicates that no endogeneity 
problems exist in the current model.  
 
6.4.1.7 Data transformation 
One of the commonest ways to overcome violation of the multiple regression 
assumptions is to transform the data. Cooke (1998) recommends the transformation of 
data when the assumptions in a regression analysis are violated. Moreover, Field (2009) 
mentions that transforming data will not alter the relationship between different 
variables; rather it will change the unit of measurement (a scale on which the variable is 
measured). Some researchers indicate the possibility of only transforming independent 
variables (Fox, 2002; Ruppert et al., 2003). Box and Tidwell (1962) and Fox (2002) 
suggested transformation of the independent variables in regression by estimating 
maximum-likelihood. Cooke (1998) suggested the dependent variables can also be 
legitimately transformed, for use in regression analysis. Consequently, the current study 
applies partial transformation (only transform firm size), rank transformation of 
independent variables and dependent variables, and normal scores approach.  
 
Rank score transformation  
Iman and Conover (1979) stated that in rank transformation, data are normally ranked in 
order; rank one is assigned to the smallest observation and rank N for the largest one. In 
this research, the method used was: N/n+1  
 where N = the ranked scores, n = Number of companies. 
 
Cooke (1998) was the first to apply this approach in disclosure study. Ranks are 
substituted by scores on the normal distribution. The normal score transformation 
approach can therefore be used as an extension of the rank approach. Cooke (1998) 
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suggested that the normal score transformation approach can be used as an extension of 
the rank approach for the following reasons: 
1) It eliminates some of the weakness of the rank transformation approach and 
retains the advantage.  
2) Normally distributed dependent variables have the same property for the 
distribution of the errors. 
3) Significance levels can now be determined; they are meaningful and have 
greater power than when using ranks. 
4) The F and t-tests are meaningful. 
5) The power of the F and t-tests may be used. 
6) The regression coefficients derived using normal scores are meaningful.  
 
Al-Htaybat (2005), Marston and Polei (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) adopted 
the normal score transformation approach in their studies. The method used in this study 
is referred to as the van der Waerden approach. Following Cheng et al. (1992), Lang 
and Lundholm (1993, 1996), and Wallace and Naser (1995), the dependent variables 
were transformed into rank scores and normal scores before running the regression 
analysis. When supporting/rejecting the hypotheses and various disclosure themes, the 
regression results for transformed (normal score transformation approaches) are used in 
this study, due to the advantages of the normal score transformation, as discussed above.  
 
6.4.2 Results of OLS regression analysis 
Based on the research design, three types of regression model were tested: partially 
transformed data, ranked scores and normal scores (van der Waerden’s approach). The 
dependent variables are TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINESS, 
PRESENTATION, and USABILITY.Tables 6.9 shows that the adjusted R2 values are 
45.9%, 51% and 52.3% for the TOTALSCORE model, which means that 45.9%, 51% 
and 52.3% of the variation in the IFR TOTALSCORE is explained by the explanatory 
variables of these model. In line with Marston and Polei (2004), the results show that 
the explanatory power of the models (as measured by adjusted R2) could be 
significantly increased through the transformation of the data. All models are significant 
at p<0.000; F values are 20.96, 25.75 and 27.08. The values of Durbin-Watson are 
1.699, 1.777 and 1.739, all less than 2, which indicates no autocorrelation between the 
variables.  
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Hypothesis H1 predicts that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s 
website is positively related to its size. This is consistent with the results of bivariate 
analysis and is largely supported by the significant coefficients of LNSIZE in three 
regressions. The p values in the three regression models are all the same value (p=0.00), 
which is significant at the 0.01 level. LNSIZE positively affected the total score of 
information disclosed. These results indicate that a company’s size of capitalisation in 
2010 increased the amount of information it showed on its website. The result is 
consistent with Marston and Leow, 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 
1999; Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999; Ettredge et al. 2002; Debrecency et al., 2002; 
Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; He and Zhang, 2007, 
Abdelsalam et al., 2007 and Chou, 2008. However, it contradicts findings from several 
other studies, such as Khanna et al. (2004), who found no statistically significant 
relationship for European multinationals listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This 
result suggests that for the bigger and smaller sized listed companies in China, size is an 
important factor for voluntary disclosure online. This finding supports agency theory, 
signalling theory and cost and benefit analysis.  
 
Agency theory suggests that larger firms exhibit higher agency costs due to the 
information asymmetry between market participants. In order to reduce information 
asymmetry, larger companies supplement traditional financial reporting mechanisms 
with web-based ones. The bigger the companies, the more information they disclosed on 
their websites, which was in line with the agency theory. Signalling theory (Kelly, 
1994) suggests that larger firms may have a greater incentive to signal their quality by 
means of improved disclosure, which is happening in bigger companies in China. It may 
also imply that because large companies have the resources for more complex 
management information systems and databases for management control purposes,  
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 Table 6.9 Regression Models of Total Score for 284 Companies 
      
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
 
 Partially transformed Score Method Rank Score Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.459 0.532 0.546 
Adjusted R Square 0.437 0.513 0.527 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.188 28.118 0.676 
F Change 20.958 25.745 29.68 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -1.359 -6.595 -181.512 -8.208 -7.939 -10.707 
LNSIZE .078 7.774** 9.521 8.837** .337 9.321** 
ROA -.004 -1.461 -.447 -1.671 -.019 -2.072 
LEVERAGE -.088 -1.287 -5.878 -.801 -.327 -1.327 
INDUSTRY .082 2.304* 8.746 2.300* .306 2.397* 
BIG4 .066 1.795 8.079 2.040* .317 2.383* 
STASHARE -.001 -2.280* -.166 -2.674* -.006 -2.718* 
LEGSHARE -.001 -.967 -.074 -1.125 -.002 -.838 
FSHARE .002 1.650* .254 2.349* .009 2.564* 
CEODUALITY 
.063 2.140* 7.082 2.254* .229 2.175* 
BOARDSIZE .000 .140 -.051 -.160 -.005 -.495 
INDEPDIR .003 2.343* .385 2.633** .010 1.965* 
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disclosure costs may be generally lower than for larger companies. They can also obtain 
capital more easily and cheaply through more extensive disclosure. Large companies are 
therefore accruing benefits from setting up websites and providing financial information 
on websites in China.  
 
The second hypothesis, H2, predicts that the total score of information on a company’s 
website is positively related to its profitability. In contrast to the results of bivariate 
analysis, it was not supported by the results of Rank regression and Normal Score 
regression model. It may be concluded that hypothesis H2 is not supported. This is 
consistent with the findings of some researchers (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Ettredge et al., 
2002; Oylere et al., 2002; Marston, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2004, He 
and Zhang, 2007), but not Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999). It might support the 
proprietary costs theory. Higher profitability firms are considered to be under the 
influence of competitive costs, which tend to increase when profitability increases; 
consequently, they disclosed less voluntary information on their website to reduce the 
chances that rival companies could take the company’s market place in China. On the 
other hand, this may be a reflection of the current lack of emphasis on performance-
based management incentives in Chinese business enterprises (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
 
H3 states that the total score of information companies disclose on their websites is 
positively associated with leverage. In contrast to the results of bivariate analysis, the 
results of the three regression models indicated non-significant coefficients. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the associations, if any, could be negative. The result 
is consistent with studies by Debrecenty et al. (2002), Oyelere et al. (2003) and Chou 
(2008), but contradicts that of Xiao et al. (2004). The bigger the proportion of debt in 
the companies’ capital structure, the less information the companies are willing to 
disclose on their websites 
 
H4 predicts that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s website is 
positively related to high-technology firms. In line with the results of bivariate analysis, 
this is also supported by the significant coefficients of INDUSTRY in three regression 
models. P values in the three models were 0.013, 0.01, and 0.006. INDUSTRY was 
positively affected by the total score of information disclosed. Companies in the high 
technology industry are therefore more inclined to divulge information via their 
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websites. Other studies have found a link between industry and voluntary disclosure 
(Ettredge et al., 2001; Oylere et al., 2003; Bonsón and Escobar, 2004; Xiao et al., 2004; 
He and Zhang, 2007), whereas others (Craven and Marston, 1999; Marston, 2003; 
Abdelsalam et al., 2004) have not. This result meets the expectations of signalling 
theory and political cost theory. It suggests that for the biggest and smallest listed 
companies in China, belonging to a high technology industry is an important factor in 
determining what the company discloses on its website; this includes companies from 
the computer, electronics, pharmaceutical and telecommunications industries. This 
study suggests that high technology companies in China make use of the available 
technology for building up their websites as a source of information for investors. It 
may also be concluded that these companies adopt the same disclosure strategy as other 
corporations in the same industry.  
 
H5 states that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s website is 
positively related to companies audited by Big-4 auditors. As with the results of 
bivariate analysis, this is also supported by the significant coefficients of BIG4 in the 
three regression models. P values in the three models are 0.09, 0.014, and 0.004. BIG4 
was positively affected by the total score of information disclosed on their websites. 
Several studies (Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 2004; Al-Shammari et al., 2007; 
Bonsón and Escobar, 2006; He and Zhang, 2007) have found that the amount and 
presentation of information for investors on a company’s website is positively related to 
the company’s use of a Big-4 auditor. This result indicates that for both the biggest and 
smallest listed companies in China, the use of an auditor from the Big-4 group is an 
important factor for voluntary disclosure online. This finding is consistent with the 
expectations of agency theory and signalling theory. Agency theory suggests that 
auditing helps to alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. It 
reflects the fact that in the Chinese context, large independent auditors such as the Big-4 
play a monitoring role, just as they do in developed countries, which leads to increased 
voluntary disclosure amongst the biggest and smallest companies. As Big-4 auditors are 
more likely to demand a high level of disclosure information to maintain their 
reputation, and the choice such auditing firms signals that they accept such demands, 
they are willing to provide high levels of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese context. 
H6 states that the total score for the disclosure of information on a company’s website 
relates negatively to the proportion of state-owned corporation ownership. In line with 
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the results of bivariate analysis, the results for the three regression models indicate that 
these variables negatively affect the total scores of disclosed by companies on their 
websites. H6 was therefore supported. STASHARE had consistently negative 
coefficients for all three models; the P values for the three models were 0.023, 0.009 
and 0.008. This shows the higher the proportion of companies’ shares held by state-
owned corporations, the less likely they are to disclose additional information on their 
websites. Agency theory argues that in a diffusion ownership environment, firms will 
disclose more information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry. State 
ownership was of negative significant in this study, suggesting that state-owned firms 
are suffering from greater information asymmetry and agency problems.  
This finding was in line with Xiao et al. (2004), who argued that the negative effects of 
state ownership are consistent with the proposition that state owners do not make high 
demands for voluntary financial disclosures, as they tend not to have company 
profitability as their primary concern and often have privileged access to private 
information. This is a reflection of either the current lack of emphasis by state 
shareholders on efficiency and profitability or their direct access to corporate insider 
information. In addition, Bai et al. (2004) argue that firms with higher state ownership 
principally aim to maintain employment and social stability (public objectives) rather 
than profit maximisation, which engenders agency conflicts between the state and 
minority shareholders.  
 
Hypothesis H7 predicts that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s 
website is positively related to the proportion of legal person ownership. In line with the 
results of bivariate analysis, LEGSHARE had no significantly coefficients on all three 
models, which indicates that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s 
website is not related to the proportion of legal person ownership. This result contradicts 
that of Xiao et al. (2004). It appears that for the bigger and smaller listed companies in 
China, legal personal shareholders did not play a positive role in monitoring 
management (Xu and Wang, 1999).  
 
Hypothesis H8 states that the total score for the disclosure of information on a 
company’s website is positively related to the proportion of foreign ownership. In line 
with the results for bivariate analysis, this is also supported by the significant 
coefficients of FSHARE in the three regression models. P values in the three models 
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were 0.085, 0.016, and 0.007. FSHARE positively affected the total score for the 
information disclosed. This is in line with Xiao et al. (2004). Here, it may be concluded 
that the biggest and smallest Chinese listed companies consider the information needs of 
foreign investors; this can then be explained by agency theory. Foreign investors in the 
Chinese stock market are likely to face a higher level of information asymmetry, given 
the language barrier and lack of access to corporate information, thus foreign investors 
could exert more effective external monitoring and pressure on management to disclose 
additional IFR information (Qu et al., 2013). As suggested by agency theory, firms with 
dual listing status (foreign and domestic) are extremely motivated to disclose 
supplementary voluntary information (Wang et al., 2008). As a result, managers tend to 
disclose more IFR information to meet their expectations of shareholders’ needs. In 
addition, firms with foreign ownership can be more politically visible and are also 
subject to more public scrutiny in China. These findings imply the adoption of IFR to 
satisfy the public by improving transparency, and may therefore potentially reduce the 
political cost (Liu and Eddie, 2007).  
 
Foreign investors in the Chinese stock market are international financial institutions. As 
equity stakeholders of listed companies, foreign investors behave as effective external 
agents (Qu et al., 2013). Having foreign shareholders requires Chinese companies to 
offer transparent disclosures, that are suited to foreign investors, to raise and retain 
foreign funds (Wang et al., 2008). As the ownership of a company is dispersed between 
an increasing numbers of investors, the Internet has become an increasingly effective 
and efficient way to communicate with these shareholders. Thus, it is anticipated that 
foreign ownership would have a positive impact on IFR. 
 
Hypothesis H9 predicts that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s 
website is negatively related to CEODUALITY. In contrast to the original hypothesis, 
which is inconsistent with the results of bivariate analysis, significant coefficients of 
CEODUALITY in three regressions models have been found. The P values in the three 
models are 0.035, 0.028 and 0.034. Several studies have found a negative relationship 
between IFR and CEO duality (Abdelsalam et al, 2007; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; 
Abdelsalam and EI-Masry, 2008; Gandía, 2008; Kelton and Yong, 2008). However, the 
same results were not obtained in China. That indicates that the biggest and smallest 
Chinese listed companies have a CEO and the chairman positions occupied by one 
person disclose more information on their websites. This meets the expectations of the 
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stewardship theory. Agency theory suggests that CEO duality is bad for performance as 
it compromises monitoring and control of the CEO. Stewardship theory, in contrast, 
argues that CEO duality may be good for performance due to the unity of command it 
presents. Stewardship theory maintains that CEO duality creates a necessary and 
important unity of command at the top of the organisation (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991). CEO duality therefore helps to avoid confusion among managers, employees and 
other stakeholders as to who is the boss and facilitates timely and more effective 
decision-making (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). The firm may otherwise experience 
conflicts at the top, reduced speed and effectiveness in decision-making and, finally, 
poor performance (Brickley et al., 1997; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
 
Hypothesis H10 states that the total score of disclosure of information on a company’s 
website is positively related to BOARDSIZE. In contrast to the results of bivariate 
analysis, results of the three regression models indicated non-significant coefficients; 
H10 was, thus rejected. This is in line with Gandía (2008) but not EI-Masry (2008), 
who found a positive relationship between IFR and the board size. The results 
demonstrated that amongst the biggest and smallest Chinese listed companies, 
BOARDSIZE is not the factor that determined the total score of the voluntary disclosure 
on their websites. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis H11 predicts that the total score of disclosure of information on a 
company’s website is positively related to the percentage of the independent directors 
on board. As with the results of bivariate analysis, H11 was also supported by 
significant coefficients in the three regression models (p values were 0.035, 0.033 and 
0.061). This finding is in line a number of studies (Xiao et al., 2004; Abdelsalam et al., 
2007; Abdelsalam and EI-Masry, 2008 and Ezat and EI-Masry, 2008). This can be 
supported by agency theory, which states that having more independent directors on 
board monitors the directors’ performance on the quality of the voluntary disclosure 
online.  
 
6.4.3 IFR and its components 
This section examines the association between the components of IFR, namely content, 
corporate governance, social responsibility, presentation, timeliness and usability, to 
identify the determinants of IFR more precisely. Classifying IFR into its main 
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components adds more depth to the analysis of the findings and provides new directions 
to explain the relationships between IFR components and their determinants. 
 
6.4.3.1 Total content 
Regarding the content scores, three multivariate analyses (partially transformed 
regression model, rank regression score model and normal score regression model) were 
used to examine the association between the extent of IFR CONTENT and their 
explanatory variables. Tables 6.10 shows that the adjusted R2 for the three models was 
49.1%, 49.2% and 49.2% for the content model, which means that 41.7% of the 
variation in the IFR content is explained by the explanatory variables of this model. All 
models were significant at p<0.000, with F values of 17.67, 23.84 and 23.96. The values 
of Durbin-Watson were 1.719, 1.819 and 1.805, all less than 2, which indicates that 
there was no autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of multivariate analysis reveal that company SIZE, INDUSTRY, FSHARE 
BIG4 and INDEPEIR are positively associated with IFR CONTENT in Normal score 
regressions. This suggests that of the bigger companies within higher percentage of 
independent directors, increased the content of disclosed information on their websites. 
In three of three regressions, FSHARE was significantly related to the content 
information disclosed on their websites, which indicated that companies that have more 
foreign shareholders disclosed more content information on their websites.  
 
On the other hand, STASHARE was negatively associated with IFR CONTENT, which 
means that companies with more state owned share disclosed less CONTENT 
information on their websites. ROA, LEGSHARE, BOARDSIZE had no significant 
relationship with IFR CONTENT. The significant positive association between Chinese 
listed companies and IFR content results is consistent with Xiao et al. (2004), Marston 
and Polei (2004), Abdel-Salam et al. (2007), Abdel-Salam and Street (2007), and Kelton 
and Yang (2008). H1.1, H1.3, H1.5 and H1.8, for IFR CONTENT are thus supported. 
 
The findings of IFR content can be explained by many theories depending on the 
examined explanatory variables. For size, agency theory clarifies that bigger companies 
disclose more content information to reduce their agency costs. Signalling theory 
suggests that the bigger companies increase their information to signal the quality of 
improved disclosure. With regard to industry type, high-technology companies 
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disclosed more content information on their websites. This may be explained by 
signalling theory, which states that companies try to adopt the same disclosure strategy 
as other companies in the same industry. With regard to auditor type, companies audited 
by Big-4 companies increase the content information disclosed on their websites, which 
is supported by agency theory and signalling theory. Agency theory argues that larger 
auditing companies are more likely to be associated with clients that disclosed higher 
levels of information for the sake of maintaining their own reputation. Signalling theory 
suggests that companies hire larger auditing companies to signal their high quality of 
disclosure.  
 
Regarding state-share ownership, the results suggest that companies with more shares 
held by the state have another channel to distribute information other than voluntary 
disclosure. It also might indicate that the costs might outweigh the benefits if these type 
of companies disclose more information on their websites. Companies that held more 
foreign shares tend to disclose more content information, which may be a result of 
agency theory that suggests that companies try to reduce information asymmetry 
between market participants. The reduced costs of disclosing content information online 
may be another factor. Finally, the higher the percentage of independent directors on 
board, the more content information the company discloses online. This may be 
explained by agency theory, which states that the existence of independent directors 
yields more effective monitoring of board directors, therefore resulting in increased 
disclosure. 
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Table 6.10 Regression Models of Total Content for 284 companies  
 
Partially transformed Score Method Rank Score Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.417 0.491 0.492 
Adjusted R Square 0.393 0.470 0.472 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.22 21.04 0.71 
F Change 17.675 23.846 23.966 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -1.507 -6.162 -166.832 -7.233 -7.400 -9.446 
LNSIZE .084 7.054** 8.925 7.943** .314 8.229** 
ROA -.003 -1.074 -.337 -1.208 -.014 -1.444 
LEVERAGE -.109 -1.337 -7.422 -.970 -.358 -1.377 
INDUSTRY .091 2.155* 8.866 2.236* .263 1.952* 
BIG4 .077 1.755 9.280 2.246* .350 2.491* 
STASHARE -.002 -2.389* -.172 -2.671* -.006 -2.927* 
LEGSHARE -.001 -1.022 -.086 -1.266 -.003 -1.083 
FSHARE .002 1.438 .229 2.037* .009 2.243* 
CEODUALITY .069 1.977* 6.518 1.989* .208 1.866 
BOARDSIZE .001 .370 .011 .032 -.003 -.234 
INDEPDIR .003 2.161* .347 2.275* .008 1.636* 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.4.3.2 Factors determining corporate governance disclosure 
With regard to corporate governance factors, three multivariate analyses (partially 
transformed regression model, rank regression score model and normal score regression 
model) were used to examine the association between the extent of IFR CG and their 
explanatory variables. Tables 6.11 indicates that the adjusted R2 for the three models is 
36%, 35.7% and 36.8% for CG model, which means that 36.8% of the variation in the 
IFR corporate governance is explained by the explanatory variables of this model. The 
explanatory power of corporate governance is less than the overall total score and 
content score. This means that more factors lead companies to disclose more corporate 
governance information on their websites, which have not been discovered in this 
model. All models are significant at p<0.000 and have F values of 13.62, 13.70 and 
14.38. The values of Durbin-Watson are 1.712, 1.742 and 1.750, all less than 2, which 
indicate that there is no autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of multivariate analysis reveal that company SIZE and INDUSTRY are 
positively associated with IFR CG in all three regressions. This suggests that bigger 
companies within the high-tech industry type disclose more corporate governance 
information on their websites. As with the results of the content scores analysis, 
STASHRE was negatively associated with IFR CG, which means that companies with 
more state owned shares disclosed less IFR CG information on their websites. 
CEODUALITY was only significant at 0.10 in the un-transformed model, from which it 
may be concluded that it is not related to the IFR CG variables. ROA, LEVERAGE, 
BIG-4, LEGSHARE, FSHARE, and BOARDSIZE, INDEPEDIR had no significant 
relationship with IFR CG. None of the corporate governance factors (CEODUALITY, 
BOARDSIZE, INDEPEDIR) were related to corporate governance. Neither the CEO-
chairman duality, the size of board nor the percentage of independent directors on board 
explained the levels of corporate governance disclosure of Chinese listed companies. 
These results are in line with the findings of Kelton and Yang (2008), Gandía (2008) 
and Li et al. (2008). 
 
The findings concerning IFR corporate governance can be explained by many theories, 
depending on the chosen explanatory variables. As with most IFR research, size is a key 
factor when determining higher disclosure levels, which can be explained by agency 
theory and signalling theory. To reduce agency costs, bigger firms disclose corporate 
governance information on their websites. In addition, bigger firms are in the public 
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spotlight more than smaller firms are, and respond to this pressure by increasing IFR 
disclosure. High technology companies tend to disclose more information to signal their 
advantage. 
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Table 6.11 Regression Models of CG for 284 Companies 
 
Partially transformed Score Method Rank Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.36 0.357 0.368 
Adjusted R Square 0.33 0.331 0.342 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.26 23.598 0.77 
F Change 13.625 13.705 14.383 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -1.576 -5.594 -142.534 -5.510 -6.601 -7.776 
LNSIZE .089 6.465** 8.338 6.617** .289 6.999** 
ROA -.002 -.595 -.219 -.701 -.008 -.742 
LEVERAGE -.112 -1.198 -8.870 -1.034 -.384 -1.363 
INDUSTRY .112 2.308* 10.145 2.281* .255 1.745* 
BIG4 .060 1.197 5.484 1.184 .193 1.268 
STASHARE -.002 -2.196* -.162 -2.236* -.006 -2.436* 
LEGSHARE -.001 -1.206 -.083 -1.088 -.003 -1.091 
FSHARE .002 1.092 .148 1.171 .005 1.272 
CEODUALITY .073 1.812* 5.830 1.586 .183 1.521 
BOARDSIZE .087 .021 -.110 -.292 -.001 -.080 
INDEPDIR .002 1.162 .124 .726 .002 .444 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.4.3.3 Factors determining the social responsibility score 
Three multivariate analyses were used to examine the association between the extent of 
IFR SOCIAL and their explanatory variables. Tables 6.12 shows that the adjusted R2 for 
the three models were 43.1%, 41.2% and 38.9% for the SOCIAL model, which means 
that 38.9% of the variation in the IFR content is explained by the explanatory variables 
of this model. It also indicated that many other factors that were not found in this model 
determine whether companies disclose more social responsibility information. All 
models were significant at p<0.000. The F values were 18.75, 17.35 and 15.77. The 
values of Durbin-Watson were 2.098, 2.055 and 2.104, all near 2, which indicates no 
autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of the multivariate analysis reveal that company SIZE, ROA and 
INDEPDIR are positively associated with IFR SOCIAL in all three regressions. This 
suggests that bigger companies that are more profitable and have more independent 
directors on their boards increase the social responsibility of disclosed information on 
their websites. On the other hand, STASHARE was negatively associated with IFR 
SOCIAL, which means that companies that have more state-owned shares disclose less 
social responsibility information on their websites. LEVERAGE, INDUSTRY, BIG4, 
LEGSHARE, FSHARE, CEODUALITY and BOARDSIZE have no significant 
relationship with IFR SOCIAL. 
The findings of IFR SOCIAL can be explained by many theories, depending on the 
explanatory variables examined. SIZE is one of the predictors of social responsibility 
score. It meets the expectations of both agency theory and signalling theory. In order to 
distinguish themselves from these high-profile events and to build a good corporate 
image, bigger firms disclose extra social information to enhance their corporate 
reputation, thereby gaining trust and support from various stakeholders. Bigger 
companies disclose more social and environmental information. Institutional theory 
suggests that when the management team perceives a need for their company to adopt 
certain institutional practices, this may explain the use of social and environmental 
disclosures to meet the social expectations.  
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Table 6.12 Regression Models of SOCIAL for 284 Companies 
 
Partially transformed Score Rank Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.431 0.412 0.389 
Adjusted R Square 0.408 0.389 0.365 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.195 22.44 0.74 
F Change 18.75 17.355 15.771 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -1.342 -6.277 -171.011 -6.952 -6.888 -8.459 
LNSIZE .080 7.660** 9.019 7.527** .276 6.965** 
ROA .005 2.037* -.648 2.177 .017 1.755* 
LEVERAGE .083 1.171 7.777 .953 .311 1.153 
INDUSTRY -.028 -.764 -2.708 -.641 -.081 -.578 
BIG4 .054 1.409 5.527 1.255 .195 1.338 
STASHARE -.001 -1.301* -.093 -1.351* -.003 -1.357* 
LEGSHARE .000 .313 .019 .263 .000 .128 
FSHARE .001 .868 .101 .841 .003 .669 
CEODUALITY .051 1.690 5.784 1.655 .213 1.838 
BOARDSIZE -.002 -.745 -.256 -.717 -.007 -.630 
INDEPDIR .004 2.487* .376 2.315* .012 2.318* 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)  ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.4.3.4 Factors determining the timeliness of information 
Three multivariate analyses were used to examine the association between the extent of 
IFR timeliness and their explanatory variables in order to examine the timeliness of 
information disclosed on the sample companies’ websites. Tables 6.13 shows that the 
adjusted R2 for the three models was 32.3%, 45.6% and 47.1% for the timeliness model, 
which means that 47.1% of the variation in the IFR timeliness is explained by the 
explanatory variables of this model. All models are significant at p<0.000; F values 
were 18.09, 20.75 and 22.05. The values of Durbin-Watson were 1.642, 1.681 and 
1.622, all less than 2, which indicates no autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of the multivariate analysis showed that company SIZE, FSHARE, 
CEODUALITY and INDEPDIR are positively associated with IFR TIMELINESS in all 
three regressions. This suggests that bigger companies hold more foreign shares. 
Companies whose CEO also acts as chairman have a bigger percentage of independent 
directors on board and increase the timeliness of disclosed information on their 
websites. On the other hand, STASHRE was negatively associated with IFR 
TIMELINESS, which means that companies with more state-owned share disclosed less 
timeliness information on their websites. ROA, LEVERAGE, INDUSTRY, BIG4, 
LEGSHARE and BOARDSIZE had no significant relationship with IFRTIMELINESS. 
The finding contradicts that of Abdelsalam and Street (2007), who found that board 
independence is negatively associated with timely corporate Internet reporting.  
 
Agency theory, signalling theory and stewardship theory can explain the findings for 
IFR TIMELINESS. Independent directors are less aligned with management, and 
consequently are more inclined to encourage firms to disclose timely information to 
outside investors. Stewardship theory argues CEODUALITY, which establishes strong, 
unambiguous leadership, embodied in a unity command, so that firms with CEO duality 
can make better and faster decisions. In the case of China, this finding suggests firms 
with CEO duality act in the best interests of companies and shareholders to disclose 
timely information on their websites.  
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Table 6.13 Regression Models of Timeliness for 284 Companies 
 
Partially transformed Score Method Rank Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.423 0.456 0.471 
Adjusted R Square 0.399 0.434 0.450 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.200 21.50 0.69 
F Change 18.098 20.756 22.057 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -1.408 -6.421 -174.571 -7.405 -7.352 -9.583 
LNSIZE .082 7.630** 9.203 8.013** .304 8.146** 
ROA -.004 -1.534 -.463 -1.624 -.016 -1.714 
LEVERAGE -.074 -1.011 -4.308 -.551 -.208 -.818 
INDUSTRY .056 1.482 4.254 1.050 .170 1.286 
BIG4 .032 .815 3.949 .935 .152 1.106 
STASHARE -.002 -2.735* -.201 -3.045* -.007 -3.166* 
LEGSHARE -.001 -1.184 -.102 -1.468 -.003 -1.120 
FSHARE .003 2.447* .297 2.577* .012 3.279* 
CEODUALITY .070 2.247* 8.410 2.511 .238 2.179* 
BOARDSIZE -.001 -.459 -.085 -.248 -.006 -.544 
INDEPDIR .004 2.618** .433 2.779** .014 2.714** 
 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.4.3.5 Factors determining presentation format 
Three multivariate analyses were used to examine the association between the extent of 
IFR PRESENTATION and their explanatory variables. Tables 6.14 shows that the 
adjusted R2 for the three models was 42.5%, 42.8% and 44.1% for the 
PRESENTATION model, which means that 44.1% of the variation in the IFR 
presentation is explained by the explanatory variables of this model. All models are 
significant at p<0.000; the F values were 18.31, 18.46 and 19.52. The Durbin-Watson 
values were 1.655, 1.66 and 1.643, all less than 2, which indicate that there was no 
autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of three multivariate analyses reveal that company SIZE, INDUSTRY, 
BIG4, CEODUALITY and INDEPDIR are positively associated with IFR 
PRESENTATION in all three regressions. This suggests that bigger high-tech 
companies audited by Big-4 auditing companies with their CEO serving as chairman of 
the board and more independent directors on board increase the presentation of 
disclosed information on their websites. There was no significant relationship between 
ROA, LEVERAGE, STASHARE, LEGSHARE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE and IFR 
PRESENTATION. 
 
A number of theories may explain the findings relating to IFR presentation depending 
on the examined explanatory variables. The benefits of information benefit outweigh the 
costs, which might explain why bigger companies provided better presentation scores 
on their website. Signalling theory may explain why companies in the high-tech 
industry that have Big-4 auditing have better presentation scores. 
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Table 6.14 Regression Models of Presentation for 284 Companies 
 
Partially transformed Score Method Rank Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.425 0.428 0.441 
Adjusted R Square 0.402 0.404 0.419 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.161 22.14 0.737 
F Change 18.311 18.468 19.518 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -.913 -5.168 -146.445 -6.033 -6.543 -8.099 
LNSIZE .057 6.673** 7.876 6.661** .265 6.739** 
ROA -.003 -1.368 -.460 -1.566 -.015 -1.509 
LEVERAGE -.054 -.925 -4.699 -.583 -.189 -.705 
INDUSTRY .068 2.230* 8.361 2.004* .310 2.234* 
BIG4 .057 1.797* 8.039 1.849* .317 2.189* 
STASHARE -0.005 .106 .006 .084 .000 .191 
LEGSHARE -.001 -1.234 -.068 -.942 -.002 -.971 
FSHARE .001 1.210 .155 1.309 .005 1.356 
CEODUALITY .056 2.224* 6.943 2.013* .250 2.181* 
BOARDSIZE .001 .420 .110 .312 .002 .181 
INDEPDIR .003 2.177* .366 2.281* .010 1.962* 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.4.3.6 Factors determining usability score 
Three multivariate analyses were used to examine the association between the extent of 
IFR USABILITY and their explanatory variables. Tables 6.15 shows that the adjusted 
R2 for the three models was 43.8%, 40.1% and 40.4% for the usability model, which 
means that 40.4% of the variation in the IFR usability is explained by the explanatory 
variables of this model. All models were significant at p<0.000; the F values were 
19.23, 16.56 and 16.77. The Durbin-Watson values were 1.864, 1.88 and 1.866, all less 
than 2, which indicate no autocorrelation between the variables.  
 
The results of multivariate analysis reveal that company SIZE, INDUSTRY and were 
positively associated with IFR USABILITY in all three regressions. ROA was 
negatively associated with IFR USABILITY in all three regressions. This suggests that 
bigger companies within the high-tech industry type that have more board members 
disclose more usability information on their websites, more profitable companies 
disclose less usability information on their websites. LEVERAGE, BIG4, STASHARE, 
LEGSHARE, CEODUALITY and INDEPDIR had no significant relationship with IFR 
USABILITY. The findings of IFR usability can be explained by signalling theory, 
bigger firms have a great incentive to signal their quality by means of improved IFR 
usability.  
 
The explanatory models have been estimated using three different techniques (partially 
transformed, rank and normal scores) in order to determine the association between the 
11 independent variables and the total score and its six sun-sections. The overall 
conclusion arising from the 21 regression models will be discussed in the Chapter’s 
summary. 
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Table 6.15 Regression Models of Usability for 284 Companies 
 
Partially transformed Score Method Rank Regression Method Normal Score Regression Method 
R Square 0.438 0.401 0.404 
Adjusted R Square 0.415 0.377 0.38 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.1432 22.65 0.761 
F Change 19.234 16.563 16.771 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t 
(Constant) -.941 -5.992 -158.668 -6.388 -7.124 -8.611 
LNSIZE .061 7.963** 9.010 7.447** .309 7.655** 
ROA -.006 -3.255* -.800 -2.664* -.032 -3.186* 
LEVERAGE -.024 -.463 -3.062 -.372 -.132 -.480 
INDUSTRY .065 2.417* 10.236 2.397* .329 2.316* 
BIG4 .043 1.524 5.141 1.156 .194 1.306 
STASHARE -.001 -1.725 -.113 -1.631 -.004 -1.603 
LEGSHARE .000 .901 .060 .820 .003 1.054 
FSHARE .001 1.533 .181 1.492 .006 1.513 
CEODUALITY .029 1.304 4.734 1.342 .159 1.349 
BOARDSIZE -.003 -1.532 -.508 -1.408 -.017 -1.455 
INDEPDIR .002 1.562 .251 1.529 .009 1.629 
 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.5 Results of the logistic regression analysis 
Table 6.3 shows that 207 (73%) of the 284 sample companies with accessible websites 
had an English-language version of their website. This is an improvement on the figures 
reported by Xiao et al. (2004), who found that 47.3% of companies surveyed had 
English websites. The logistic regression analysis examined what factors determine 
whether companies have an English-language version. It was also found that 206 
(72.9%) of companies provided financial information on their website in this study. 
Allam and Lymer (2003) also found that 96% of companies disclosed financial 
information on their websites in the five developed countries surveyed. This difference 
between Chinese listed companies and those in other developed countries led this study 
to examine the factors determining whether companies provide financial information on 
their websites.  
 
Binary logistic regression is an alternative to traditional regression analysis and 
simultaneously predicts the probability of an event (Hair et al., 1998, Mertler and 
Vannatta 2005). Logistic regression is used where the dependent variable is not a 
quantitative or continuous variable (George and Mallery, 2000) and tests the ability of a 
model or a group of variables to predict group members as defined by categorical 
variables. Logistic regression also provides several distinct advantages over multiple 
regressions as the independent variables do not have to be normally distributed, linearly 
related or have equal variance within each group. This makes logistic regression more 
flexible than other parametric techniques (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). Logistic 
regression was run to test models to predict whether or not a company has an English-
language website. The second logistic regression was run to test models to predict 
whether a company discloses financial information on its website. This section presents 
the results of two logistic regressions. 
 
6.5.1 Companies with English-language websites 
Binary logistic regression was used to determine which of the independent variables 
significantly predict that a company has English-language pages on their website. 
Before running the regression, the multicollinearity problem was checked by testing the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) factors for each individual independent variable. The 
value of VIF factors ranged from 1.089 to 2.841; none individually exceeded 3.0, which 
indicated that there is no multicollinearity.  
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The results of the binary logistic regression model are shown in Table 6.32. Cox and 
Snell R2 (11.7%) and Nagelkerke R2 (17.0%) were used to measure the proportion of 
variability in the dependent variables that can be accounted for by all of the independent 
variables in this model. The R2 shows that this model has a 11.7% to 17.0% degree of 
explanatory power. The Chi-Square goodness of fit was 35.427 (p=0.00). Only two of 
the explanatory variables (LNSIZE p-value=0.003) were positively significantly reliable 
at distinguishing whether or not a company had an English-language version. Larger 
companies tend to have English-language webpages. STASHARE and CEODUALITY 
were negatively significantly related with ENWEB at 0.10 and 0.05 levels. This 
suggests that companies that hold more state-owned shares and had a CEO acting as 
chair of the board were unwilling to have English-language versions of their websites.  
Table 6.16 Logistic regression model (Company has English on their website or 
not) 
 
  Chi-
square 
df Sig. -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
Model 35.427 11 .000 296.499 .117 .170 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
LNSIZE .396 .135 8.612 1 .003** 1.486 
ROA -.035 .031 1.279 1 .258 .966 
LEVERAGE .238 .860 .077 1 .782 1.269 
INDUSTRY .373 .461 .654 1 .419 1.452 
BIG4 -.542 .564 .923 1 .337 .582 
STASHARE -.014 .008 3.246 1 .072* .986 
LEGSHARE .006 .008 .579 1 .447 1.006 
FSHARE .022 .017 1.712 1 .191 1.022 
CEODUALITY -.927 .414 5.014 1 .025** .396 
BOARDSIZE -.060 .039 2.354 1 .125 .942 
INDEPDIR .017 .018 .857 1 .355 1.017 
Constant -6.934 3.112 4.963 1 .026 .001 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) 
** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
*** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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This result is not consistent with Xiao et al.’s (2004), who suggested foreign share 
ownership has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Agency theory 
provides an explanation for management to disclose voluntarily. State ownership 
structures do not truly represent stakeholder’s interest when listing companies and state 
shareholders due to their lack of interest in disclosing English-languages versions. In 
addition, this finding suggests listed companies holding a greater percentage of state-
owned shares do not consider such information necessary to international investors. 
State owners do not express a high demand for the disclosure of English-language 
versions, as they tend not to consider international investors a primary concern 
 
6.5.2 Provision of financial information by companies 
This section examines what factors determine whether companies disclose financial 
information on their websites. The results of the second binary logistic regression model 
are shown in Table 6.33. The Cox and Snell R2 (25.1%) and Nagelkerke R2 (36.3%) 
measures show the proportion of variability in the dependent variables that can be 
accounted for by all of the independent variable in this model. The R2 in this model has 
a 25.1% to 36.3% degree of explanatory power. The Chi-Square goodness of fit was 
82.11 (p=0.00). One of the predicator variables (LNSIZE p-value=0.000) was positively 
significantly reliable at distinguishing whether companies have financial information on 
their websites. Another of the predictor variables, FSHARE (p-value=0.96), was 
positively significantly related to the dependent variables FWEB (dummy variable that 
examines whether companies have financial information). Larger companies that have 
more foreign shares therefore tend to disclose financial information online. 
 
On the other hand, LEVERAGE (p-value=0.019), INDUSTRY (p-value = 0.69) and 
STASHARE (p-value = 0.012) were negatively significantly related with FWEB at the 
0.05, 0.10 and 0.05 levels. This suggests that high-technology companies that hold more 
state-owned shares and have a high debt ratio were unwilling to disclose financial 
information on their websites. State-owned companies provided less financial 
information on their websites, a result that is consistent with Xiao et al. (2004). This 
result was interpreted as a reflection of the current lack of emphasis on efficiency and 
profitability by state shareholders or their direct access to corporate insider information. 
The negative relationship between financial information on the Internet and leverage 
levels is consistent with the results of Eng and Mak (2003) and Cormier et al. (2009). A 
possible explanation is that agency problems, for this result may be that the debt holders 
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may be informed through other (private) channels, which would result in a decreased 
use of IFR for companies with high debts (Bollen et al., 2006). 
 
Table 6.17 Logistic regression model (Company has Financial information on their 
website or not) 
  Chi-
square 
df Sig. -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Model 82.110 11 .000 251.776 0.251 0.363 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
LNSIZE 0.763 0.165 21.278 1 0.00*** 2.145 
ROA -0.046 0.035 1.716 1 0.19 0.955 
LEVERAGE -2.221 0.946 5.515 1 0.019** 0.108 
INDUSTRY -1.426 0.785 3.302 1 0.069* 0.24 
BIG4 -1.125 0.839 1.798 1 0.18 0.325 
STASHARE -0.024 0.01 6.264 1 0.012*** 0.976 
LEGSHARE 0 0.008 0.014 1 0.905 0.999 
FSHARE 0.034 0.021 2.773 1 0.096* 1.035 
CEODUALITY -0.513 0.403 1.62 1 0.203 0.598 
BOARDSIZE 0.061 0.049 1.561 1 0.211 1.063 
INDEPDIR 0.007 0.02 0.121 1 0.728 1.007 
Constant -13.09 3.791 11.924 1 0.001 0 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) 
** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
*** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
 
6.6 Sensitivity analysis 
To further test the consistency of the results presented in the previous section, a series of 
regression analyses were performed. A weight system on dependent variables 
(weighting the ‘content’ element twice compared to the other elements) was first used, 
followed by the use of different measurement of companies’ size, for example turnover, 
total assets and total numbers of employees as a proxy for size. Thirdly, different 
measurements of a company’s profitability were used to test the regression.  
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6.6.1 Using different measurements as a proxy for size 
To further test the consistency, three measurements were tested as proxies for company 
size. The original measurement for size was market captalisation. However, other 
measurements for size, such as a company’s turnover, total assets and total staff 
numbers can also be tested. The normal scores of regression were performed. Table 6.18 
show the results of three tests. There were slight differences in the results compared to 
the original research. In contrast to the original results, when the regression was 
performed using total turnover as a proxy for size, LEVERAGE had a significantly 
negative relationship with TOTALSCORE, while CEODUALITY had no significant 
relationship with TOTALSCORE in one Model. When the regression was performed 
using total assets as a proxy for size, LEVERAGE had a significant negative 
relationship with TOTALSCORE, INDUSTRY and BIG4 and did not show any 
significantly relationship with TOTALSCORE in another model. When the regression 
was performed using total staff numbers as a proxy for size, STASHARE did not 
significantly affect IFR TOTALSCORE. The majority of other explanatory variables 
held the same level of significance, although the coefficients varied. Considering that 
CEODUALITY and BIG4 were only rated insignificant in one of four sensitivity 
analysis models, the results of the hypotheses remain unchanged.  
 
6.6.2 Using different measurements as a proxy for profitability 
Additional tests can be done by different measurements of profitability. The original 
measurement of profitability was the return on assets ratio; it can also be measured by 
return on equity ratio. The additional regression was run using different measurements 
of profitability, as reported in Table 6.18. Although the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables varied, the significance of the results remained the same. 
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Table 6.18 Sensitivity analysis  
 Sensitivity analysis 1 
(Total Staff number) 
Sensitivity analysis 2 
(Total Turnover) 
Sensitivity analysis 3 
(Total Assets) 
Sensitivity analysis 4 
(ROE) 
R Square 0.468 0.502 0.545 0.545 
Adjusted R Square 0.446 0.482 0.527 0.527 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.732 0.70 0.676 0.676 
F Change 21.32 24.973 29.659 29.660 
Sig. F Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) 
-2.281 -7.29 -5.319 -9.125 -6.409 -10.847 -7.468 -10.209 
LNSIZE 
.174 5.869*** .227 7.471** .286 9.313*** .306 9.048** 
ROA 
.013 1.499 -.005 -.592 -.001 -.084 -.003 -.804 
LEVERAGE 
.053 .201 -.538 -1.909* -.727 -2.722* -.066 -.316 
INDUSTRY 
.478 3.528*** .481 3.676** .129 .973 .345 2.725*** 
BIG4 
.572 4.140*** .415 2.996 .187 1.342 .359 2.718*** 
STASHARE 
-.003 -1.224 -.004 -1.798* -.005 -2.500** -.005 -2.525** 
LEGSHARE 
-.003 -1.062 -.001 -.347 -.002 -.781 -.003 -1.170 
FSHARE 
.008 1.974* .007 1.800* .007 1.841 .009 2.522** 
CEODUALITY 
.217 1.899* .173 1.575 .229 2.174** .234 2.204** 
BOARDSIZE .007 .608 .008 .721 -.011 -.981 -.006 -.511 
INDEPDIR .012 2.334** .010 1.876* .009 1.854* .010 2.021** 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10)** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) *** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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6.7 Summary 
The empirical results showed that 95% (284) companies had their own websites, 
including 149 of the biggest companies and 135 of the smallest Chinese listed 
companies, whilst 5% (six) of the companies did not provide any information. It was 
found that 73% (207) companies disseminated English-language information on their 
websites and 72.9% (206) had financial information on their websites. Compared to the 
previous research by Xiao et al. (2004), the descriptive analyses showed that companies 
are trying to improve their reporting quantity and quality through voluntary disclosure 
on their websites. There was a relative improvement in the disclosure of financial 
information, corporate governance information, social responsibility information, 
timeliness of disclosure, presentation and usability on sampled websites. However, 
compared to recent research in the US, UK and other western countries, it was 
suggested that the quality of IFR still needs to be improved in China to meet the 
expectations of development in the global securities market. This requires more open 
and transparent information disclosure for listed companies.  
 
The results of multivariate analysis were mixed, which to some extent was consistent 
with previous research. Company size, industry type, Big-4 auditor type, state share 
ownership, foreign share ownership, CEO duality and the proportion of independent 
directors were significant explanatory variables for the total score disclosed on 
corporate websites. Leverage, profitability, legal personal ownership and board size 
have no predictive value for Internet reporting practices for listed companies. 
Classifying IFR into content score, corporate governance score, social responsibility 
score, timeliness score, presentation score and usability score provided new directions 
for explaining the relationships between IFR and their determinants. Only size, industry 
type and state share ownership can explain IFR, whilst the corporate governance score, 
size, profitability, state share ownership and the proportion of independent directors on 
board predicts the IFR social responsibility score. IFR timeliness can be explained by 
size, state share ownership, foreign share ownership, CEO duality and the proportion of 
independent directors on board. Additionally, the results showed that when a higher 
proportion of shares are held by the state, there is a tendency not to provide an English-
language version of the website. This indicates that shareholders are less keen to 
improve their web facilities and transparency, which would offer quality websites to 
maintain global investor relations. State-owned companies rely heavily on finance and 
169 
 
lack incentives to disclose financial information on their websites. Similar results were 
obtained from sensitivity analysis.  
 
The findings partly meet the expectation of agency theory, signalling theory, 
institutional theory and the cost and benefits approach (Table 6.22). Additionally, 
stewardship theory explained one of the corporate governance factors, namely CEO 
duality.  
 
Table 6.19 The results of the hypotheses tested 
Hypothesis Independent Variables Results Related Theory 
H1 Size + Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
Cost and benefit 
approach 
H2 Profitability (ROA) No relation   
H3 Leverage No relation  
H4 Industry type + Signalling theory 
H5 Auditor type (Big 4) + Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
H6 State ownership _ Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
H7 Legal person ownership No relation  
H8 Foreign share ownership + Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
H9 CEO Duality + Stewardship theory 
H10 Board size No relation  
H11 Independent directors + Agency theory 
 
 
The next chapter discusses the economic consequences of IFR on Chinese listed 
companies.  
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Chapter 7 Economic consequences of the IFR and its components 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5, which examined agency theory, signalling theory and cost benefit theory, as 
well as prior studies on this topic, raised one question: does IFR and its components 
have any impact on the value of Chinese listed firms? In order to answer the question, 
one set of hypotheses were drawn up to test the relationship between IFR and IFR 
components and firm value. Three years of firm value data were collected and tested to 
determine the economic impact of IFR and its components. The results of the 
descriptive study, comparison study, univariate analysis and multivariate regression 
analysis are presented here and summarised at the end of this chapter. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
7.2.1 Measurement of Firm value 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to replacement cost; it was adapted from 
macroeconomics to analysis at the industry and firm level. Slightly different 
formulations of Tobin’s Q have been used, all aiming to capture the theoretical 
argument that relates market value to the cost of replacing those assets (Sharma et al., 
2013). In this study, only basic financial and accounting information was used, thereby 
avoiding data availability problems. This indicator reveals the potential of the added 
value of the company as perceived by the market as a reflection of its performance. If 
Tobin’s Q is greater than 1.0, it indicates that the company has a market value 
exceeding the price of the replacement of its assets. The consequential added-value for 
the shareholders would then refer to the capacity of investment to remunerate the 
owners’ capital. 
 
The market/book ratio, which incorporates both historical accounting and forward-
looking market indicators of firm performance, provides a theoretical rationale for its 
use as a measure of performance (Lee and Makhija, 2009). The ratio reflects the 
premium (or discount) the market gives to the firm on its net assets, and, as such, 
reflects the efficiency with which the market views the firm is being managed (Sharma 
et al., 2013). The MBR reflects the incentives for additional capital investments to grow 
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the firm (Goranova et al., 2010). MBR is thus indicative not only of efficiency in asset 
utilisation but also of future growth potential (Sharma et al., 2013). 
 
Firm value was measured by Tobin’s Q and the MBR in this study. Data from two years 
(2010 and 2011) was collected in order to gain a better understanding of how IFR 
affected the firm value in the same year and the year after, when the web disclosure 
index was collected. The measurement of Tobin’s Q for 2010 and 2011, MBR for 2010 
and 2011 were discussed in Chapter 5.8.3. In this study, a Tobin’s Q and the 
market/book ratio value was greater than 25, this figure was considered to be an outlier 
and was excluded from the study. Thus, 4 companies in 2010 and 6 companies in 2011 
were excluded from the study.  
 
Table 7.1 shows that the mean values of Tobin’s Q in 2010 and 2011 were 2.78 and 
1.88, the median values were 2.26 and 1.57.  The mean value of Tobin’s Q exceeded 1, 
which implies that on average the resources of listed companies are used effectively. 
Bai et al. (2004), who observed 865 Chinese companies in 1999, 2000 and 2001, found 
that the mean values of Tobin’s Q were 2.574, 3.645 and 2.689. The maximum values 
of Tobin’s Q in this study were 11.57, 6.96 and 10.55; the minimum values of Tobin’s 
Q were 0.34, 0.73 and 0.77 for 2010, 2011. Similarly, in Bai et al. (2004), the maximum 
values of Tobin’s Q in 1999, 2000 and 2001 were 13.38, 18.34 and 25.74. The 
minimum values of Tobin’s Q were 0.58, 0.88 and 0.68. Shan and Xu (2012) examined 
139 Chinese listed companies during the period 1999 to 2009. The Tobin’s Q mean 
value was calculated to be 1.39, the median value 0.648, whilst the maximum value of 
Tobin’s Q was 28.34 and the minimum 0.08. Leung and Cheng (2013) examined the 
largest Chinese listed companies. Of the 4,913 companies they studied, similar results 
were obtained regarding Tobin’s Q. The positive skewness values indicate that scores 
clustered to the left at the low values. The values of kurtosis for Tobin’s Q were 4.62 
and 6.15. The positive kurtosis indicates that the distributions are rather peaked. 
 
Table 7.1 also shows that the mean values of the MBRs were 3.11 and 1.99. In this 
study, the maximum values for the MBRs were 11.46 and 6.87, with minimum values 
of 0.04 and 0.03. In a study of listed companies in Egypt, Ezat (2010) found that the 
mean value of MBR was 1.89 with an SD of 2.89. The maximum value for the MBR 
was 40.83 and the minimum 0.07. The positive skewness values indicate that scores are 
clustered to the left at low values, and the values of kurtosis for the market/book ratio 
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were 4.62, 6.15 and 3.57. Positive kurtosis indicates that the distributions are rather 
peaked.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in this chapter 
(TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, TIMELINESS, PRESENTATION, USABILITY, 
LNSIZE, ROA, STASHARE, LEGSHARE, FSHARE, CEODUALITY, BOARDSIZE 
and INDEPDIR) can be found in Chapter 6 Table 6.4 & Table 6.5. 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive statistics for firm’s value 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011  
N  284 280 282 278  
Mean 2.78 2.30 1.88 1.40 
Median 2.26 1.77 1.57 1.14 
Std. Deviation 1.87 1.99 1.08 1.20 
Variance 3.48 3.98 1.16 1.43 
Skewness 1.93 1.73 2.25 1.84 
Kurtosis 4.62 3.78 6.15 4.44 
Range 11.23 11.42 6.23 6.84 
Minimum 0.34 0.04 0.73 0.03 
Maximum 11.57 11.46 6.96 6.87 
 
Notes: All the variables are defined in Table 5.3  
 
7.2.2 Comparison of firm value 
 
7.2.2.1 Comparison of firm value between the bigger and smaller companies 
Company size is one of the factors determining IFR and IFR components. Larger 
companies provide more information than smaller companies, as well as more 
information on the reduced perceived estimation risk to investors, assuming that 
company size is inversely related to the firm’s cost of finance and firm value (Boston 
and Plumlee, 2005; Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Garay et al., 2013). It is of interest to 
determine the difference in firm value between the 149 bigger companies and 135 
smaller companies in a Chinese context.  
 
Table 7.2 compares the values obtained for the 149 bigger companies and 135 smaller 
companies in 2010.  Mann-Whitney tests were performed to find out the results.  As 
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shown in Table 7.2, the smaller sample companies had a greater average increase in 
Tobin’s Q 2010 value more than did the bigger sample companies (the mean rank 
increased from 115.68 to 172.1), with a z value of -5.781 and significant level at 0.00. 
There was a statistically significant difference in Tobin’s Q value 2010 between the 
bigger and smaller sample companies. At the same time, the smaller sample companies 
increased the MBR 2010 value by a greater amount than did the bigger sample 
companies (mean rank increased from 114.19 to 168.76), with a z value of -5.634 with a 
significant level at 0.00. This indicated that there is a statistically significant difference 
between the smallest and bigger sample companies’ MBR 2010. 
Table 7.2 Mann-Whitney test (Bigger and smaller companies in 2010) 
Mann-Whitney 
  SIZETYPE N Mean Rank Z- values  
TOBINSQ2010 SMALLERCOMPANIES 135 172.1 -5.781** 
BIGGERCOMPANIES 149 115.68   
MBR2010 SMALLERCOMPANIES 135 168.76 -5.634** 
BIGGERCOMPANIES 145 114.19   
 
Similar results are shown in Table 7.3, which shows the comparison value between the 
149 bigger sample companies and the 135 smaller companies in 2011. On average, the 
smaller sample companies had an increased Tobin’s Q 2011 value compared to the 
bigger sample companies (mean rank increased from 111.31 to 175.32), with a z value 
of -6.58 and significant level at 0.00. There was a statistically significant difference 
between the smaller and bigger sample companies’ Tobin’s Q value 2011. At the same 
time, there was an increase in the MBR 2011 value for the smaller sample companies 
compared to the bigger sample companies (mean rank increased from 107.07 to 
176.42), with a z value of -7.175 and significance level at 0.00. This indicated that there 
was a statistically significant difference between the smaller and bigger sample 
companies’ MBR in 2011. The same results were obtained when additional t-tests were 
used to test whether there was a significant difference in the firm value score for the 
bigger and smaller companies.  
 
This result is consistent with Shan and Xu (2012), who found firm size had a significant 
negative relationship with Tobin’s Q in their model. Shan and Xu (2012) suggested that 
large firms may have an opportunity for the controlling shareholders (state or legal 
entities) to appropriate and exploit firm value. 
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Table 7.3 Mann-Whitney test (Bigger and smaller companies in 2011) 
Mann-Whitney 
 SIZETYPE N Mean Rank Z-values 
TOBINSQ2011 SMALLERCOMPANIES 133 175.32 -6.58** 
BIGGERCOMPANIES 149 111.31  
MBR2011 SMALLERCOMPANIES 130 176.42 -7.175** 
BIGGERCOMPANIES 148 107.07  
 
7.2.2.2 Comparison of firm value for companies with or without an English-
language website 
This study found that 207 Chinese listed companies had an English-language version of 
their website, which may indicate that their focus on becoming global has led them to 
advantage of having a website that can be accessed by existing and potential 
shareholders anywhere in the world. The use of the English language on the companies’ 
websites may be regarded as a signal to investors that their quality of disclosure has 
improved. These tests add to the literature on the difference in firm value between 
companies who have English-language versions of their websites and those who do not. 
 
Table 7.4 compares the 207 companies who in 2010 had an English-language version of 
their website with the 77 companies who did not. Mann-Whitney tests were used to 
calculate the results. As shown in Table 7.4, companies without an English-language 
website had on average an increased Tobin’s Q 2010 value compared to companies with 
an English-language version (mean rank increased from 134.66 to 163.58), with a z 
value of -2.639 at a significant level 0.00. There is thus a statistically significant 
difference in the Tobin’s Q value 2010 between sample companies with and without an 
English-language version. At the same time, companies without an English-language 
version had a greater MBR 2010 value than companies with an English version (mean 
rank increased from 134.63 to 163.66), with a z value of -2.648 and a significance level 
of 0.00. This indicated that there is a statistically significant difference between sample 
companies with and without an English-language version with respect to the MBR 
2010. 
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Table 7.4 Mann-Whitney test (Companies with or without English version website 
in 2010) 
 
Mann-Whitney 
  
ENGWEB N Mean Rank Z-values 
TOBIN'SQ2010 WEB without English version 77 163.58 -2.639** 
WEB with English version 207 134.66  
MBR2010 WEB without English version 77 163.66 -2.648** 
WEB with English version 207 134.63  
 
Similar results are shown in Table 7.5, which compares the values obtained for 77 
companies without English-language versions of their websites and 205 companies with 
English-language versions in 2011. On average, companies without English-language 
versions had a higher Tobin’s Q 2011 value than companies with an English-language 
version (mean rank increased from 130.77 to 170.07), with a z value of -3.606. There 
was thus a statistically significant difference in the Tobin’s Q value 2011 between 
sample companies with an English-language version and those lacking this. At the same 
time, companies without an English-language version of the website had an increased 
MBR2011 value than companies who did have an English-language version (mean rank 
increased from 130.88 to 169.77), with a z value of -3.568 and a significance level of 
0.00. This indicated a statistically significant difference in the MBR2011 between 
sample companies with an English-language version and those without. 
Table 7.5 Mann-Whitney test (Companies with or without English version website 
in 2011) 
Mann-Whitney 
  
ENGWEB N Mean Rank Z-Values 
TOBINSQ2011 WEB without English version 77 170.07 -3.606** 
WEB with English version 205 130.77  
MBR2011 WEB without English version 77 169.77 -3.568** 
WEB with English version 205 130.88  
 
The same results were obtained when additional T-tests were used to test whether there 
was a significant difference in the firm value score for companies with or without an 
English-language version of their websites. 
 
This result is consistent with Botosan and Plumlee (2002), who found increased 
disclosure was sensitive to the type of disclosure being made, they also found positive, 
negative, and no association between different types of disclosure and the cost of 
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capital. Hassan et al. (2009) found voluntary disclosure had a positive but insignificant 
association with firm value. In the context of China, higher value firms may choose not 
to disclose English information on their websites, as they consider the benefits of 
English information are outweighed by the associated cost; for example the cost of 
preparing English information and the costs associated with information disclosure by 
international competitors. As the market in China does not operate openly, it can also be 
concluded that higher value firms may be able to gain preferential treatment from the 
government, such as preferential loans and large product orders (Sun et al., 2012) and 
less reliance on international investors.  
 
7.2.2.3 Comparison of firm value companies with or without financial information 
The web is now perceived as a convenient platform for the disclosure of both financial 
and non-financial information (Robb et al., 2001). This study found that 206 Chinese 
listed companies provided their financial information on their websites. Previous 
research has focused on the disclosure of financial information and investor relations on 
corporate websites (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004). It 
is of interest to determine how the inclusion or omission of financial information affects 
firm value.  
 
Table 7.6 shows the results of the Mann-Whitney tests used to find out the difference in 
firm value between companies with or without financial information. Surprisingly, 
companies who did not disclose financial information had on average a higher Tobin’s 
Q 2010 value than companies who did (mean rank increased from 130.41 to 174.42), 
with a z value of -4.03 with a significance level of 0.00. There was thus a statistically 
significant difference between the Tobin’s Q values 2010 for companies that disclosed 
financial information and those who did not. At the same time, companies whose 
websites did not provide financial information had a higher MBR 2010 value than 
companies who did provide financial information (mean rank increased from 129.25 to 
168.85), with a z value of -3.64 and significance level of 0.00. This indicated that there 
was a statistically significant difference in the MBR 2010 between companies with or 
without financial information. 
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Table 7.6 Mann-Whitney test (Companies with and without financial information 
in 2010) 
Mann-Whitney 
  FWEB N Mean Rank Z-values 
TOBINSQ2010 WEB without Financial information 78 174.42 -4.031** 
WEB with Financial information 206 130.41  
MBR2010 WEB without Financial information 78 168.85 -3.64** 
WEB with Financial information 202 129.55  
 
With regards to firm value in 2011, similar results are shown in Table 7.7. Companies 
who did not disclose financial information had a higher Tobin’s Q 2011 value than 
companies who did (mean rank increased from 130.37 to 171.4), with a z value of -
3.774 and a significant level at 0.00. There was a statistically significant difference in 
the Tobin’s Q value 2011 between companies who disclosed financial information and 
those who did not. At the same time, companies who did not provide financial 
information on their websites had a higher MBR 2011 value than companies who did 
(mean rank increased from 127.52 to 172.53), with a z value of -4.13 and significant 
level at 0.00. This indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in the 
MBR 2011 between companies with or without information. 
Table 7.7 Mann-Whitney test (Companies with and without financial information 
in 2011) 
                                                                  Mann-Whitney  
  FWEB N Mean Rank Z- values 
TOBINSQ2011 WEB without Financial information 77 171.4 -3.774** 
WEB with Financial information 205 130.27  
MBR2011 WEB without Financial information 74 172.53 -4.125** 
WEB with Financial information 204 127.52  
 
Similar results were obtained when additional T-tests were carried out to test whether 
there was a significant difference in the firm value score for companies with and 
without financial information on their websites. 
 
This result is consistent with that in the previous study (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). 
Hassan et al. (2009) suggested the mixed results emphasise that the association between 
disclosure and firm value is complex and reliant on the interplay of a number of factors, 
such as the trade – off between the costs and benefits associated with disclosure. In the 
case of China, when financial information that could reveal certain crucial aspects of a 
firm’s operations is disclosed to investors, it is also disclosed to the firm’s competitors, 
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which may disadvantage the firm competitively. For this reason, higher value firms tend 
not to disclose additional financial information on their websites when proprietary costs 
are sufficiently high. 
 
7.3 Univariate analysis 
7.3.1 Pearson correlations 
Three Pearson correlation tests were run to identify the relationship between dependent 
variables (firm value) and independent variables. For firm value at the end of 2010, 
Table 7.8 shows that both the Tobin’s Q 2010 and the MBR 2010 were negatively 
associated with total scores, company size, the proportion of foreign shares and board 
size at the 0.01 level. Both Tobin’s Q 2010 and the MBR 2010 were positively 
associated with ROA and the proportion of LEGALSHARE at the 0.01 level, but not 
with CEODUALITY. Similarly, there was no relationship between firm value and the 
proportion of STASHARE and INDEPEDIR in 2010. 
 
For firm value at the end of 2011, Table 7.9 shows that both Tobin’s Q 2011 and the 
MBR 2011 were negatively associated with total scores, company size, the proportion 
of foreign shares and board size at the 0.01 level. Both Tobin’s Q 2011 and the MBR 
2011 were positively associated with ROA at the 0.01 level. There was no relationship 
between firm value and the proportion of STASHARE, LEGSHARE, CEODUALITY 
and INDEPEDIR in 2011.  
 
7.3.2 Spearman’s rho correlations 
Three Spearman’ rho correlation tests were run to identify the relationship between 
dependent variables (firm value) and independent variables. With regard to firm value 
measured at the end of 2010, Table 7.11 shows that both Tobin’s Q 2010 and the MBR 
2010 were negatively associated with total scores, company size, the proportion of state 
shares, foreign shares and board size at the 0.01 level. Both Tobin’s Q 2010 and the 
MBR 2010 were positively associated with ROA and the proportion of legal shares. 
However, in this test, the MBR 2010 was positively associated with CEODUALITY at 
the 0.05 level, whilst there was no relationship with Tobin’s Q 2010. There was no 
relationship between firm value and the proportion of INDEPEDIR in 2010. The 
difference between these tests and the Pearson correlation test was that both Tobin’s Q 
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2010 and the MBR 2010 were negatively associated with the proportion of state shares 
at the 0.01 level. 
 
For firm value measured at the end of 2011, Table 7.12 shows that both Tobin’s Q 2011 
and the MBR 2011 were negatively associated with total scores, company size, the 
proportion of state and foreign shares and board size at the 0.01 level. Both Tobin’s Q 
2011 and the MBR 2011 were positively associated with ROA. There was no 
relationship between firm value and CEODUALITY or INDEPEDIR in 2011. The 
MBR 2011 was positively associated with the proportion of LEGSHARE at the 0.05 
level. There was no relationship between Tobin’s Q 2011 and the proportion of 
LEGSHARE.  
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Table 7.8 Correlations matrix of Independent and Dependent variables 
 
 
  TOBINSQ 
2010 
MBR2010 TOTAL 
SCORE 
LNSIZE ROA STA 
SHARE 
LEG 
SHARE 
FSHAR
E 
CEODUA
LITY 
BOARD
SIZE 
INDEP
DIR 
TOBINSQ2010 1           
MBR2010 .995** 1          
TOTALSCORE -.302** -.305** 1         
LNSIZE -.189** -.211** .608** 1        
ROA .547** .567** .074 .296** 1       
STASHARE -.091 -.085 .106 .352** .082 1      
LEGSHARE .208** .234** -.131* -.115 .227** -.093 1     
FSHARE -.245** -.259** .301** .271** -.098 .002 -.140* 1    
CEODUALITY .039 .064 .013 -.163** .027 -.057 .120* .002 1   
BOARDSIZE -.209** -.252** .225** .345** -.112 .064 -.151* .263** -.141* 1  
INDEPDIR -.002 .000 .198** .147* .038 .118* -.009 .000 -.018 -.233** 1 
Variable defined in Table 5.3  
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.9 Correlations matrix of Independent and Dependent variables 
 
  TOBINSQ
2011 
MBR2011 TOTAL 
SCORE 
LNSIZE ROA STA 
SHARE 
LEG 
SHARE 
FSHA
RE 
CEODUAL
ITY 
BOARD 
SIZE 
INDEP
DIR 
TOBINSQ2011 1           
MBR2011 .985** 1          
TOTALSCORE -.251** -.282** 1         
LNSIZE -.168** -.238** .608** 1        
ROA .502** .512** .074 .296** 1       
STASHARE -.088 -.092 .106 .352** .082 1      
LEGSHARE .075 .109 -.131* -.115 .227** -.093 1     
FSHARE -.218** -.250** .301** .271** -.098 .002 -.140* 1    
CEODUALITY .008 .048 .013 -.163** .027 -.057 .120* .002 1   
BOARDSIZE -.127* -.201** .225** .345** -.112 .064 -.151* .263** -.141* 1  
INDEPDIR -.038 -.033 .198** .147* .038 .118* -.009 .000 -.018 -.233** 1 
 
Variable defined in Table 5.3 
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.10 Correlations matrix of Independent and Dependent variables 
 
 
  TOBINSQ
2010 
MBR2010 TOTAL 
SCORE 
LNSIZE ROA STASH
ARE 
LEGSH
ARE 
FSHARE CEODU
ALITY 
BOARD 
SIZE 
INDEP
DIR 
TOBINSQ2010 1.000           
MBR2010 .991** 1.000          
TOTALSCORE -.454** -.446** 1.000         
LNSIZE -.406** -.396** .648** 1.000        
ROA .403** .445** .095 .220** 1.000       
STASHARE -.176** -.161** .165** .337** .091 1.000      
LEGSHARE .153** .173** -.098 -.126* .190** .049 1.000     
FSHARE -.393** -.391** .416** .369** -.095 .121* -.146* 1.000    
CEODUALITY .096 .120* .000 -.142* .065 -.025 .141* -.014 1.000   
BOARDSIZE -.337** -.378** .223** .334** -.140* .105 -.132* .244** -.175** 1.000  
INDEPDIR -.010 -.006 .196** .149* .036 .070 -.047 .025 .003 -.263** 1.000 
 
Variable defined in Table 5.3  
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the % level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.11 Correlations matrix of Independent and Dependent variables 
 
  TOBINSQ 
2011 
MBR2011 TOTALS
CORE 
LNSIZE ROA STAS
HARE 
LEGSH
ARE 
FSHA
RE 
CEODUAL
ITY 
BOARDS
IZE 
INDEP
DIR 
TOBINSQ2011 1.000           
MBR2011 .976** 1.000          
TOTALSCORE -.459** -.460** 1.000         
LNSIZE -.425** -.434** .648** 1.000        
ROA .319** .376** .095 .220** 1.000       
STASHARE -.167** -.140** .165** .337** .091 1.000      
LEGSHARE .118 .142* -.098 -.126* .190** .049 1.000     
FSHARE -.417** -.417** .416** .369** -.095 .121* -.146* 1.000    
CEODUALITY .063 .090 .000 -.142* .065 -.025 .141* -.014 1.000   
BOARDSIZE -.284** -.338** .223** .334** -.140* .105 -.132* .244** -.175** 1.000  
INDEPDIR -.060 -.043 .196** .149* .036 .070 -.047 .025 .003 -.263** 1.000 
Variable defined in Table 5.3  
*Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) ** Significant at the % level (p<0.01) 
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7.4 Multivariate regression analysis 
7.4.1 The regression model 
To examine the economic impact of IFR, this section describes the tests used to 
determine whether IFR and IFR components influence firm value. To implement this 
test, the multiple regression model developed by Garay et al., (2013), Leung and Cheng 
(2013), Orens et al., (2010), Shan and Xu (2012), Wang et al., (2008) and Silva and 
Alves (2004) was adopted. Firm value was measured by Tobin’s Q and the MBR were 
the dependent variables in the model. Independent variables are IFR scores, firm size, 
profitability and a list of corporate governance factors. X1 (IFR total score, content 
score, corporate governance score, social score, presentation score and usability score) 
was included with the expectation that IFR and IFR components would have an impact 
on firm value. X2 (firm size) and X3 (profitability) were included due to the impact of 
the size and profitability of the company on firm value. Recent empirical evidence from 
China has suggested that the presence of a good set of corporate governance practices 
has a positive impact on firm value (Bai et al., 2004; Shan and Xu, 2010; Leung and 
Cheng, 2013). A number of corporate governance variables - X4 (STASHARE), X5 
(LEGSHARE), X6 (FSHARE), X7 (CEODUALITY), X8 (BOARDSIZE) and X9 
(INDEPDIR) were thus included in this model. Based on the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 4, the regression model to be empirically investigated was as follows: 
 
Y= β0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+β5X5+β6X6+β7X7+β8X8+β9X9 +Ɛ 
 
Where Y = Firm value measured by Tobin’s Q or the MBR, X1= IFR total score, 
content score, corporate governance score, social score, presentation score and usability 
score. X2 = firm size as measured by market capitalisation (LNSIZE), X3 = profitability 
(ROA), X4 = shares held by state-owned corporations as a proportion of total shares 
(STASHARE), X5 = shares held by legal persons as a proportion of total shares 
(LEGSHARE), X6 = shares held by foreign shareholders (FSHARE), X7 = 1 for CEO 
also serving as chair of the board of directors (CEODUALITY), X8 = the number of 
board directors (BOARDSIZE), X9 = independent directors as a proportion of total 
directors (INDEPDIR). 
 
Two sets of regression tests were performed using firm values at the end of 2010 and 
2011. As based on the analysis in chapter 6, some of the independent variables were not 
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normally distributed, all the regressions tested in this chapter used the normal score (the 
van der Waerden approach). Across the six tests, VIF factors of all the explanatory 
variables ranged from 1.06 to 2.51. This indicated that there was no multi-collinearity 
problem in these models.  
 
7.4.2 The results of regression models for firm value in 2010 
The first regression test was performed using Tobin’s Q 2010 as the dependent variable. 
As shown in Table 7.12, the adjusted R2 was 46.7%, meaning that 46.7% of the 
variation in the Tobin’s Q 2010 was explained by the explanatory variables of this 
model. This model was significant (p<0.00) and the F value was 26.49. The value of 
Durbin-Watson was 1.726, which indicates no autocorrelation between variables. 
Additional regression tests were performed to examine the Tobin’s Q 2010 and IFR 
components, including CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION 
and USABILITY (results are shown in table 7.13 to 7.18). 
 
Among with the explanatory variables, TOTOALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, 
TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION, USABILITY, LNSIZE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE 
had a negative effect on Tobin’s Q 2010; ROA positively affects Tobin’s Q 2010. There 
was no relationship between the other control variables and Tobin’s Q 2010.  
 
The second regression test was run by examining the MBR 2010 as a dependent 
variable. The results are shown in Table 7.12. The adjusted R2 was 55.1%, which means 
that 55.1% of the variation in the MBR 2010 can be explained by the explanatory 
variables of this model. This model was significant (p<0.00) and the F value was 36.70. 
The value of Durbin-Watson was 1.75, which indicates no autocorrelation between 
variables. Additional regression tests were performed to examine the MBR 2010 and 
IFR components, including CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINEE, 
PRESENTATION and USABILITY (results are shown in table 7.13 to 7.18).   
 
Of the explanatory variables, TOTOALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, 
TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION, USABILITY, LNSIZE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE 
had a negative effect and ROA a positive effect on the MBR 2010. As with the Tobin’s 
Q 2010 model, there was no relationship between other control variables and the 
MBR2010.  
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7.4.3 The results of regression models for firm value in 2011 
The third regression test was performed using Tobin’s Q 2011 as a dependent variable. 
As shown in Table 7.12, the adjusted R2 was 44.3%, meaning that 44.3% of the 
variation in the Tobin’s Q 2011 can be explained by the explanatory variables of this 
model. This model was significant (p<0.00) and the F value was 24.01. The value of 
Durbin-Watson was 1.69, which indicates no autocorrelation between variables. 
Additional regression tests were performed to examine the Tobin’s Q 2011 and IFR 
components, including CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION 
and USABILITY (results are shown in table 7.13 to 7.18). 
 
Of the explanatory variables, TOTALSCORE, CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, 
TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION, USABILITY, LNSIZE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE 
had a negative effect on Tobin’s Q 2011, whilst ROA had a positive effect. There was 
no relationship between other control variables and Tobin’s Q 2011.  
 
The fourth regression test was run by examining the MBR 2011 as a dependent variable. 
The results are shown in Table 7.12. The adjusted R2 was 50%, meaning that 50% of the 
variation in the MBR 2011can be explained by the explanatory variables in the model. 
This model was significant (p<0.00) and the F value was 30.21. The value of Durbin-
Watson was 1.82, which indicates no autocorrelation between variables.  Additional 
regression tests were performed to examine the Tobin’s Q 2010 and IFR components, 
including CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION and 
USABILITY (results are shown in table 7.13 to 7.17). 
 
TOTALSCORE CONTENT, CG, SOCIAL, TIMELINEE, PRESENTATION, 
USABILITY, LNSIZE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE had a negative effect on the MBR 
2011, whilst ROA had a positive effect. As with the Tobin’s Q 2011 model, there was 
no relationship between other control variables and the MBR 2011.  
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Table 7.12 Regression model of firm value (TOTALSCORE) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.467 0.551 0.443 0.500 
Adjusted R Square 0.449 0.536 0.424 0.483 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.72 0.67 0.73 0.69 
F Change 26.494 36.709 24.010 30.217 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) .066 .648 .099 1.045 .087 .840 .072 .739 
TOTALSCORE -.246 -3.990*** -.264 -4.636*** -.212 -3.391*** -.199 -3.365*** 
LNSIZE -.204 -3.110*** -.204 -3.353*** -.230 -3.472*** -.289 -4.609*** 
ROA .483 10.038*** .523 11.773 .439 9.008*** .499 10.853 
STASHARE -.128 -2.090*8 -.070 -1.214 -.095 -1.538 -.025 -.426 
LEGSHARE -.032 -.542 -.015 -.275 -.072 -1.197 -.079 -1.401 
FSHARE -.169 -2.296** -.155 -2.259** -.275 -3.685*** -.201 -2.860*** 
CEODUALITY -.050 -.443 -.107 -1.017 -.056 -.491 -.049 -.452 
BOARDSIZE -.094 -1.775* -.159 -3.263*** -.041 -.759 -.092 -1.825 
INDEPDIR .001 .015 -.005 -.121 -.036 -.723 -.012 -.257 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) *** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.13 Regression model of firm value (CONTENT) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.467 0.548 0.445 0.499 
Adjusted R Square 0.449 0.533 0.427 0.482 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.728 0.673 0.735 0.696 
F Change 26.436 36.245 24.236 30.07 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) 0.063 .614 0.095 .994 0.086 .830 0.069 .705 
CONTENT -0.234 -3.953*** -0.242 -4.413*** -0.213 -3.561*** -0.185 -3.261*** 
LNSIZE -0.218 -3.427*** -0.225 -3.782*** -0.237 -3.675*** -0.303 -4.964*** 
ROA 0.488 10.144*** 0.529 11.858*** 0.444 9.127*** 0.504 10.931*** 
STASHARE -0.131 -2.147** -0.074 -1.279 -0.099 -1.604 -0.028 -.471 
LEGSHARE -0.036 -.605 -0.019 -.344 -0.075 -1.257 -0.082 -1.452 
FSHARE -0.175 -2.388** -0.164 -2.388*** -0.277 -3.737*** -0.207 -2.954*** 
CEODUALITY -0.045 -.393 -0.1 -.944 -0.054 -.470 -0.044 -.402 
BOARDSIZE -0.094 -1.771* -0.16 -3.255** -0.04 -.747 -0.092 -1.824* 
INDEPDIR -0.003 -.067 -0.01 -.231 -0.038 -.773 -0.016 -.335 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) *** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.14 Regression model of firm value (CG) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.461 0.538 0.437 0.492 
Adjusted R Square 0.443 0.522 0.418 0.475 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.732 0.681 0.740 0.701 
F Change 25.801 34.748 23.437 29.252 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) 0.057 .553 0.084 .872 0.078 .752 0.062 .630 
CG -0.196 -3.521*** -0.187 -3.597*** -0.164 -2.917*** -0.139 -2.607*** 
LNSIZE -0.255 -4.190*** -0.272 -4.775*** -0.277 -4.489*** -0.339 -5.810*** 
ROA 0.497 10.230*** 0.536 11.857*** 0.45 9.168*** 0.509 10.943*** 
STASHARE -0.129 -2.091* -0.07 -1.206 -0.096 -1.537 -0.024 -.413 
LEGSHARE -0.042 -.711 -0.027 -.486 -0.08 -1.332 -0.086 -1.516 
FSHARE -0.204 -2.800*** -0.195 -2.856*** -0.305 -4.151*** -0.233 -3.341*** 
CEODUALITY -0.033 -.291 -0.083 -.780 -0.041 -.355 -0.032 -.291 
BOARDSIZE -0.095 -1.781* -0.161 -3.238*** -0.042 -.774 -0.094 -1.845* 
INDEPDIR -0.017 -.343 -0.024 -.534 -0.051 -1.034 -0.027 -.580 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) *** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.15 Regression model of firm value (SOCIAL) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.460 0.540 0.439 0.502 
Adjusted R Square 0.443 0.524 0.42 0.485 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.732 0.680 0.739 0.694 
F Change 25.795 35.034 23.652 30.424 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) .051 .493 .080 .838 .074 .716 .063 .644 
SOCIAL -.204 -3.518*** -.204 -3.766*** -.182 -3.103*** -.193 -3.506*** 
LNSIZE -.252 -4.106*** -.264 -4.606*** -.269 -4.341*** -.314 -5.398*** 
ROA .469 9.667*** .509 11.293*** .427 8.705*** .486 10.561*** 
STASHARE -.106 -1.723* -.049 -.847* -.076 -1.226 -.006 -.103 
LEGSHARE -.027 -.451 -.012 -.209 -.067 -1.116 -.074 -1.318 
FSHARE -.216 -2.985*** -.207 -3.065*** -.314 -4.307** -.236 -3.438*** 
CEODUALITY -.032 -.278 -.086 -.804 -.041 -.360 -.039 -.357 
BOARDSIZE -.095 -1.787* -.160 -3.233* -.041 -.770 -.092 -1.818* 
INDEPDIR .001 .028 -.006 -.133 -.034 -.690 -.008 -.162 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)*** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.16 Regression model of firm value (TIMELINESS)  
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.472 0.554 0.448 0.504 
Adjusted R Square 0.454 0.539 0.430 0.488 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.724 0.669 0.733 0.693 
F Change 26.995 37.18 24.537 30.712 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) .070 .691 .101 1.064 .092 .890 .076 .783 
TIMELINESS -.257 -4.297*** -.269 -4.852*** -.229 -3.776*** -.212 -3.693*** 
LNSIZE -.226 -3.678*** -.233 -4.078*** -.246 -3.956*** -.305 -5.187*** 
ROA .488 10.193*** .529 11.942*** .444 9.149*** .504 10.992*** 
STASHARE -.136 -2.229 -.078 -1.355 -.103 -1.666 -.032 -.545 
LEGSHARE -.046 -.778 -.031 -.565 -.084 -1.407 -.091 -1.607 
FSHARE -.163 -2.223** -.150 -2.187** -.268 -3.601*** -.195 -2.783* 
CEODUALITY -.053 -.472 -.107 -1.017 -.060 -.530 -.052 -.484 
BOARDSIZE -.094 -1.791* -.160 -3.284*** -.041 -.763 -.092 -1.835 
INDEPDIR .011 .227 .005 .110 -.026 -.520 -.003 -.066 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)*** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.17 Regression model of firm value (PRESENTATION) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.452 0.532 0.427 0.487 
Adjusted R Square 0.434 0.516 0.408 0.47 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.738 0.685 0.747 0.705 
F Change 24.901 33.99 22.493 28.658 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) .056 .540 .084 .871 .073 .698 .061 .613 
PRESENTATION -.161 -2.799*** -.165 -3.104*** -.110 -1.889*** -.110 -2.003*** 
LNSIZE -.274 -4.468*** -.284 -4.961*** -.304 -4.891*** -.354 -6.048*** 
ROA .484 9.920*** .524 11.553*** .440 8.898*** .500 10.730*** 
STASHARE -.101 -1.627 -.040 -.681 -.075 -1.188 -.005 -.087 
LEGSHARE -.037 -.618 -.022 -.392 -.075 -1.235 -.083 -1.442*** 
FSHARE -.211 -2.881*** -.202 -2.939*** -.316 -4.260*** -.239 -3.412 
CEODUALITY -.036 -.313 -.088 -.817 -.037 -.321 -.033 -.299 
BOARDSIZE -.091 -1.684* -.156 -3.119*** -.040 -.744 -.091 -1.780* 
INDEPDIR -.007 -.139 -.015 -.317 -.046 -.913 -.021 -.435 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05)*** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 7.18 Regression model of firm value (USABILITY) 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
R Square 0.462 0.547 0.435 0.499 
Adjusted R Square 0.444 0.532 0.416 0.482 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.731 0.674 0.742 0.696 
F Change 25.942 36.13 23.227 30.109 
Sig. F Change 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Coefficients B t B t B t B t 
(Constant) .045 .442 .076 .801 .067 .647 .056 .577 
USABILITY -.207 -3.622*** -.230 -4.355*** -.158 -2.721*** -.179 -3.288*** 
LNSIZE -.235 -3.714*** -.234 -3.976*** -.268 -4.179*** -.307 -5.103*** 
ROA .464 9.534*** .501 11.165*** .424 8.592*** .483 10.420*** 
STASHARE -.122 -1.986 -.061 -1.060 -.089 -1.437 -.021 -.352 
LEGSHARE -.009 -.145 .011 .192 -.054 -.887 -.059 -1.038 
FSHARE -.194 -2.664*** -.182 -2.682*** -.301 -4.066*** -.219 -3.154*** 
CEODUALITY -.024 -.210 -.078 -.745 -.031 -.270 -.029 -.269 
BOARDSIZE -.106 -1.994* -.172 -3.519*** -.051 -.945 -.102 -2.016* 
INDEPDIR -.005 -.096 -.011 -.254 -.042 -.857 -.015 -.324 
 
*Significant at the 10% level (p<0.10) ** Significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) *** Significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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7.4.4 Discussion of the hypothesis test 
Hypothesis H12 states that IFR and its components (total, content, corporate 
governance, social, timeliness, presentation and usability) of Chinese listed companies 
is positively correlated with the firm value. Surprisingly, in line with the results of 
univariate analysis, there was a significant negative association between IFR total score, 
content, corporate governance, social, timeliness, presentation, usability and the firm 
value 2010 and 2011 models. In addition, LNSIZE, FSHARE and BOARDSIZE had a 
negative effect on the MBR 2011, whilst ROA had a positive effect.  
 
The results contradict some previous IFR studies conducted in other countries. Garay et 
al. (2013), Ezat (2010), Cormier et al (2009) and Silva and Alves (2004) found a 
positive relationship between IFR and firm value (Tobin’s Q or the market to book 
equity ratio). Hunter and Smith (2009), Lai et al. (2010) and Rahman (2010) found a 
positive relationship between IFR and stock price. On the other hand, the results are in 
line with some previous disclosure studies. Hassan et al. (2009) found that mandatory 
disclosure has a highly significant but negative relationship with firm value (measured 
by the market/book ratio), while voluntary disclosure has a positive but insignificant 
association with firm value in Egypt. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) found that the 
benefits of increased disclosure are sensitive to the type of disclosure being made; 
positive and negative associations, as well as an absence of association, between 
different types of disclosure and the cost of capital were found.  
In the case of China, Lan et al. (2013) found no evidence that extensive voluntary 
disclosures benefit public companies in China in the form of lower equity costs. Wang 
et al. (2008), who found no evidence of voluntary disclosure benefits to companies by 
reducing debt capital costs, obtained similar results. Wang et al. (2013) found that more 
voluntary disclosure does not create value for Chinese firms. Chen et al. (2014) found a 
negative relation between firm value and voluntary disclosure for firms that rely heavily 
on Ganxi (connections) for their value creation. In this study, in line with the results of 
previous studies, there was a significant negative association between IFR total score, 
content, corporate governance, social, timeliness, presentation, usability and firm value, 
as well as the 2010 and 2011 models.  
One explanation is that higher value firms may choose not to disclose more IFR 
information if the benefits of disclosure are outweighed by the associated cost, such as 
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proprietary costs (Armitage & Marston, 2008, Healy & Palepu, 2001, Verrecchia, 
1983). These costs include not only expense incurred when preparing and disseminating 
information but also the costs deriving from disclosing information that could be used 
by competitors and other parties in a way that is harmful to the reporting company. 
According to Verrecchia (1983), the higher the proprietary costs associated with the 
disclosure, the less negatively investors react to the withholding of relevant information; 
thus, it is less probable that companies will disclose information voluntarily. A 
significant negative association between IFR information and firm value suggests these 
costs are particularly relevant for IFR disclosure.  
Another explanation is that firms might not disclose IFR because they perceive no 
benefit to investors. The Chinese information environment is a low information 
environment, and Chinese retail investors are less sophisticated than those in the 
developed economies. Therefore, the quality of information and the level of disclosure 
that relevant differ, and what is useful for the Chinese investor is more basic than that 
for investors in developed economies (Lam and Du, 2004). As a consequence, voluntary 
disclosure in China is generally associated with low marginal benefits, and there is little 
urgent need for Chinese firms wishing to use IFR to access outside resources (Chen et 
al., 2014); thus, high value Chinese firms are less likely to disclose IFR on their 
websites. 
In this study, among other control variables, company size, the proportion of foreign 
shares and board size were negatively related to firm value, whilst ROA was positively 
related to firm value.  This reflects the fact that in the Chinese context, larger companies 
with a higher proportion of foreign shares and with a larger supervisory board disclosed 
more information on their websites, which negatively affected their firm value. 
Companies that were more profitable had a positive effect on firm value. Although the 
results contradict the majority of IFR studies, they were nevertheless consistent with 
some studies in the Chinese context. Gunasekarage et al. (2007) evidenced firm size had 
a negative significant influence on Tobin’s Q and market/book ratio by examining 1034 
Chinese listed companies.  Shan and Xu (2012) found that firm size had a negative and 
significant relationship with Tobin’s Q in their model. Bai et al. (2004), who used three 
years of panel data to examine the relationship between governance mechanisms and the 
market valuation of list companies, found that smaller companies have a higher firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q. Despite spilt share structure reform in 2006 and state 
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ownership decreased significantly, this reform was almost completed in 2008 in spit of 
state shareholders does not want lose control right in the industries (Wei and Geng, 
2008), thus large state associated firms have less distance between ownership and 
control, this finding highlight the existence of agency problems in China, especially for 
larger companies.  
 
At the same time, Leung (2009) conducted a corporate governance disclosure study in 
Hong Kong, with data collected from 258 firms over the 2003 to 2005 period. Empirical 
results show that voluntary corporate governance disclosure is positively and 
significantly related to market valuation (measured by Tobin’s Q) for small firms. It 
may be concluded from this study that, by disclosing voluntary information on their 
websites, smaller companies enjoy the benefit of receiving higher market valuations. In 
contrast to Bai et al. (2004), it was found that having more shares held by foreign 
investors had a negative effect on market valuation. Shan and Xu (2012) found that 
foreign ownership had no impact on a firm’s performance. Other control variables did 
not appear to affect firm value in the regression model. As with the current study, Shan 
and Xu (2012) also found that a number of factors, including ownership concentration, 
independent directors, board meetings and supervisory board size had no impact on firm 
performance. 
In this study, board size was found to be negatively related to firm value. This reflects 
the fact that in the Chinese context, board size may not be able to affect the extent of 
any monitoring, controlling and decision making in Chinese firms. Prior studies show 
that large boards are less effective than smaller boards, due to free-rider problems. 
Bennedsen et al. (2008) and Yermack (1996) offer evidence that smaller boards are 
associated with high firm value. More specifically, when the board of directors is in the 
hands of state-owned larger shareholders, there is a serious insider control problem in 
Chinese listed companies (Wei and Geng, 2008). Furthermore, there are few 
professionals (lawyers, accountants and finance experts) on the corporate boards in 
Chinese firms, and almost no minority shareholder representation (Chen et al., 2004). 
As a result, board independence is highly compromised (Liu, 2006). Thus, it is likely 
that such boards do not effectively monitor management or enhance firm value.  
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7.5 Summary 
The descriptive results of mean values of Tobin’s Q in 2010 and 2011 all exceeded 1in 
this study, which shows that the resources of Chinese listed companies are used 
effectively. Similarly, the descriptive results of 2010 and 2011 mean MBR indicate that 
Chinese listed companies are efficient at asset utilisation. This also suggests there is 
future growth potential for Chinese listed companies. Both Mann-Whitney tests and t-
tests are used to determine whether firm value is influenced by company size, the use of 
English-language website versions and by the inclusion of financial information on 
company websites.  Surprisingly, the results indicate that on average, smaller Chinese 
listed companies that do not have English-language website version or financial 
information on their websites have a higher value than do the biggest companies who 
have English-language website versions and financial information on their websites. 
 
Both univariate and multivariate analyses were performed to examine the effect of IFR 
and its components on firm value. As with the univariate results, after controlling for a 
number of variables, both the 2010 and 2011 models showed that the IFR total score 
had a significant negative impact on firm value. In addition, IFR content, timeliness, 
corporate governance and social responsibility had a negative effect on firm value. The 
irrelevance and negative impact of IFR on the firm value in this case highlights the need 
to examine regulation and reform in the Chinese stock market. Furthermore, the absence 
of the effects of corporate governance factors on firm value indicates that there is a need 
for improvement in institutions’ corporate governance. As the Chinese stock market is 
developing rapidly, it is also hoped that as investors become more experienced, greater 
uptake of extensive voluntary disclosure will have benefits in terms of cost of equity in 
the future (Lan et al., 2013), which is therefore likely to increase firm value.  
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Chapter 8 Perceptions and attitudes toward the IFR of Chinese listed 
companies: results of interviews 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis employs triangulation research strategy to strengthen the research findings, 
including methodological triangulation, data triangulation and theoretical triangulation. 
Chapter 6 analysed the factors leading to Chinese companies voluntarily disclosing IFR 
on their websites, by examining the quantitative data in the survey results. This current 
chapter has employed semi-structured interviews to identify additional factors 
influencing Chinese companies voluntarily to disclose IFR on their websites, and to 
establish the perceptions of companies toward IFR, along with any future incentives to 
improve IFR on their websites.  
The interviews lasted approximately 60 minutes on average, with the shortest being 
approximately 40 minutes and the longest around 85 minutes. All interviews were 
transcribed and then organised into categories, depending on the themes and sub-themes 
of the interview guide. Each transcript has been given a clear identifiable code, and 
participants classified according to their web status into three categories: (1) Active and 
maintained websites with financial information (A1 to A 15); (2) Active and maintained 
websites but without financial information (B1 to B7); (3) Companies without active 
websites (C1 to C3). 
The process of analysis has been presented and explained in Chapter 5. This chapter 
will examine the interview findings relating to the following: (1) the motivation for 
constructing and maintaining websites; (2) factors determining why some companies do 
not disclose financial reporting on their websites; (3) the reasons for companies 
deciding not to have a website; (4) perceptions of IFR; and (5) future implications for 
IFR. 
 
 
199 
 
Table 8.1 Background information concerning the interviewees 
 
Interviewee code  Website status Main business  Job title Highest academic 
qualification 
Internet 
experience 
A1 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Mining  Board secretary MBA 7  years 
A2 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  IR officer MSc in Marketing  10 years 
A3 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Banking Senior officer in 
accounting department 
PhD in Accounting  8 years 
A4 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  IR officer MSc in Accounting and 
Finance 
7 years 
A5 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Real estate IR officer BA in Finance 6 years 
A6 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Transport Board secretary MBA 11 years 
A7 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Insurance  IR officer MSc in Finance and Banking 10 years 
A8 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Logistic and transport Head of IT department BA in computer science 8 years 
A9 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  Head of Marketing 
Department  
MSc in Marketing  10 years 
A10 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  IR officer MSc in Accounting 5 years 
A11 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Information and 
communication technology 
Head of IT department MSc in computer science 12 years 
A12 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Real estate IR officer MBA 8 years 
A13 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Energy Board secretary BA in Accounting with 
Marketing Management 
6 years 
A14 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  IR officer MSc in Accounting  9 years 
A15 Active with financial information on the 
website 
Manufacturing  Senior officer in 
accounting department 
MSc in Finance 5 years 
      
B1 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Social service IR officer MA in Accounting 8 years 
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B2 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Manufacturing  IR officer MSc in Accounting and 
Finance 
6 years 
B3 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Wholesale and retailing Head of Marketing 
Department 
BA in Marketing 
Management 
7 years 
B4 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Manufacturing  Senior officer in 
accounting department 
MSc in Finance 8 years 
B5 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Manufacturing  Vice general manager MBA 7 years 
B6 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Retailing  IR officer BA in  Accounting and 
Banking 
5 years 
B7 Active with no financial information on 
the website 
Real estate Senior officer in 
accounting department 
BA in Accounting 5 years 
      
C1 No website Manufacturing  IR officer BA in Marketing 4 years 
C2 No website Retailing  Vice general manager MBA 7 years 
C3 No website Manufacturing  Head of Marketing 
Department  
MSc in Marketing 5 years 
      
R1    Regulator PhD in Finance 9 years 
R2   Regulator MSc in Economic 11 years 
 
Note: Internet experience represents the length of time that interviewees using Internet as part of their working environment.
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8.2 Factors determining whether a company adopts IFR 
The first objective of this research is to examine the factors determining the financial 
information provided on Chinese websites. In Chapter 6, it was established that the 
results of the disclosure index analysis established the significant factors for the total 
scores disclosed on the corporate websites. These included: company size; industry 
type; big-4 auditor type; state share ownership; foreign share ownership; CEO duality; 
the proportion of independent directors. However, the R square for the total content 
model is 51.1%, implying that the 51.1% variation in the IFR content is explained by 
the explanatory variables. It is therefore of interest to identify the additional factors 
determining a company’s choice to disclose IFR on its website. The results of the semi-
structured interviews (Table 8.2) reveal that there are a number of additional factors that 
determine whether companies disclose IFR on their website. Each of these factors will 
be discussed in detail in the following section. 
Table 8.2 Factors determining a company’s adoption of IFR 
Factors determining company adopting IFR n Percentage 
Communication tools with investors and other stakeholders 8 32% 
Timely information to investors  6 24% 
Benefit of having a website 7 28% 
Company’s image and reputation  5 20% 
Management decision 4 16% 
Winning awards 3 12% 
 
Note: The statistics in this table are based on the full group of 25 interviews. 
 
8.2.1 Communication tools with investors and other stakeholders 
In comparison to the traditional Investor Relations (IR) model, the use of the Internet 
can widen the reach of IR, particularly through its general accessibility as a 
communications channel. This gives a greater reach to IR through the automation of a 
number of its services (Rowbottom et al., 2005). A major advantage of web-based 
corporate reporting is that the communication possibilities go far beyond those 
achievable by traditional means. Technology and interactivity can be used to engage 
investors and enhance their experience through a variety of means, e.g. flash movies; 
videos of interviews with senior management; financial information downloads; 
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charting tools and feedback forms (Jeffrey, 2008). Kelton and Yang (2008) consider the 
Internet to be a unique information disclosure tool that encourages flexible forms of 
presentation and permits immediate, broad, and inexpensive communication with 
investors. 8 of the 25 participants (32%) noted that companies disclose their information 
on the Internet because they are able to use it as communication channel with investors 
and other stakeholders.  
Our top priority is our investors. By setting up an interactive platform, such as a 
chat line and message board, through our websites, we can answer a lot of 
queries from our investors. Our company has quite a few staff members always 
working online. Any of our investors can get a response as soon as our staff are 
at work. (A6) 
It is one of our important duties to make sure that we keep our shareholders 
informed with regard to what's happed, what we are doing right now and what 
we are going to do in the future: our website fulfils this task. (A3) 
It is a convenient way to communicate with your investors, potential investors, 
analysts and even researchers. You can find out historical data dated back 4 or 
5 years. We have the facility of emails, videos, e-journals, and a calendar. (A11) 
Investors can access our websites any time at all, and they can obtain 
information from anywhere they are, as long as they have an Internet 
connection. Our website also enables us to communicate with not just only 
domestic investors, we can communicate with foreign investors with ease, as 
well. (A1) 
It is the company's strategy to set up a website. We need to take advantage of 
current technology to have a dialogue with our stakeholders. (A7) 
Recently, our company started placing WEIBO on our websites, and the number 
of visitors increased significantly since then. (A10) 
IFR provides an efficient means for companies to improve communications with 
investors, decrease costs associated with distributing hard-copy information, and 
increase the frequency of information disclosures (FASB 2000). Agency theory 
addresses the problem of information reporting for assessing managerial behaviour 
where management holds private information and does not communicate. A possible 
explanation of the results of the interview is that managers provide additional 
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disclosures to shareholders on their websites in order to the reduce agency costs. A 
survey by Ashbaugh et al. (1999) has established that those firms engaged in online 
corporate reporting place greater emphasis on communication with potential and 
existing shareholders. According to FASB (2000), one of the potential motives for 
companies to provide financial information on the Internet is communicating with 
previously unidentified consumers of information. Similar results have been reported by 
White and Raman (2000), indicating that one of the purposes of constructing a website 
is to improve the information communicated to company stakeholders. Furthermore, 
Adams and Frost (2006) propose that website development is driven by the desire to 
provide a mechanism for communication.  
8.2.2 Timely information to investors 
The key advantages of the Internet have been identified as consisting of speed and cost. 
The timeliness of IFR refers to the immediacy of information. Wagenhofer (2003) notes 
that:  
By placing financial information on the firm’s websites, users can search, filter, 
retrieve, download, and even reconfigure, such information at low cost in a 
timely fashion. The Internet allows for hyperlinks, search engines, multimedia 
and interactivity. The Internet opens up new disclosure opportunities.  
Timeliness refers to the speed of presenting financial reports in order to promote 
transparency (Lymer and Debreceny, 2003). Timeliness of information disclosure is not 
only a matter of investor decision-making, but can also reduce the opportunities for 
internal staff to maximise their use of insider information to exploit any opportunity for 
insider trading due to time differences. Investors require true, accurate, complete and 
timely information, and listed companies should take effective measures to ensure their 
websites disclose accurate and timely information. The interviewees were aware of the 
implications: 
I believe that the current constraint of some listed companies is the speed of site 
content updates. If listed companies can accelerate the frequency of website 
update, it can sustain communication with investors. (A1) 
Elliott (1992), Wallman (1995) and ICAS (1999) all call for greater disclosure and more 
frequent online reporting. IFR improves the efficiency of capital markets through the 
rapid dissemination of information to financial markets. Such timely information may 
have a significant influence on decisions made by both potential and existing investors, 
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as well as other stakeholders (Hanafi et al., 2009). 6 of the 25 interviewees (24%) stated 
that timely information is one of the factors leading to the company’s decision to 
disclose information on their website. The interviewees in this current study stated that: 
Our drive to set up a website is in order to deliver up to date information about 
our company, ideally in a timely manner. The frequency for updating a website 
is a bottleneck of developing the website and the complicated procedures result 
in slow updates. It would better if our company could shorten the approval level 
of content updates. (A4) 
We consider that our website is a way to make everybody receive the 
information at the same time. It is the easiest and quickest way to distribute, not 
only financial information, but also company announcements and press releases. 
(A 15) 
Any information we need to post on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website, we 
will afterwards post on our own websites straight away, then the information 
can be accessible by everyone… Our company websites are normally updated 
twice or three times a day. (A 10) 
If we look from user's point of view, timely information is crucial for users to 
make decisions. We are trying to assist users as much as we can, and our 
website helps. It makes information available in more effective ways for users. 
(A3) 
The interview results support signalling theory. The guidelines on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange emphasise that: “listed companies should update websites with current 
information. There should be a significant distinction between current and historical 
information, and error messages should be promptly corrected to avoid misleading 
investors” (CSRC, 2004). Signalling theory has been used to explain separation between 
ownership and control, and the motivation of managers to disclose additional 
information in response market pressure (Ross, 1979). By providing more information 
in a timely manner, managers signal to shareholders the firm’s financial reporting 
quality, which can be an easy method for distinguishing themselves from others in the 
marketplace.  
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8.2.3 Benefit of having a website 
A key driver for Internet reporting is the cost savings resulting from the cessation of the 
production and distribution of hard copy reports (Xiao et al., 2005), and therefore email 
distribution is markedly cheaper. The advantages of the Internet for financial reporting 
are its cheapness, speed, dynamism and flexibility (Lymer, 1999). Haniffa and 
Ab.Rashid (2004) state that IFR can be cost effective, fast, flexible in format, and 
accessible to all users within and beyond national boundaries. A small number of the 
interviewees remarked that: 
 
It is obvious that we have reduced the cost of printing and posting paper reports. 
On top of that, if any shareholders request annual reports they can always go to 
our websites. But that is not the only reason we disclose information on our 
websites. (A7) 
We do see the physical costs reduced by not sending as many as reports as 
before (we had a website), at the same time other costs are incurred by 
constructing and maintaining our websites. We are not certain when, and where, 
benefit might come from. However, we understand the importance of disclosure 
and transparency. (A4)  
It is the cheapest and easiest way to disseminate the company's information. 
(A13) 
By disclosing information on our website and making us visible, we hope to 
attract a larger range of investors, and in the long run our company will benefit. 
(A8) 
One of the great benefits of our websites is that we can attractive more investors 
and more customers. (A9) 
The results of interviews support the cost and benefit approach. Gray and Roberts 
(1989) note that disclosure choices will be determined by managerial assessment of the 
costs and benefits of alternative disclosure methods. Companies may also increase their 
voluntary disclosure in order to raise capital more cheaply on the markets (Marston, 
1999). FASB (2000) suggests that reducing the cost and time it takes to distribute 
information is a reason for companies to provide financial information on the Internet. 
Interviews conducted by Ettredge et al. (2001) have established that IR directors view 
the website as a means of reducing administrative costs, and that online disclosure helps 
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provide a common level of disclosure to all stakeholders. The UK IRS (Investor 
Relations Society) states that website outlay and maintenance costs of £20,000-30,000 
per annum could be quickly recouped, with the marginal costs of distributing online 
financial reports being zero, compared to an estimated £5 on average to send a hard 
copy of a financial report (Beattie and Pratt, 2001). However, Jones et al. (2001) report 
that the cost savings from distributing information online may not be a motivator for 
operating an IR Website, due to the fact that such gains can be eroded by the costs of 
processing the greater requests for information generated by the website. 
8.2.4 Company’s image and reputation 
Companies have the potential to manage their information disclosure and improve their 
corporate image by emphasising positive information and placing their own 
interpretation on anything that has the potential to be negative. Remarks provided by 
interviewees regarding a company’s image and reputation associated with web 
construction include: 
We are the largest company in our industry. It is unbelievable that we would not 
have a website. How can we let investors realize that we are number one in this 
field? We can broadcast it through our website. (B3) 
Our company website may be the first contact with our investors and customers. 
The quality of our website is a clear indicator of our company. They can see our 
vision and our mission on our website. We also have videos, flashes, adverts…. 
we hope the efforts we have made to maintain our website would impress our 
investors and customer at the first sight and allow them gain more confidence in 
our company. (A14) 
The industry we are in is quite competitive. We always have to do better, and 
that including everything… Our website is a window to show our ability and 
what we have achieved. (B6) 
Signalling theory suggests that higher quality firms will use the Internet to disseminate 
‘positive’ accounting information as widely as possible (Craven and Marston, 1999). 
Adams and Frost (2006) suggest that corporate image is the most important driver in 
developing a corporate website. Ali Khan and Ismail (2012b) have examined the factors 
that influence companies in Malaysia to engage in IFR, with the results of the 
questionnaire concluding that enhanced corporate image is the key factor. Ali Khan and 
Ismail (2012a) examined bank officer’s views of factors that determine whether 
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companies engage in IFR; their analysis indicates that enhanced corporate image is the 
important influence for companies in Malaysia to practice IFR. AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2012) noted that perceptions of corporate image and reputation were highlighted by a 
number of interviewees as influencing website adoption in Jordon. 
 
8.2.5 Management decision 
Gowthorpe (2004) states that corporate managers generally use their experience to 
imagine the shareholder’s needs. The beliefs of the senior executives, in particular, 
bring a strong influence to bear. Managers are accustomed to visiting their competitors’ 
websites to gain new ideas about the information content. Management strategy has an 
important influence on the adoption of Internet financial reporting and disclosure. A 
number of the interviewees commented that: 
It is up to our top management team, if they make decisions on constructing a 
website and disclose financial information on our website, they must know there 
is a need to do so. (A6) 
There is another factor need to be taken into consideration: our chairman makes 
all the decisions. (B2) 
The average age of our company’s staff is 32. We have a very active team…. our 
management team loves advanced technology. They made a decision to 
construct a website, and that’s why we were one of the very first companies in 
our field to do so… our director has his own WEIBO on our website. (B5) 
From the above interview results, it can be concluded that the decision of management 
is one the factors that influences companies to disclose information on their website. 
The results are consistent with agency theory that management attempt to reduce the 
high agency costs associated with information asymmetry between market participants 
by disclosing IFR on their websites. Similarly, White and Raman (2000) note that “in 
almost all the organisations in the study, the decision to develop a website was made by 
one person, usually the CEO or Marketing manager.” Aly (2010) notes that 
management approach, strategy and mentality affect voluntary adopt Internet financial 
disclosure and reporting. Ali Khan and Ismail (2012b) conclude that directors’ desire to 
engage in IFR is a factor in influencing companies to practice IFR. AbuGhazaleh et al. 
(2012) also suggest that the decision to adopt, renew, or update websites crucially 
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depends upon whether or not such a decision is congruent with the beliefs of senior 
management. 
 
8.2.6 Winning awards 
The China Securities Times and the Securities Times Network set up the ‘China Listed 
Companies Excellent Website Award’ campaign in 2008. The selection of the 
outstanding Chinese listed company’s websites runs annually, and is a highly popular 
event for listed companies. A professional research team evaluates the company 
websites first, by undertaking comprehensive study visits and basing results on a 
standard system. Descriptive statistics are obtained, followed by the process of 
determining the ranking through the collection and analysis of each site’s composite 
score, based on the score of professional public online voting, plus the selection of 
experts. There are over thirty specific evaluations, mainly on the following aspects: 1) 
Timeliness of information disclosure: this measure is to examine whether the company 
website publish their mandatory information in a timely manner, and whether they 
update their company’s information, media reports and other relevant information. 2) 
Information disclosure initiative: this measure examines whether the company’s 
disclosures include further voluntary information. 3) Adequacy of information 
disclosure. 4) Fairness of information disclosure. 5) Interactive ability of company’s 
websites. 6) Functionality of company’s website. 7) The speed of the company’s 
website. 8) The convenience in using the company website. 9) Openness of the 
company’s website. 10) The company website’s multimedia applications.  
 
Once the score been finalised, the shortlisted companies are published in the ‘Securities 
Times’, one of SEC key papers, followed by the Securities Times Online 
(www.stcn.com), along with co-media releases of the reports of the listed companies. 
Finally, the lists of those who have won awards are announced in ‘Securities Times’ and 
‘Securities Times News Network’, along with promotion in a dedicated portal.  
Our company has won the award of ‘Most popular listed company’s website to 
investors” in 2009 and 2010: we are very proud of our website quality. It not the 
main reason why we construct and maintain our website, but it is a bonus (A4) 
Some media (such as Securities Times) organised the best websites campaign, 
which establishes and demonstrates the excellent examples of listed companies' 
websites. They have an award list for the most popular listed companies for 
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investors, the Best Investors Relations Interactive Platform Website, Best 
Innovative Application Website… As our company is a technology oriented 
company, we hope we can win next year’s competition in the category of Best 
Innovative Application Site… (A11) 
The results support institutional theory, which suggests that online disclosure may be 
driven by a desire to meet the expectations of social or capital markets (Rowbottom, 
2002). The coercive isomorphic pressures from the China Securities Times and the 
Securities Times Network have proved an active driving force for companies to adopt 
their IFR practices to bring these into line with the expectations and demands of its 
powerful stakeholders. The results also support signalling theory, which determines that 
companies seek to distinguish themselves in the market by providing excellent websites.  
Awards for the Best Investor Relations Websites are made in the United States by 
Investor Relations Magazine (www.irmag.com) and in the United Kingdom by the 
Investor Relations Society (www.ir-soc.org.uk). The results are consistent with research 
conducted by a number of scholars. A survey conducted by Ali Khan and Ismail 
(2012b) reports that winning awards is the one of the factors that explains the reasons 
Malaysian companies disclose information on their websites. Similarly, Khan and 
Ismail (2012a) conclude that the views of bank officials determined whether companies 
engaged in IFR, with their analysis indicating that winning awards is important factor in 
the decision of Malaysian companies to practice IFR.  
8.3 Factors influencing companies who did not disclose financial information on 
their websites 
The descriptive analyses of the survey in Chapter 6 revealed that, of the original sample 
of 300 companies, 284 (98%) have accessible websites. From the final sample of 284, 
approximately 190 (67%) had disclosed their current year balance sheet, along with 
income and cash flow statements, on their websites. 179 companies (63%) disclosed 
their past year’s balance sheet and income statement. In this section, the results of the 
interviews (Table 8.3) identify the reason a number of companies set up a website but 
did not use it to disclose financial information. 
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Table 8.3 Factors influencing companies who did not disclose financial information 
on their websites 
 
Factors influencing companies who did not disclosed financial 
information on their websites 
n Percentage 
Financial information already exists through other media 4 57% 
Litigation costs 2 25% 
 
Note: The statistics in this table are based on the 7 interviews 
 
8.3.1 Financial information already existing through other media 
The investor relation officer of a company, which does not provide financial 
information on its websites, stated: 
You can find out financial information on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website 
and Securities Times, that’s mandatory. We feel it a more trustworthy source of 
financial information from creditable media (for users). (B6) 
Another interviewee noted that: 
Our company is the parent company of a group of subsidiary companies. If you 
can find …. the company’s website of one of our subsidiary companies, all the 
financial information is available there…. There is no need to disclose financial 
information twice. (B2) 
The results accord with the interview results of AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012), who state 
that: “Our annual reports are already on the JSC's website”. Companies are of the 
opinion that they already have their information available on the Stock Exchange 
website (and other media) and therefore they feel it is unnecessary to disclose it on their 
own website. Ali Khan and Ismail (2012a, 2012b) report that: a view that “there are 
alternative forms of obtaining information” is a further reason for Malaysian companies 
choosing not to disclose information on their websites.  
8.3.2 Litigation costs 
As pointed out by two of the interviewees, litigation costs are another reason why 
companies choose not to disclose information on their websites. Elliott and Jacobson 
(1994) suggested that the legal actions taken against managers for inadequate or 
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untimely disclosures could encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure. One 
interviewee noted: 
I understand that managers may choose to disclose less information on their 
websites for reducing the risk of litigation and avoid legal sanctions. (R1) 
Another interviewee stated: 
Unlike in the USA, the SEC has issued Safe Harbour Provisions to encourage 
managers to provide more voluntary disclosure. There is not a similar regulation 
exist in China. The CEOs are reluctant to make more disclose than mandatory 
required by law because by the nature of certain disclosure, they could be wrong. 
(R2) 
One interpretation of this evidence is that managers in China consider their costs and 
benefits in terms of IFR practice. Thus, if the cost of disclosing IFR is potentially 
outweighed by the benefit, then managers will be reluctant to voluntarily disclose 
information on their websites. 
8.4 Factors influencing companies without their own websites 
The descriptive analyses of Chapter 6 established that, of the original sample of 300 
companies, 284 (98%) have accessible websites and 6 have no website. In this section, 
three interviewees explain the factors that influenced these companies not to establish 
their own website (Table 8.4). In order to understand the factors that might affect the 
decision not to have a website, three companies were approached. 
Table 8.4 Factors influenced companies did not have their own websites 
Factors influencing companies that did not have their own 
websites 
n Percentage 
No legal requirement 1 33% 
Not a priority of management  2 66% 
Note: The statistics in this table are based on the 3 interviews. 
 
8.4.1 No legal requirement 
There are currently three guidelines promoting listed companies to disclose financial 
information on their websites, these include: (1) Listed companies and investors 
relations guidelines (published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission); (2) 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange listed company investor relations management self-
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discipline convention; and (3) The Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies investor 
relations management guidelines. However, there is no mandatory requirement for 
companies to disclose information online, as pointed out by one of the interviewees: 
There is no legal requirement to publish any information on the company’s 
website. I know there are some guidelines that companies should have a 
disclosure on their own websites from the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, but it is not mandatory. We publish our reports on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in the newspapers. We have met all the 
mandatory requirements from the Stock Exchange. (C 3) 
These results agree with those of Ali Khan and Ismail (2012b), who examined the 
factors that influence companies in Malaysia to engage in IFR. The results of their 
questionnaire advised that ‘no legal requirement’ is the key factor influencing 
companies not to practice IFR. Ali Khan and Ismail (2012a) identified that a the views 
of a bank officer concerning the relevant factors determined whether or not companies 
engaged in IFR, and their analysis indicated that ‘no legal requirement’ is an important 
factor in Malaysian companies failing to practice IFR. Moradi et al. (2011) conclude 
that a lack of legal requirements set by the Stock Exchange Organisation for companies’ 
release of information via the Internet is the main reason for companies in TSE failing 
to disclose information on their websites. AbuGhazaleh et al. (2012) suggest that the 
perceptions of the interviewees were that the Jordanian securities law, as well as 
corporate law, do not require them to have a website or to use it to disclose any financial 
information. 
8.4.2 Not the priority of management 
Two interviewees all agreed that their companies will create a website in the future, and 
that the reason it has not yet been created is a surplus of other matters to deal with, 
either internally or externally, leading to management being forced to prioritise. One 
interviewee noted that: 
You may know that our company just went through an acquisition process, so we 
have a lot of others things to sort out at the moment. Once it has been done, we 
will consideration the re-construction of our own websites. (C1) 
Another interviewee states that: 
It is on our agenda to build our website, we are just not fully ready yet to do so. 
Our company is very young. (C3) 
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From the above comments, it can be concluded that it is the intention of these 
companies to build up their websites in the near future. They identify having too many 
other business events to deal with at present, but that the future building of their website 
is on their agenda.  
8.5 Perceptions of IFR by companies 
Although interviews were primarily conducted to understand the factors influencing 
companies to build a website, reasons also emerged as to why some companies did not 
disclose financial information on their websites or did not have a website. The third 
objective is to investigate the perceptions of IFR by Chinese listed companies. This 
section forms an analysis of the following issues discussed during the interviews (Table 
8.5): (1) the cost of construction and improving a website; (2) the additional costs for 
the companies to disclose information online; (3) the languages used to construct a 
website; (4) the format companies use to disclose financial information and security of 
information, as discussed below.  
Table 8.5 Perceptions of IFR by companies 
Perceptions of IFR by companies     n  Percentage 
Cost of Construction websites and upgrade websites 10 40% 
Other costs that could occur with regard to IFR 2 8% 
Updating the website 6 24% 
Languages used on websites  4 16% 
Presentation formats of financial information 6 24% 
Integrity of information 5 20% 
Note: The statistics in this table are based on the full group of 25 interviews. 
 
8.5.1 Cost of construction and upgrading of websites 
8.5.1.1 Cost of construction of websites and upgrading of websites 
Setting up a company’s website and upgrading it to apply current technology is an 
additional cost for listed companies. Some of the interviewees revealed the figure they 
had spent on constructing and upgrading their website, while a small number mentioned 
the cost incurred when constructing their own websites: 
It cost our company nearly RMB 5 million Yuan (£500,000) to construct our 
website. We host a telecommunication trunk room, and we take responsibility for 
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maintaining and updating our website… we have 8 staff members doing the job 
currently. (A3) 
Setting up our website only cost us about RMB 100000 Yuan (£10,000). We rent 
a space server and outsource related information to an information services 
company, who are response for the maintenance…. we do have some concerns 
about the safety of the website. (B7) 
We spent about RMB 330000 Yuan (£33,000) on building up our website (B2) 
Interviewees also discussed their plans to update their websites within the next few 
months: 
We have a plan to improve our website. It will involve changing the content. The 
funding is available now, and it is about RMB 450000 Yuan (£45,000). (A6) 
Our users are quite happy with our website… Yes, we are going to upgrade our 
website, but it’s just minor work, it won’t cost more than RMB 2000 Yuan 
(£200). (B5) 
Recently, our company received some valuable feedback with regards our 
website… it will be foolish not to adopt the recommendations. We need to 
discuss it with our managers. (A13) 
8.5.1.2 Other costs that could be incurred with regard to IFR 
One interviewee raised the issue of additional cost, and concerns about losing 
competitive advantage by disclosing sensitive information on their website: 
It is not only about the cost of constructing and maintaining our website. We 
have to think about our competitors… we do not want them to know everything 
we do. (A12) 
This finding confirms that proprietary costs are relevant for IFR reporting. Proprietary 
Costs Theory (Verrecchia, 1983; Wagenhofer, 1990) states that companies limit 
voluntary disclosure of information to the financial market because of disclosure-related 
costs (i.e. proprietary costs). These include not only the costs of preparing and 
disseminating information, but also arise when disclosing information makes the 
reporting company vulnerable to its competitors. Research conducted by Moradi et al. 
(2011) also confirmed that the possibility of rivals’ accessing the company’s major 
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information through a website was one of the reasons companies are unwilling to 
disclose information on their websites on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). 
8.5.2 Updating the website 
The key advantage of IFR is instant access and the ability to access up-to-date 
information. The company is able to carry out regular maintenance of their own website 
in order to provide continuous updates and reflect new information for users. 
Interviewees made the following comments:  
 
Our website has been updated a few times a day. (A3) 
Normally we do (update) it daily. (A8) 
It depends, if we have important news to release, we update it a few times a 
week, otherwise we update it weekly. (B2) 
For every piece of information we wish to post on our website, we need the 
approval from the leadership of our company, such as the major shareholder 
department and local government. That slows down the speed of updating our 
website. (A7) 
 
In China, local government plays a key role in state-owned company management, and 
therefore company managers require the consent of a government body to release 
information to the public when updating their website. The results of the interviews are 
consistent with the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, which suggested that: (1) the total 
disclosure of information on a company’s website is negatively related to the proportion 
of state owned corporate ownership; (2) the timeliness of the disclosure of information 
on a company’s website is negatively related to the proportion of state owned corporate 
ownership. Yap and Saleh (2000) suggest that timeliness of reporting is one of the 
issues in IF reporting in Malaysia, and that more frequent reporting would need a real-
time entry.  
 
8.5.3 Languages used on websites 
As revealed in Chapter 6, 207 companies of the final sample of 284 companies (73%) 
used both Chinese and English on their website, and 14 companies used multiple 
languages. Interviewees gave their opinions in relation to the language used on their 
website: 
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There are two language used on our website: Chinese and English. English is a 
globally used language, so it is very important to use it. (A11) 
Actually, we use Chinese, English and Russian…. we have to think about our 
customers when we design our website; our customers mainly speak those three 
languages. (A6) 
I know a lot of companies use both Chinese and English. Our company simply 
uses Chinese at the moment. Maybe in the future we will add in English, when 
our business is expanding. (B5) 
Davey and Homkajohn (2004) established that 34 Thai company websites (92%) could 
be read in English. This was not surprising, since a large proportion of Thai companies 
are export-oriented and, as foreign investors are important shareholders in many 
companies, only 3 companies used Thai alone. Similarly, research undertaken by 
Malhotra and Makkar (2012), found that the majority of companies examined in the 
Indian corporate sector provided information only in English. The results of the 
interviews emphasise that Chinese listed companies are willing to adopt English or 
multiple languages on their websites, in order to meet stakeholders’ requirements. 
 
8.5.4 Presentation formats of financial information 
Interviewees discussed the formats they used to disclose financial information on their 
websites. In Chapter 6, of the 190 companies disclosing financial information on their 
websites, 176 companies used PDF format, and 48 used HTML format, with a number 
of companies using both. In the 2010 survey, no companies disclosed XBRL format 
financial information on their website. Interviewees explained the format they selected 
and their reasons: 
Our company posts in both PDF and HTML formats to meet the users’ 
requirements; we only post XBRL on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website. 
(A14) 
XBRL is very useful, but at the moment PDF is more popular with most users, it 
is easy to print out. (A2) 
A lot of our investors prefer to use the PDF format, as it is safe. It is hard to 
change, thus it is much more secure. (A11) 
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You can always find XBRL format reports through the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange website. (A7) 
Allam and Lymer (2003) suggest that using HTML may result in tables and pages being 
spilt. PDF is a commonly used standard for the distribution and exchange of electronic 
documents, as it uses a universal file format that preserves the attributes of the source 
paper documents (Adobe, 2004). Adobe software can also be used to preserve the 
integrity of PDF files and has been increasingly used, due to the fact that it is 
convenient for preparers (Trites, 2005). 
The choice and use of website financial format is mainly PDF, with companies posting 
in XBRL format on Chinese Stock Exchange websites. This can be considered a typical 
application of innovation diffusion theory, having passed through the five stages 
identified by Roger (1995), e.g. knowledge; persuasion; decision, implementation; and 
confirmation. 
8.5.5 Integrity of IFR  
The integrity of IFR is therefore inferred from (i) the security of web-based financial 
information, (ii) senior management’s knowledge of external audit procedures that 
address IFR risks, and (iii) the use of legal disclaimers regarding the validity of web-
based financial information (Smith and Pierce, 2004). A further issue is web security. 
When it comes to IF reporting, the reliability of information (in addition to its 
completeness and faithfulness to that which it purports to represent) is dependent upon 
the existence and implementation of effective security measures (Trites, 1999; IASC, 
1999).  
 
If information is not secure, hackers can alter financial data and the firm’s name might 
then be associated with misleading information. Weak website security can also have a 
negative influence on companies who allow their sites to be hacked. FASB (2000) states 
that three issues of particular concern to the governance of IFR relate to the security of 
information and the use of hyperlinks.  
 It is one of our concerns, the security of our websites. (A4) 
I have heard a few stories about companies’ websites being hacked and there 
was some negative impact on those companies. We are trying our best to 
strengthen the security of our website. (A9) 
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Our company is relatively small. We do not have the ability to build our own 
team to support us to maintain the website technologically. Another choice is 
that we could set up a website by outsourcing information to a services 
company; however, we would have concerns about the security of the website… 
we would not be in control of the situation. (B5) 
Misleading information is another problem with IFR. Investors in Chinese stock  
are not as mature as those in other developed countries; some information 
companies post on their websites can easily mislead them. (R2) 
The maintenance and security of websites (particularly those sections containing 
financial information) can be costly. IFR requires additional consideration in terms of 
ensuring appropriate authorisation within organisations to edit web-based information, 
along with appropriate controls to prevent unauthorised access from within, and outside, 
the organisation (FASB, 2000; Trites, 1999; Lymer, 1999). Ali Khan and Ismail (2012a, 
2012b) studied the perceptions of Malaysian companies, concluding that security issues 
were the disadvantages of IF reporting. Yap and Saleh (2011) also concluded that 
website security is one of the issues of IFR. In addition, the directors are responsible for 
the maintenance and integrity of the website and ensure the validity of online financial 
data. This issue also been highlighted by some interviewees as one of their concerns 
when it comes to IF reporting in China.  
8.6 Future implications on how to improve IFR 
The interviewees listed the future implications of ways of improving IFR (Table 8.6): 
New rules and regulations (4); Completeness of information disclosed on the website 
(6); Built information and an interactive platform on the website (6); Accelerate the 
content update frequency (5); The development of mobile terminals (3) 
Table 8.6 Future implications on how to improve IFR 
 
Future implications on how to improve IFR  n  Percentage 
New rules and regulations 5 19% 
Completeness of information disclosed on the website 6 22% 
Built information and an interactive platform on the website 6 22% 
The development of mobile terminals 3 11% 
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Note: The statistics in this table are based on the full group of 27 interviews. 
8.6.1 New rules and regulations 
This section discusses the ways in which IFR can impact on the regulatory framework. 
There are two different opinions of the new legal rules and regulation with regard to 
IFR. One interviewee proposed that new rules and regulations would promote the 
development of IFR, however another felt that IFR should not be made a legal 
requirement: 
          New rules and regulations (in relation to IFR) can help. (A10) 
          It is up to the standard setters. At the same time, I do not think it easy to    
operate… it is a complicated process. (B2) 
  It will be very useful to set up guidance or a framework to direct IFR practice. 
(R1) 
These interview results are consistent with the research of Xiao (2002), in which a 
number of contrasting views were identified concerning the extent to which additional 
regulations will be necessary. Participant A believed that no regulation would be 
necessary, while another expected that there would be a need for new regulations, due to 
the fact that the Internet represents a radical change in the commercial process, 
rendering the governmental regulatory superstructure less effective (Xiao, 2002). 
According to Yap and Saleh’s (2011) research, they interviewed 10 preparers of 
Malaysia companies. Some respondents expected a need for new regulations, others 
believed no regulation would be necessary, because they assumed a company would 
present audited or reviewed information only on the webpage. 
 
8.6.2 Completeness of information disclosed on the website 
A small number of interviewees suggested that complete information should be 
disclosed on a company’s website. They felt that most companies display mandatory 
disclosures, but not many voluntary disclosures: 
I believe that an excellent website should provide a sufficient amount of 
information to investors. (A2) 
You can easily find products on some companies’ websites, but it hard to find 
sales data and customer profiles from most companies’ websites. (A8) 
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There has been a great improvement of investor relation sections on most 
companies’ websites recently. However, one of the important items that is 
always missing is a calendar of future financial events. (A1) 
Some companies only disclose positive news (B3) 
This is inconsistent with an analyst’s view of IFR in Greece (Demos, 2008): 
More information is needed, such as sales breakdown, EBITDA breakdown, 
financial terms, strategy, more updates on the industry and the sector, etc. 
Graham et al. (2005) suggest that some companies are prone to releasing good news 
faster and to delay bad news, in the hope that the company’s status will improve.  
 
8.6.3 Building information and an interactive platform on the website 
The Internet allows one-way, two-way and multi-way communications, and permits the 
development of highly interactive applications. This offers the possibility of interactive 
users providing corporate information (Xiao, 2002). Chinese listed companies have 
recognised the importance of an interactive platform. In 2011, over 100 companies 
displayed WEIBO on their website’s front-page. 
I hope that in future a listed company website can become the most authoritative 
and comprehensive corporate disclosure of a relevant information platform, 
including the ability to collect and reproduce company-related information for 
investors. And also that websites can become an important platform for online 
communications. (A3) 
It is a trend that more and more investors will use the websites as the platform 
to obtain more useful information and make rational investments. Adopting use- 
friendly technology on websites is of great importance. (A12) 
We suggested that companies should pay attention to the rapid growth of micro 
blogging (WEIBO) and other information-sharing platforms. The future of listed 
companies' micro-blogging will become an important platform for interaction 
with investors. It could help companies to share disclosures of information and 
news with investors. (B1) 
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Listed companies' websites should increase their interaction with investors and 
make use of more new techniques for investors… I did not see a lot of 
companies disclose corporate webcast events. (A6) 
The web allows users to interact with corporate databases in an interactive manner that 
would be impossible in a print-based environment (Debreceny et al., 2001). Ryan 
(2010) states that the new wave of popular social networking applications (such as 
Facebook and Twitter) has implications for IFR, as corporations consider new ways of 
communicating with stakeholders. Chinese listed companies could fully utilise the 
potential of the technology for providing corporate accountability to their stakeholders.  
 
8.6.4 The development of mobile terminals 
An increasing number of mobile users in China gain access to company information 
through mobile technology rather than traditional PCs. At the end of June 2011, there 
were three billion mobile users in China, with an increasing number of individual 
investors using mobile networks to trade shares. A number of interviewees noted that 
listed companies should gain the relevant knowledge, and actively develop the use of 
mobile Internet functions. Currently, the first priority is to improve the company's 
website, with the second step being to consider the development of mobile interactive 
methods.  
I believe that, compared to the traditional PC, mobile phones are more 
convenient, and make it faster for investors to obtain information from 
companies. This new era has brought opportunities and challenges for investor 
relation departments to update websites, including interactive feedback. (B4) 
For the information on our company website…. we can also consider future 
mobile applications in order to expand its functionality. (A5) 
Consistent with the interviewees’ views concerning mobile phone usage in the future, 
Al-Htaybat et al. (2013) also suggest that smart mobile devices can be seen as the future 
revolutionary terminal of financial reporting. This is due to the nature of mobile 
technology providing different levels of user accessibility, interactivity and research 
ability, and thus the potential to create real-time communication.  
The emergences of new technological innovations, along with the rapid growth of the 
Internet as a network communication tool, have significantly influenced corporate 
financial reporting practices. They have also increased the pressure on corporations and 
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have raised the challenge to provide and maintain relevant information to meet the 
needs of interested users (Al-Htaybat, 2012). The ongoing technological developments 
create the potential to provide a future revolutionary terminal that will transform current 
corporate reporting dissemination practices to smart mobile reporting. This is due to the 
entrepreneurial nature of these technologies, which provide users with differing levels 
of accessibility, interactivity and research ability (Al-Htaybat et al., 2013). For example, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has offered a 
Smartphone application providing a range of features, such as financial news reporting 
with regular updates, and a standard changes tracker tool. Thus, it provides the latest 
information, news, and standard changes to handheld devices in an easy-to-use format 
(www.icaew.com).  
8.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the results and framework of the major themes and the 
subjects covered in the interviews. There has been an examination of the qualitative 
factors leading to Chinese listed companies disclosing information on their websites 
except for financial information, along with reasons for failing to construct a website. 
The perceptions and future implications of IFR have also been discussed. 
The findings of the interviews established a number of factors leading companies to 
engage with websites. These include: as a communication tool with investors and other 
stakeholders; to create timely information to investors; to improve the company’s image 
and reputation; as a result of management decisions; to win awards. These results 
support the propositions of the following: innovation diffusion theory; institutional 
theory; signalling theory; and cost and benefit hypothesis.  
Three factors support innovation diffusion theory: 1) as a communication tool with 
investors and other stakeholders; 2) for business applications; and 3) for management 
decisions. Innovation diffusion theory suggests that management is influenced by the 
perceived benefit of new technology to communicate with investors and stakeholders, 
as well as business applications. Those evidence supports that support of senior 
management is essential for the successful implementation of new technologies. Factors 
supporting institutional theory include the ability to give timely information to 
investors, and winning awards. The isomorphism pressures created by Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges, and other stakeholders, were active forces for companies voluntarily placing 
timely disclosures on their websites. This supports the view that a company is adopting 
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its existing IF corporate reporting practices to bring them into line with the expectations 
and demands of its powerful stakeholders.  
Signalling theory suggests that higher quality firms will use the Internet to disseminate 
‘positive’ accounting information as widely as possible, along with firms seeking to 
distinguish themselves in the market. Companies signal themselves by providing high 
quality websites to enhance their image and reputation, or in order to win an award in a 
competition. Prior research notes that disclosure choices will be determined by 
managerial assessment of the costs and benefits of alternative disclosure. The 
interviewees are aware of the benefit they could achieve by disclosing this information 
on their websites in China.  
In addition, financial information already available through other media is the factor 
influencing companies not to disclose financial information on their websites. A current 
lack of legal requirements, combined with management priorities, is factor influencing 
companies who do not have their own websites.  
Interviewees discussed the following: (1) the cost of constructing and improving 
websites, and the fact that additional costs could be incurred by companies to disclose 
information online; (2) the languages used to construct website; (3) the format used by 
companies to disclose financial information, and security of such information. One 
interviewee raised the issue of additional cost, and a concern about losing competitive 
advantage by disclosing sensitive information on their website. This result confirms that 
proprietary costs are relevant for IFR. These costs include not only the costs of 
preparing and disseminating information, but also those resulting from disclosing 
information which may be used by competitors (and other parties) in a manner harmful 
for the reporting company. Companies were not prepared to disclose more information 
on their websites because of the proprietary costs associated with the disclosure that 
might occur in the future.  
Additionally, interviewees suggested a number of future means of improving IFR, 
including: (1) A need for new rules and regulations relating to IFR. (2) A need for 
companies to improve the quality of IFR, i.e. the completeness of the information 
disclosed on the website; placing information and an interactive platform on the 
website; accelerating the content update frequency and the development of mobile 
terminals. These suggestions will assist future improvements in IFR development for 
Chinese listed companies.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions, Limitations and Further research 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This study has sought to further understanding of voluntary disclosure, specifically IFR, 
on the Chinese stock market. Three objectives were addressed: (i) examining the 
provision of financial information on Chinese listed companies’ websites and factors 
determining the financial information given on those websites; (ii) examining the 
economic consequences of IFR on companies’ values in China; and (iii) investigating 
the perceptions of Chinese participants regarding IFR. Fifteen research questions were 
designed and twelve hypotheses were drawn on to accomplish the above aims and 
objectives. Data was collected via the IFR index review and semi-structured interviews 
were conducted to answer the research questions and test the twelve hypotheses.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to summarise the thesis and present its main conclusions. 
Section 9.2 presents the summary and key findings of the study. Section 9.3 highlights 
the contributions of the study to knowledge and the implications of IFR practices. 
Section 9.4 discusses the limitations of the study and offers suggestions for further 
research.  
 
9.2 Summary and Key Findings of the study 
The overview of the main findings of the study are summarised below by objectives and 
related research question:  
 
Objective 1  
RQ1: What are the scope and patterns of IFR and its components by Chinese 
listed companies? 
 
This question was answered in Chapter 6 through analysis and evaluation of the firms’ 
IFR checklist. The original sample was 150 of the largest companies and 150 of the 
smallest companies currently listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
categorised by market capitalisation. 284 (95%) companies have accessible websites. 
All 284 were rated according to the disclosure checklist identified. The disclosure 
checklist included 104 items, of which 67 are content items, 10 are timeliness items, 14 
are presentation items and 13 are usability items. It was found that 100% of companies 
include graphic images on their websites and none of the companies disclosed XBRL 
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format information. This indicates a high degree of variation in the quality of the sample 
websites and the amount of information presented.  
 
Content disclosure encompasses 67 items, including accounting and financial 
information, corporate governance information, social responsibility information, and 
contact details. A total of 36 items regarding accounting and financial information were 
included in the study. It was found that the highest percentage, 68%, related to past 
financial highlights, whilst the lowest percentage, 10%, concerned earning and sales 
forecasts. The study found that about 67% of the total sample disclosed their current 
year’s balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow statement on their websites, 
whilst 63% of the companies disclosed their previous year’s balance sheet, income 
statement, and 67% of the past year’s cash flow statement. This is in contrast with Xiao 
et al.’s earlier study (2004), which found 44.3% of sample companies provided the 
current year’s balance sheet and current year’s income statement, and 42.4% provided 
the current year’s cash flow statement. In total, 63.5% of the companies sampled by 
Xiao et al. (2004) provided their previous year’s balance sheet, and the previous year’s 
income and cash flow statements. 
 
Corporate governance information tested comprised 15 items, and the level of 
disclosure varied from a maximum of 73% to a minimum of 17%. Only 17% of the 
sample companies disclosed a code of ethics on their websites, similar to the survey 
results obtained by Álvarezet al. (2008), which reported 16.2% of Spanish companies 
sampled disclosed their codes of ethics. Marston and Polei (2004) found that 9% of 
German companies disclosed their code of ethics on their websites. 
 
Social Responsibility Information contained 11 items; among these, the percentages of 
disclosure varied widely from a maximum of 99% to a minimum of 2%. It was found 
that almost 99% of the sample companies disclosed their company profiles on their 
websites, whilst only 2% of sample companies disclosed their customer profiles. It was 
found that 33% of the companies surveyed disclosed information from environmental 
and health and safety reports. This relatively low result can be compared with UK 
companies (86%) surveyed by Allam and Lymer (2003) and German companies (52%) 
surveyed by Marston and Polei (2004). 
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With regard to the timeliness of the information disclosed on the websites of Chinese 
sample companies, the checklist contained 10 items. A total of 98% of the companies in 
this study disclosed current press releases and news items on their websites, compared 
to 60.1% in Xiao et al. (2004).  59% of sampled companies disclosed their current share 
price in this study. The FASB (2000) survey showed that 57% of the US companies 
surveyed provided samples according to their latest stock prices, while later, Allam and 
Lymer (2003) found that 96% of the companies surveyed in the US provided such 
information. A total of 93% of sample companies in Germany, surveyed by Marston 
and Polei (2004), provided current share prices.  
 
In relation to the presentation of the sample websites, this checklist contained 14 items 
relating to presentation information. It was found that 100% of companies include 
graphic images on their websites. However, this study found none of the annual reports 
and financial statements were disclosed in XBRL format. Boubaker et al. (2012) 
reported the same result regarding the provision of data in the XBRL format, following 
their study of French listed companies  
  
Website usability was assessed according to 13 items in this study. The highest 
percentage was for next/previous/top buttons to navigate sequentially, which was 97%, 
and the lowest percentage was for an option to bookmark pages, which scored 0.00%. It 
is worth noting that only 2% of companies supplied online investor information about 
order services, a result that mirrored Xiao et al.’s (2004). Marston and Polei (2004) 
found 42% of German companies provided online investor information services in 
2000, but that this number had increased to 80% by 2003. 
 
In summary, the data presented by this study, updates the previous research by Xiao et 
al. (2004), and the descriptive analyses show, that in the interim, companies have sought 
to improve the reporting quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures on their Websites.  
There was relative improvement in disclosures of financial information, corporate 
governance information, social responsibility, timeliness of disclosure, presentation and 
usability on the sampled websites. However, compared to recent research in the US, UK 
and other western countries, it is suggested that the quality of IFR still requires 
improvement in China if it is to meet expectations and developments in the global 
securities market, which demand more open and transparent information disclosure for 
listed companies. 
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RQ2: Is there any difference between bigger listed companies and smaller 
companies with regard to IFR and its components?  
 
Chapter 6 answered this question, by comparing the 149 bigger and 135 smaller 
companies’ IFR scores. The highest total score was 0.95 for the bigger companies and 
0.75 for the smaller. The lowest total score for the bigger companies was 0.13 and the 
lowest score for the smaller companies was 0.07. The mean score for the bigger 
companies was 0.663 compared to 0.388 for the smaller companies, and the median of 
the IFR score for the bigger companies was 0.726 compared to 0.373 for the smaller 
companies. These results indicate that bigger companies have better IFR scores than 
smaller companies. The skewness value for the bigger companies was -1.25; whereas, 
the skewness value for smaller companies was 0.186. This indicated that the scores for 
total IFR items for the bigger companies were accumulated on the right side of the 
distribution, and those for the smaller companies were on the opposite side.  The 
Kurtosis value found for the bigger companies was 0.664 and for the smaller companies 
it was -1.578. A positive kurtosis value indicates that the distribution of IFR scores for 
bigger companies was relatively flat; whereas, on the other hand, the distribution of IFR 
scores for the smaller companies was rather peaked. 
 
RQ3: What company specific factors determine the level of IFR and its 
components by Chinese listed companies? RQ4: What are the corporate 
governance factors that determine the extent and scope of IFR and its components 
by Chinese listed companies? 
 
These questions were answered in Chapter 6 by testing the relationship between each 
firms IFR scores, the firms’ characteristics, and corporate governance factors. 
Consistent with previous research in this field, the results of univariate analysis and 
multivariate analysis are mixed. The findings showed that company size, industry type, 
big-4 auditor type, state share ownership, foreign share ownership, CEO duality, and the 
proportion of independent directors are significant explanatory variables for total score 
disclosed on the corporate website. Conversely, leverage, profitability, legal personal 
ownership, and board size have no predictive value for Internet reporting practices 
among the listed companies (See Table 9.1).  Sensitivity analyses were performed and 
the results are consistent.  
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Table 9.1 Summary of factors affecting IFR practice 
Factors Univariate analysis Multivariate 
analysis 
Theories supported 
SIZE Positive Positive Agency theory, 
signalling theory, 
cost and benefit 
approach 
PROFITABILITY No relation No relation  
LEVERAGE Positive No relation  
INDUSTRY Positive Positive Signalling theory 
BIG4 Positive Positive Agency theory 
Signalling theory  
STASHARE Weak positive Negative  Agency theory 
Institutional theory 
LEASHARE Negative  No relation  
FSHARE Positive Positive Agency theory, 
Institutional theory 
CEODUALITY No relation Positive Stewardship theory 
BOARDSIZE Positive No relation  
INDEPDIR Positive Positive Agency theory 
 
Classifying IFR according to content score, corporate governance score, social 
responsibility score, timeliness score, presentation score, and usability score, provided 
novel methods for explaining the relationships between IFR and their determinants. 
Only size, industry type and state share ownership were found to explain IFR corporate 
governance score, whilst size, profitability, state share ownership and proportion of 
independent directors on board predicts the IFR social responsibility score. IFR 
timeliness can be explained by the size, state share ownership, foreign share ownership, 
CEO duality, and the proportion of independent directors on board. 
 
RQ5: What factors influence whether Chinese listed companies disclose the 
English version of IFR? RQ6: What factors influence whether Chinese listed 
companies disclose financial information on their websites?  
 
In addition, two logistic regressions were run to test the models, and to predict what 
factors determine whether a company has an English website or not, the second logistic 
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regression was run to test models, and to predict whether a company discloses financial 
information on its website or not. The results indicated that larger companies with CEO 
duality tend to disclose information online on English language web pages, whereas, 
companies with a higher proportion of state-owned shares were unwilling to disclose 
information online on English language web pages. The results suggest that larger 
companies, holding a high-tech industry catalogue, and with more foreign shares are 
likely to disclose financial information online. Companies with more state-owned shares 
and a higher debt ratio are unwilling to disclose financial information. This may be 
because companies with higher state ownership in China receive government financing 
and so are less dependent on the stock market for external capital to fund their 
investments; thus, there is less need for them to communicate with investors to reduce 
information asymmetry (Tang and Wang, 2011). 
 
RQ7: In the companies participants’ view what are the additional factors that 
determine the extent and scope of IFR and its components by Chinese listed 
companies? 
 
This question was answered in Chapter 8 through analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews. The finding from the interviews with the companies’ participants suggested 
that factors determining whether companies adopt IFR are: communication tools with 
investors and other stakeholders, provision of timely information to investors, the 
benefit of having a website for a company’s image and reputation, management 
decisions and winning awards (see Table 9.2).  
 
Table 9.2 Other factors determining a company’s adoption of IFR 
Factors determined 
company adopting IFR  
Semi-structured interviews 
results 
Theories supported 
Communications tools with 
investors and stakeholders 
32% agreed Agency theory 
Timely information to 
investors 
24% agreed Signalling theory 
Benefit of having their 
websites 
28% agreed cost and benefit approach 
Company’s image and 
reputation 
20% agreed Signalling theory 
Management decision 16% agreed Agency theory 
Signalling theory 
Winning awards 12% agreed Signalling theory 
Institutional theory 
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RQ8: In the companies participants’ view what are the factors influence the non-
financial disclosure of IFR by Chinese listed companies? RQ9: Why have some 
companies not set up websites yet? 
 
This question was answered in Chapter 8 by analysing the semi-structured interviews. 
Factors influencing companies not to disclose financial information on their websites 
was the presence of this financial information in other media. Additionally, some 
companies had no website because there is no legal requirement to do so and a website 
is not a priority of management. The interviewees also stated that future creation of new 
websites is a factor on their agendas.  
 
Objective 2  
RQ10: Is there any difference between the bigger and smaller Chinese listed 
companies’ firm value? 
 
This question was answered by comparing firm values across the 149 bigger and 135 
smaller companies in 2010 and 2011. A Mann-Whitney test and a T-test were 
performed to yield the results. The smaller sample companies reported a greater average 
increase in Tobin’s Q value 2010, 2011 and the MBR 2010, 2011 than the bigger 
sample companies. This indicated a statistically significant difference between the 
bigger and smaller sample companies’ firm valuations. On average, the smaller 
companies had an increased Tobin’s q value, and MBR both in 2010 and 2011. This 
result is consistent with prior research by Shan and Xu (2012), which found firm size 
had a significant negative relationship with Tobin’s Q. Bai et al. (2004) and Leung 
(2010) concluded that smaller companies have a higher firm value when measured by 
Tobin’s Q. It may be concluded from this study that, by disclosing voluntary 
information on their websites, smaller companies enjoy the benefit of higher market 
valuations. 
 
RQ11: Is there any difference between the firm values of Chinese listed companies 
with an English version of IFR and those without?  
 
This question was answered in Chapter 7 by comparing firm values across the 77 
companies who in 2010, 2011 had an English-language version of their website, and the 
231 
 
207 companies who did not. Mann-Whitney tests and a T-test were used to calculate the 
results. Companies without an English-language website had on average an increased 
Tobin’s Q value and the MBR for 2010, 2011 compared to companies with an English-
language version. This indicated a statistically significant difference between sample 
companies with and without an English-language version with respect to Tobin’s Q and 
the MBR in 2010 and 2011.  
 
In the context of China, higher value firms may choose not to disclose English 
information on their websites, as they consider the benefits of English information are 
outweighed by the associated cost; for example the cost of preparing English 
information and the costs associated with information disclosure by international 
competitors. As the market in China does not operate openly, it can also be concluded 
that higher value firms may be able to gain preferential treatment from the government, 
such as preferential loans and large product orders (Sun et al., 2012) and less reliance on 
international investors.  
 
RQ12: Is there any difference between the firm values of Chinese listed companies 
that disclose financial information on their websites and those who do not?  
 
In Chapter 7, this question was answered by comparing firm value between companies 
with or without financial information on their websites. The Mann-Whitney test and T-
test were performed to determine results. Surprisingly, companies that did not disclose 
financial information had a higher Tobin’s Q for 2010, 2011 value on average, and a 
higher MBR ratio, than those companies that did. Thus, there was a statistically 
significant difference between the Tobin’s Q values and MBR in 2010, 2011 for 
companies that disclosed financial information and those who did not. In the case of 
China, when financial information that could reveal certain crucial aspects of a firm’s 
operations is disclosed to investors, it is also disclosed to the firm’s competitors, which 
may disadvantage the firm competitively. For this reason, higher value firms tend not to 
disclose additional financial information on their websites when proprietary costs are 
sufficiently high. 
 
RQ13: How do IFR and its components impact on Chinese listed companies’ firm 
value? 
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This question was answered in Chapter 7 by testing the IFR index results and firm 
value. Firm value was measured by Tobin’s Q for 2010 and 2011. In addition, firm 
value was measured by the MBR for 2010 and 2011. Two Pearson correlation tests and 
spearman’ rho correlation tests were run to identify any relationship between the firm 
value and other variables. The three sets of Pearson correlation tests and Spearman’ rho 
correlation tests in 2010 and 2011, all suggested IFR firm value is negatively associated 
with total score, company size and the proportion of foreign shares. IFR firm value is 
positively associated with profitability, but no other relationship was identified in the 
univariate analysis. 
 
Univariate and multivariate analyses were performed to discover whether IFR and its 
components affect a firm’s value. Models for both 2010 and 2011 revealed that IFR 
total score has a significant negative impact on firm value. Additional regression tests 
were therefore performed to examine firm value and IFR components, IFR content, 
timeliness, corporate governance, social factors, presentation and usability all have a 
negative effect on firm value. A significant negative association between IFR 
information and firm value suggests proprietary costs are particularly relevant for IFR 
disclosure.  
In this study, in line with the results of previous studies, there was a significant negative 
association between IFR total score, content, corporate governance, social, timeliness, 
presentation, usability and firm value, as well as the 2010 and 2011 models. One 
explanation is that higher value firms may choose not to disclose more IFR information 
if the benefits of disclosure are outweighed by the associated cost, such as proprietary 
costs. A significant negative association between IFR information and firm value 
suggests these costs are particularly relevant for IFR disclosure. Another explanation is 
that firms might not disclose IFR because they perceive no benefit to investors. The 
Chinese information environment is a low information environment, and Chinese retail 
investors are less sophisticated than those in the developed economies. Therefore, the 
quality of information and the level of disclosure that relevant differ, and what is useful 
for the Chinese investor is more basic than that for investors in developed economies 
(Lam and Du, 2004).  
Additionally, board size was found to be negatively related to firm value. This reflects 
the fact that in the Chinese context, board size may not be able to affect the extent of 
233 
 
any monitoring, controlling and decision making in Chinese firms. Prior studies show 
that large boards are less effective than smaller boards, due to free-rider problems. More 
specifically, when the board of directors is in the hands of state-owned larger 
shareholders, there is a serious insider control problem in Chinese listed companies 
(Wei and Geng, 2008). Furthermore, there are few professionals (lawyers, accountants 
and finance experts) on the corporate boards in Chinese firms, and almost no minority 
shareholder representation (Chen et al., 2004). As a result, board independence is highly 
compromised (Liu, 2006). Thus, it is likely that such boards do not effectively monitor 
management or enhance firm value.  
Objective 3  
 
RQ14: What are the perceptions of IFR from the participants in China’s 
perspective? 
 
This question was answered by analysing the semi-structured interviews with the 
participants in chapter 8. The cost of constructing and improving a website, and 
additional costs that may be incurred by companies when disclosing information online, 
the languages used to construct the website, the format that companies use to disclose 
financial information, and the security of websites were all considerations discussed by 
the interviewees. The cost of setting up and maintaining a website varies; for example, 
one company spent nearly RMB 5 million Yuan (£500,000) constructing their websites, 
while another company spent just RMB 100,000 Yuan (£10,000). Several companies 
have outsourced the construction and maintenance of their websites. One of the 
interviewees raised a concern regarding the cost of disclosing sensitive information; 
they reported reluctance to enable their competitors to gain access to their information, 
which supports the proprietary cost theory.  
 
With regard to updating their websites, some companies stated that they update their 
websites several times a day, while others update daily; other companies update their 
sites several times each week. The process of updating a website depends on the internal 
system and capital structure; for example, if a company is a state-owned company it 
must receive the consent of the relevant government body before releasing information 
to the public. 
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In respect of the language used on websites, some companies use multiple languages, 
for example both Chinese and English, and other companies use Chinese only. 
Regarding the format on which financial information is issues, most interviewees stated 
a preference for a PDF format, one interviewee stated that XBRL can be found on Stock 
Exchange websites. Web security was also a concern; companies expressed concern 
about the negative impacts of unsecured websites.  
 
RQ15: How, from the participants in China’s perceptive, can IFR be improved?  
 
This question was answered by the results from the semi-structured interview in 
Chapter 8. One of the interviewees suggested new rules and regulations would promote 
the development of IFR; on the other hand, another interviewee felt there is no need to 
resort to a legal regulation. A few interviewees argued that the information presented 
was relatively complete. They suggested that most companies disclose a substantial 
amount of mandatory information on their websites, and that more voluntary disclosure 
should be offered to inform investors in the future. Other interviewees emphasised the 
benefit of including an interactive platform on their websites, although others felt that 
companies should accelerate their content update frequency to meet stakeholders’ 
needs. They observed that the rapid increase in numbers of mobile users in China has 
brought about both opportunities and challenges to companies.  
 
9.3 Contributions and implications of the study 
This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical and theoretical evidence 
on IFR practices of China listed companies.  Results from statistical analysis, together 
with perceptions of the participant interviewed, provided a better understanding of IFR 
practices.  
 
Firstly, the study provided a new approach to assessing the extent to which companies 
disclosed IFR on their websites; the content and presentation were examined in earlier 
studies, but this study is distinctive in considering content, timeliness, presentation and 
usability, as it provides a clearer portrayal of those Chinese list companies engaged in 
IFR. 
 
Secondly, since the Chinese government recently emphasised corporate governance 
issues and their intention to improve the situation, corporate governance factors have 
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been investigated in this study; very few researchers have previously dealt with this in 
reference to China. These factors include board independence, board size and CEO role 
duality and the study considers whether they affect IFR.  
 
Thirdly, the study provides a methodological contribution to IFR practices, in terms of 
exploring the potential of mixed methods research. In contrast, earlier explanatory 
studies were purely quantitative in nature in the main. In addition; other motivations 
regarding IFR disclosure were examined, thus the triangulation of the research method 
is employed. In addition, the disclosure index and semi-structured interviews were used 
to gain a more in-depth understanding of the area.  
 
Fourthly, the study contributes to the existing literature on IFR by providing a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to apply to an emerging market. Prior studies 
investigating the determinants of IFR theories as a new area of voluntary disclosure, and 
the current study, consider institutional theory as well as agency theory, signalling 
theory and the cost and benefit approach. The theoretical triangulation applied in this 
thesis also provided a broader understanding of IFR practices.  
 
Fifthly, this study differs from prior studies conducted in the same area, because it 
examines not only the factors that determine companies’ adoption of IFR practices, but 
also the factors that influenced companies not to disclose information on their websites. 
This study employed semi-structured interviews to uncover this information.  
 
Sixthly, one of the more significant features in this study is to determine the economic 
consequences of IFR according to Chinese listed companies, as these have never been 
examined before in China. The study provides empirical evidence to explain how IFR 
and its components, CG factors affect a firm’s value. The irrelevance and negative 
impact of IFR on firm value reveals several deficiencies in the Chinese stock market.  
 
Seventhly, prior research details the increasing supply of IFR, as there is a lack of 
empirical research investigating participant’s perceptions of this information. This 
research investigated the perceptions of Chinese participants on IFR to fill this gap. By 
conducting a semi-structured interview with some participants, the research provides an 
insight into the advantages and problems apparent in current IFR practice, with specific 
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reference to the implementation of IFR for the purposes of development and 
improvement. 
My empirical results support several theoretical predictions. Despite the ongoing 
reform, the ownership structure remains a significant corporate governance issue in 
China. High state ownership and legal person ownership in China result in traditional 
agency issues arising between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. State 
ownership was found to be negatively significant with the IFR score in this study, 
suggesting that state-owned firms suffer from greater information asymmetry, and 
agency problems. Foreign share ownership positively affected the total score for the 
information disclosed in this study. Consistent with agency theory predictions, foreign 
investors behaved as effective external agents, exerting more effective external 
monitoring and pressure on management to disclose more IFR information. Therefore, 
firms with foreign share ownership are extremely motivated to disclose extra 
information voluntarily. As a result, managers tend to disclose more IFR information to 
meet the expectations of shareholders. In addition, firms with foreign ownership are 
more politically visible and subject to more public scrutiny in China, and the findings 
imply the adoption of IFR to satisfy the public by improving transparency might 
potentially reduce political costs. Consistent with Stewardship theory predications, CEO 
duality creates a necessary and important unity of command at the top of the 
organisation; both large and small Chinese listed companies in which a single person 
occupies the CEO and Chairman positions disclose more information on their websites.  
Furthermore, a significant negative association between IFR information and firm value 
suggests proprietary costs are particularly relevant for IFR disclosure. Higher value 
firms choose not to disclose more IFR information if the benefits of disclosure are 
outweighed by the associated cost, such as the proprietary costs. These costs include not 
only the costs of preparing and disseminating information but also costs deriving from 
disclosure of information, which may be used by competitors and other parties in a way 
that is harmful to the reporting company. In addition, the Chinese information 
environment is considered a low information environment, Chinese retailers and 
investors are less sophisticated than those in developed economics. Thus, voluntary 
disclosure in China is generally associated with low marginal benefit, and there is 
minimal pressure on Chinese firms to use IFR to access outside resources (Chen et al., 
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2014). For these reasons, high value Chinese firms are less likely to disclose IFR on 
their websites. 
In this study, among other control variables, company size, the proportion of foreign 
shares and board size were negatively related to firm value, whilst ROA was positively 
related to firm value. This reflects the fact that in the Chinese context, larger companies 
with a higher proportion of foreign shares and a larger supervisory board disclosed more 
information on their websites, negatively affecting their firm value. Companies that 
were more profitable had a positive effect on firm value. Although the results contradict 
the majority of IFR studies, they were nevertheless consistent with some studies in the 
Chinese context. Despite a spilt share structure reform in 2006 and the significant 
decrease in state ownership, this reform was almost complete by 2008, although state 
shareholders were reluctant to lose control (Wei and Geng, 2008). Thus, large state 
associated firms have less distance between ownership and control, this finding 
highlights the existence of agency problems in China, especially for larger companies.  
 
The benefit of this research is that it illuminated the relationship between IFR practice 
and the Chinese institutional environment. These empirical results offer significant 
benefits to professional bodies, in particular furthering understanding of IFR practices 
and their characteristics, to help guide regulatory approaches to IFR, and to dictate rules 
and recommendations for the future. The empirical results are particularly useful for 
investors and other users, because they could help them to estimate the types and extent 
of information provided by listed companies. Therefore, they can then adjust their 
strategy when collecting additional information from other sources, and act cautiously 
when evaluating corporate disclosure. These empirical results are also very useful for 
companies seeking to learn from companies exhibiting best practice. In particular, the 
evidence showing that smaller companies benefit more from IFR than the bigger 
companies, in terms of firm value, should motivate smaller companies to improve their 
IFR practice and enhance their market valuation. This would provide additional value to 
their shareholders and reduce future investment costs. The results will be particularly 
interesting to academics and future researchers in the area of emerging markets, as the 
Chinese stock market is rapidly developing and offers a unique institutional setting. 
This research provides useful insights into how agency issues, the cost and benefit 
approach and unique institutional frameworks are related to IFR.  
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9.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Although this study has provided some useful insights into IFR by listed companies on 
the CSE, several limitations should be noted, as there are several future research 
opportunities in this area.  
 
Firstly, the current study focuses only on Internet disclosure in China, and so the results 
may not be possible to replicate in other countries. An international meta-analysis of the 
determinants of IFR would be useful to gain a clearer picture to develop a 
comprehensive predictive IFR model.  
 
Secondly, the time horizon of the study is cross-sectional, which implies that the 
findings are related to a specific year, i.e. 2011.  Some prior studies considered a 
longitudinal time horizon, covering more than one period, and so were able to identify 
trends in IFR, and establish causal relationships. 
 
Thirdly, this study focuses on IFR only, which represents just one element of a 
company’s disclosure; future studies could offer a comparison between both Internet 
and paper-based mediums, to demonstrate the differences between the two. The 
significant association between various mediums of disclosure and their determinants 
may vary, which would enrich the discussion about the value of using the Internet as a 
disclosure tool. 
 
Fourthly, in terms of the IFR measuring process, the subjectivity associated with 
weighting is a major limitation of this approach, as the current study weighted each item 
of disclosure equally, although different information might not be equally important or 
relevant. Another area for future study could involve using a weighted disclosure in 
conjunction with questionnaires to establish the relative importance of different types 
of, and means of disclosing, financial and non-financial information for various groups 
(Aly et al, 2010).  
 
Fifthly, usability and the perceived credibility of information provided on a 
corporation’s website varies greatly; future research is required to investigate how 
continuous auditing could be used to enhance the credibility of internet financial 
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reporting and disclosure. This is another area that has not been covered in this study, 
and could be researched further. 
 
Sixthly, the current study tested the relationship between IFR, corporate CG 
mechanisms and firm valuation; namely, Tobin’s Q and the market/book value. Further 
study might empirically test whether or how IFR impacts upon other measurements of a 
companies’ performance, for instance a company’s cost of capital, cash flows, stock 
prices, trading volumes of the shares and analysts’ following. Further, additional 
research could distinguish an association between good versus bad presentation of non-
financial information on a website, and a firm’s financial cost (Orens et al., 2010).  
 
Seventhly, the current study only analysed the perception of company’s participants, a 
future area of research would be to consider the opinions of other user groups. 
Investigating the perceptions of regulators, investors and academics could shed provide 
a clearer understanding of IFR practices.  
 
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the current study used agency theory, signalling 
theory, institutional theory, cost and benefit approach and stewardship theory to explain 
and predict IFR practices. Further research could also apply legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory to gain an insight into IFR practices.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Disclosures of checklist items by the sample companies 
  
1) Content Items Number Percentage 
1.1 Accounting and Financial information     
1.1.1 Balance sheet of current year   
1.1.2 Balance sheet of past year   
1.1.3 Income statement of current year   
1.1.4 Income statement of past year   
1.1.5 Cash flow statement of current year   
1.1.6 Cash flow statement of past year   
1.1.7 Notes to the financial statement of current year   
1.1.8 Notes to financial statement of past year   
1.1.9 Auditor report of current year   
1.1.10 Auditor report of past year   
1.1.11 Quarterly report of current year   
1.1.12 Quarterly report of past year   
1.1.13 Half-year report of current year   
1.1.14 Half-year report of past year   
1.1.15 Annual report of current year   
1.1.16 Annual report of past year   
1.1.17 Top ten stockholders in the current year   
1.1.18 Statement of changes in stockholders' equity    
1.1.19 Management report   
1.1.20 Share price history   
1.1.21 Market share of key products   
1.1.22 Share price performance in relation to stock market index   
1.1.23 Summary of key financial ratios   
1.1.24 Past press release   
1.1.25 Segmental reporting   
1.1.26 Financial statements according to China GAAP   
1.1.27 The difference between China GAAP and IFRS   
1.1.28 Past financial highlights/summary   
1.1.29 Earnings or sales forecast   
1.1.30 Industry statistics or data   
1.1.31 Past dividends   
1.1.32 Performance analysis   
1.1.33 Links to financial analysts   
1.1.34 Links to Chinese Stock Exchange   
1.1.35 Supplement or Amendment to current year annual report   
1.1.36 Earnings release   
1.2 Corporate Governance Information   
1.2.1 Notice of meetings and agenda to annual shareholders' meeting   
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1.2.2 Speeches of the management board during the AGM   
1.2.3 Articles of Association   
1.2.4 Code of Ethics   
1.2.5 Board of directors names or photos    
1.2.6 Board of directors (C. V, profiles and executives/non executives)   
1.2.7 Remuneration of board of directors   
1.2.8 Management Team   
1.2.9 Chairman's message to shareholders   
1.2.10 Organizational Structure   
1.2.11 Ownership structure   
1.2.12 Corporate governance principles/guidelines   
1.2.13 Management's plan to meet objectives and strategies   
1.2.14 Charters of audit committee   
1.2.15 Charters of other committee   
1.3 Social Responsibility Information   
1.3.1 Company profile   
1.3.2Company history   
1.3.3 Customer profile   
1.3.4 Employee profile/training   
1.3.5 Human resources Information   
1.3.6 Environmental /safety health Report   
1.3.7 Corporate responsibility report   
1.3.8 Mission/Vision statement   
1.3.9 Discussing on product quality and safety   
1.3.10 Certificate of quality assurance (ISO) or awards of best practice (for 
service Companies) 
  
1.3.11 Donations/sponsoring to community groups   
1.3.12 Links to products services and sales information   
1.4 Contact Details Information   
1.4.1 The existence of investor relations section   
1.4.2 Name of investor relations officer   
1.4.3 E-mail to investor relations   
1.4.4 Phone number to investor relations   
1.4.5 Postal address to investor relations   
Total content 68   
(2) Timeliness of Information   
2.1 Current press releases or news   
2.2 Current share price   
2.3 Calendar for future financial events   
2.4 Pages indicate the latest update   
2.5 Hints for finding current information directly   
2.6 Current key financial ratios   
2.7 Current financial highlight/summary   
2.8 Option to register for future e-mail alerts regarding press releases. 
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2.9 The most recent quarterly report reports   
2.10 Current dividends announcements   
Total Timeliness 10   
(3) Presentation   
3.1 Annual report in PDF-format   
3.2 Annual report in HTML-format   
3.3 Any financial statements in PDF format   
3.4 Any financial statements in HTML format   
3.5 Annual report in XBRL- format   
3.6 Any financial statements in XBRL format   
3.7 Graphic images   
3.8 Flashes (moving pictures)   
3.9 Sound files   
3.10 Video files   
3.11Webcast events   
3.12 Clear boundaries between the annual report and other information   
3.13 Change to printing friendly format possible   
3.14 Ability to download information   
3.15 Investor presentation   
3.16 English language of home page   
Total Presentation 16   
(4) Usability   
4.1 Link to annual report on home page   
4.2 Help site   
4.3 Pull-down menu   
4.4 Internal search box   
4.5 Next/previous/top buttons to navigate sequentially   
4.6 One click to get to investor relations information   
4.7 Site Map   
4.8 Feed Back   
4.9 Table of contents   
4.10 Mailing list   
4.11 Privacy statement   
4.12 Legal statement   
4.13 FAQ (in the Investor relation page)   
4.14 Financial glossary   
4.15 Book mark the page   
4.16 External links (other than Chinese Stock Exchange) 
  
  
4.17 Online investor information order services   
Total Usability 17   
Total Items 111   
Note: Each item is assigned either a 1 or a 0 depending on the whether it is 
disclosed or not, respectively 
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Appendix 2 Durbin-Watson and Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) value  
 
 
 
 TOBINSQ2010 MBR 2010 TOBINSQ2011 MBR2011 
Durbin-Watson 1.726 1.752 1.698 1.820 
VARIABLES              VIF VIF VIF VIF 
TOTALSCORE  1.954 1.957 1.954 1.954 
LNSIZE 2.199 2.222 2.199 2.199 
ROA 1.171 1.167 1.171 1.171 
STASHARE 1.115 1.118 1.115 1.115 
LEGSHARE 1.111 1.103 1.111 1.111 
FSHARE 1.271 1.272 1.271 1.271 
CEODUALITY 1.074 1.071 1.074 1.074 
BOARDSIZE 1.382 1.386 1.382 1.382 
INDEPDIR 1.208 1.213 1.208 1.208 
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Appendix 3.1 Interview questions in English 
 
First section: 
 
Motivation and factors affect company’s decision to adopt IFR and perceptions of 
IFR by companies. 
 
 B1) Interview questions (Reporting companies) 
 
Introduction  
Thank respondents for their support and time 
Briefly mention the nature and importance of the research 
Assure interviewees of the confidentiality of the research 
Background Information 
Name of the organisation: 
Name of the Interviewee: 
Interviewee’s position:                               
Number of years in current position: 
Interviewee’s use of the Internet: 
Number of years using the Internet: 
 
Interview questions: 
1) Are you satisfied with the Internet service available in China? 
If yes, please give the reason. 
If no, please give the reason. 
2) Currently, according to our survey, 95% percent of our sample companies 
disclosed IFR information on their website, and 5% percent of our sample 
companies did not. Please tell me your opinion of why this is. 
3) What is the motivation of your company when disclosing Financial Reporting data 
on your website? 
Briefly mention economic factors and corporate factors determining the quantity 
and quality (explain this to the interviewee) of IFR discovered in the survey. 
Ask: what, if any, other factors exist? Such as ‘a communication tool to inform 
stakeholders’ (explain)?  Improve reputation and image? Top management 
decision? 
4) What cost is incurred when your company discloses IFR on your website? What 
kind of costs? 
After the answer (depending on the answer), ask the follow questions: 
How about cost of producing IFR? How about the cost of competitors obtaining 
the information on your websites?  Possible legal costs? 
5) Are you satisfied with the quality of the IFR at your company?  
6) Do you think that IFR is important to those who use your company’s financial 
information? Please explain. 
7) Do you think that your company might benefit from IFR? Please explain. 
8) What are difficulties and problems you might encounter due to the IFR on your 
website? 
9) In your opinion, how should IFR in China be developed and improved? 
10) Are there any plans for your company to improve the IFR on your website? 
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B2) Interview questions (companies have website but no Financial information) 
 
Introduction  
Thank respondents for their support and time 
Briefly mention the nature and importance of the research 
Assure interviewees of the confidentiality of the research 
Background Information 
Name of the organisation: 
Name of the Interviewee: 
Interviewee’s position:                               
Number of years in current position: 
Interviewee’s use of the Internet: 
Number of years using the Internet: 
 
Interview questions: 
 
1) Are you satisfied with the Internet service available in China? 
If yes, please give the reason. 
If no, please give the reason. 
2) Currently, according to our survey, 95% percent of our sample companies 
disclosed IFR information on their website, and 5% percent of our sample 
companies did not. Please tell me your opinion of why this is. 
3) What is the motivation of your company when disclosing information on your 
website? Why your company did not disclose financial information on your 
website? 
Briefly mention economic factors and corporate factors determining the quantity 
and quality (explain this to the interviewee) of IFR discovered in the survey. 
Ask: what, if any, other factors exist? Such as ‘a communication tool to inform 
stakeholders’ (explain)?  Improve reputation and image? Top management 
decision? 
4) What cost is incurred when your company discloses IFR on your website? What 
kind of costs? 
After the answer (depending on the answer), ask the follow questions: 
How about cost of producing IFR? How about the cost of competitors obtaining 
the information on your websites?  Possible legal costs? 
5) Are you satisfied with the quality of the IFR at your company?  
6) Do you think that your company might benefit from IFR? Please explain. 
7) What are difficulties and problems you might encounter due to the IFR on your 
website? 
8) In your opinion, how should IFR in China be developed and improved? 
9) Are there any plans for your company to improve the IFR on your website? 
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B3) Interview questions (No Reporting companies) 
 
Introduction  
Thank respondents for their support and time 
Briefly mention the nature and importance of the research 
Assure interviewees of the confidentiality of the research 
Background Information 
Name of the organisation: 
Name of the Interviewee: 
Interviewee’s position:                               
Number of years in current position: 
Interviewee’s use of the Internet: 
Number of years using the Internet: 
 
Interview questions: 
1) Are you satisfied with the Internet service in China? 
If yes, please give reason. 
If no, please give reason. 
2) Currently, according our survey, 95% percent of our sample company disclosed 
IFR on their website,5 % percent of our sample company did not. Please tell me 
your opinion of why this is? 
3) Please give the reason why your company not disclose Financial Reporting on 
your websites? 
Is that because of cost factors? Is that because of legal environment? Is that 
because of technology reasons? Is that because of management decisions?  
4) In general, do you think IFR is useful to users? 
5) Are there any plans for your company to develop a website and disclose IFR on 
your own website in the future? 
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Appendix 3.2 Interview questions in Chinese 
 
采访的问题 
B1) 采访的问题（针对在网上有财务报表的公司） 
自我介绍和初步会谈 
对采访者的合作表示感谢 
对项目的性质进行说明和项目的重要性 
确保受访者的个人信息和这次会谈的保密性 
背景信息：受访者的名称 
受访者的单位 
受访者的职务，职务年限 
受访者的用互联网的时间 
 
采访的具体问题： 
 
1）你对中国的互联网服务满意吗？ 
如果满意，请给出原因。如果不满意，也请给出原因。 
2）目前，根据我们的调查， 95%公司在互联网上展示财务报表，也有5%公司
不这样做，请问你对此现像的观点是什么？ 
3）请问为什么贵公司要在把财务报表放在互联网上？ 
（简单介绍一些已经在调查中发现的经济原因，公司内部的因素等。有没
有其他因素？比如，与股东交流沟通的渠道？增强企业形象？或者只是因
为管理层的决策?） 
4）请你谈谈贵公司在互联网上展示财务报表的的时候，有没有什么费用发生？
是什么具体费用？ 
（根据收访者的回答，接着展开问题。是否牵涉到制作成本？还是涉及竞
争者能利用贵公司的财务报表，发生竞争成本？法律因素？） 
5）你对本公司的网上财务报表的质量满意吗？ 
6）请问你觉得网上财务报表对你公司的相关用户的重要性？请给出原因 
7）你觉得你们公司受益于网上报表吗？请描述 
8）在贵公司在互联网上展示网上报表的时候，有什么困难和问题发生？ 
9）以您的观点，请问中国的网上财务报表该如何发展和改进？ 
10） 请问贵公司有没有计划要改进你们的网上财务报表？ 
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B2) 采访的问题（针对有网站，但网站没有财务报表的公司） 
 
自我介绍和初步会谈 
对采访者的合作表示感谢 
对项目的性质进行说明和项目的重要性 
确保受访者的个人信息和这次会谈的保密性 
背景信息：受访者的名称 
受访者的单位 
受访者的职务，职务年限 
受访者的用互联网的时间 
 
采访的具体问题： 
 
 
1）你对中国的互联网服务满意吗？ 
如果满意，请给出原因。如果不满意，也请给出原因。 
2）目前，根据我们的调查， 95%公司在互联网上展示财务报表，也有5%公司
不这样做，请问你对此现像的观点是什么？ 
3）请问为什么贵公司要在把一些信息放在互联网上？请问为什么贵公司没有把
财务报表放在互联网上？ 
（简单介绍一些已经在调查中发现的经济原因，公司内部的因素等。有没
有其他因素？比如，与股东交流沟通的渠道？增强企业形象？或者只是因
为管理层的决策?） 
4）请你谈谈贵公司在互联网上展示财务报表的的时候，有没有什么费用发生？
是什么具体费用？ 
（根据收访者的回答，接着展开问题。是否牵涉到制作成本？还是涉及竞
争者能利用贵公司的财务报表，发生竞争成本？法律因素？） 
5）你对本公司的网上的信息质量满意吗？ 
6）你觉得你们公司受益于网上信息吗？请描述 
7）在贵公司在互联网上展示网上报表的时候，有什么困难和问题发生？ 
8）以您的观点，请问中国的网上财务报表该如何发展和改进？ 
9）请问贵公司有没有计划要改进你们的网上信息？ 
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B3 ）采访的问题（针对没有网站的公司） 
 
自我介绍和初步会谈 
对采访者的合作表示感谢 
对项目的性质进行说明和项目的重要性 
确保受访者的个人信息和这次会谈的保密性 
背景信息：受访者的名称 
受访者的单位 
受访者的职务，职务年限 
受访者的用互联网的时间 
 
采访的具体问题： 
 
1）你对中国的互联网服务满意吗？ 
如果满意，请给出原因。如果不满意，也请给出原因。 
2）目前，根据我们的调查，有95%公司在互联网上展示财务报表，也有5%公
司不这样做，请问你对此现像的观点是什么？ 
3）请问为什么贵公司没有把财务报表放在互联网上？ 
是否是成本原因? 法律环境原因？技术的原因？还是纯粹的管理层的决策? 
4）请问您觉得用户有没有可能受益于网上财务报表？ 
5）请问贵公司近期或远期有没有计划在互联网上展示财务报表？ 
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Appendix 4 Results of Hausman tests 
 
 
 
 
. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9998
                          =        0.98
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
     CEODUAL       6.89438     6.808914        .0854658        .2320507
    INDUSTRY      9.005263     9.123784       -.1185215        .2868699
         ROA     -.2013033     -.212495        .0111917        .0191586
       BOARD     -.0026947    -.1138307         .111136        .1142514
        BIG4      6.132031     6.643802       -.5117714        .5848688
      FSHARE      .1683046     .1646407        .0036639        .0083142
    LEGSHARE     -.0700995    -.0712308        .0011313        .0046419
    STASHARE     -.1290452    -.1248652         -.00418        .0059875
      LNSIZE      7.499023     7.637205        -.138182        .1548278
      INDEDI      .4937646     .3265413        .1672233        .1690693
                                                                              
                   ivreg          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman ivreg
                                                                              
       _cons    -134.7899   19.90795    -6.77   0.000    -173.9825   -95.59733
     CEODUAL     6.808914   2.952903     2.31   0.022     .9955582    12.62227
    INDUSTRY     9.123784   3.574093     2.55   0.011     2.087498    16.16007
         ROA     -.212495   .2121223    -1.00   0.317    -.6300984    .2051083
       BOARD    -.1138307   .2981865    -0.38   0.703     -.700868    .4732066
        BIG4     6.643802   3.761584     1.77   0.078    -.7615963     14.0492
      FSHARE     .1646407   .1020739     1.61   0.108    -.0363112    .3655927
    LEGSHARE    -.0712308   .0616743    -1.15   0.249    -.1926485    .0501869
    STASHARE    -.1248652    .058243    -2.14   0.033    -.2395277   -.0102027
      LNSIZE     7.637205   .9219082     8.28   0.000     5.822252    9.452158
      INDEDI     .3265413   .1387297     2.35   0.019     .0534252    .5996573
                                                                              
      TSCORE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    187588.972   283  662.858558           Root MSE      =  19.164
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4459
    Residual    100264.596   273  367.269581           R-squared     =  0.4655
       Model    87324.3763    10  8732.43763           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   273) =   23.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     284
. reg TSCORE  INDEDI LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY CEODUAL
. est store ivreg
. 
. predict ivresid, residuals
                                                                              
               CEODUAL INDEDIA
Instruments:   LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY
Instrumented:  INDEDI
                                                                              
       _cons    -138.9848   20.40487    -6.81   0.000    -179.1557   -98.81391
     CEODUAL      6.89438   2.962007     2.33   0.021     1.063102    12.72566
    INDUSTRY     9.005263   3.585587     2.51   0.013     1.946348    16.06418
         ROA    -.2013033   .2129857    -0.95   0.345    -.6206066    .2179999
       BOARD    -.0026947   .3193252    -0.01   0.993    -.6313476    .6259582
        BIG4     6.132031   3.806781     1.61   0.108    -1.362348    13.62641
      FSHARE     .1683046   .1024119     1.64   0.101    -.0333128     .369922
    LEGSHARE    -.0700995   .0618487    -1.13   0.258    -.1918606    .0516616
    STASHARE    -.1290452     .05855    -2.20   0.028     -.244312   -.0137784
      LNSIZE     7.499023   .9348189     8.02   0.000     5.658653    9.339393
      INDEDI     .4937646   .2187015     2.26   0.025     .0632087    .9243204
                                                                              
      TSCORE        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    187588.972   283  662.858558           Root MSE      =  19.215
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4430
    Residual    100798.224   273  369.224265           R-squared     =  0.4627
       Model    86790.7474    10  8679.07474           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   273) =   23.61
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     284
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
. ivreg  TSCORE  LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY CEODUAL (INDEDI= INDEDIA)
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. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9998
                          =        1.00
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg
                                                                              
     CEODUAL      4.940482     4.873543        .0669386        .1814292
    INDUSTRY      6.712633     6.805461       -.0928285         .224188
         ROA     -.0767595    -.0855251        .0087656        .0149393
       BOARD      .0474831     -.039561        .0870441        .0883869
        BIG4      4.690548     5.091379       -.4008301        .4535419
      FSHARE      .1106425     .1077729        .0028696        .0064955
    LEGSHARE     -.0560338    -.0569198         .000886        .0036329
    STASHARE     -.1067905    -.1035166       -.0032739          .00466
      LNSIZE      5.261595     5.369823       -.1082271        .1200139
      INDEDI      .3643091     .2333363        .1309728        .1307396
                                                                              
                   ivreg          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman ivreg
                                                                              
       _cons     -98.0159   15.39284    -6.37   0.000    -128.3196   -67.71215
     CEODUAL     4.873543   2.283187     2.13   0.034     .3786525    9.368433
    INDUSTRY     6.805461   2.763491     2.46   0.014        1.365    12.24592
         ROA    -.0855251   .1640131    -0.52   0.602    -.4084163    .2373661
       BOARD     -.039561    .230558    -0.17   0.864    -.4934586    .4143366
        BIG4     5.091379   2.908459     1.75   0.081    -.6344805    10.81724
      FSHARE     .1077729   .0789236     1.37   0.173    -.0476033     .263149
    LEGSHARE    -.0569198   .0476866    -1.19   0.234       -.1508    .0369604
    STASHARE    -.1035166   .0450335    -2.30   0.022    -.1921738   -.0148595
      LNSIZE     5.369823     .71282     7.53   0.000       3.9665    6.773145
      INDEDI     .2333363   .1072659     2.18   0.030     .0221628    .4445098
                                                                              
Totalcontent        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     104739.31   283  370.103568           Root MSE      =  14.818
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4067
    Residual    59942.1113   273  219.568173           R-squared     =  0.4277
       Model    44797.1986    10  4479.71986           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   273) =   20.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     284
. reg Totalcontent INDEDI LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY CEODUAL
. . est store ivreg
. 
. predict ivresid, residuals
                                                                              
               CEODUAL INDEDIA
Instruments:   LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY
Instrumented:  INDEDI
                                                                              
       _cons    -101.3014   15.77815    -6.42   0.000    -132.3637    -70.2391
     CEODUAL     4.940482   2.290384     2.16   0.032     .4314222    9.449541
    INDUSTRY     6.712633    2.77257     2.42   0.016     1.254298    12.17097
         ROA    -.0767595   .1646921    -0.47   0.642    -.4009874    .2474684
       BOARD     .0474831   .2469195     0.19   0.848    -.4386253    .5335914
        BIG4     4.690548   2.943609     1.59   0.112     -1.10451    10.48561
      FSHARE     .1106425   .0791904     1.40   0.163     -.045259     .266544
    LEGSHARE    -.0560338   .0478248    -1.17   0.242    -.1501861    .0381185
    STASHARE    -.1067905    .045274    -2.36   0.019     -.195921   -.0176599
      LNSIZE     5.261595   .7228525     7.28   0.000     3.838522    6.684669
      INDEDI     .3643091   .1691118     2.15   0.032     .0313801    .6972381
                                                                              
Totalcontent        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     104739.31   283  370.103568           Root MSE      =  14.858
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4035
    Residual    60269.4579   273  220.767245           R-squared     =  0.4246
       Model    44469.8519    10  4446.98519           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   273) =   20.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     284
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
. ivreg  Totalcontent LNSIZE STASHARE LEGSHARE FSHARE BIG4 BOARD ROA INDUSTRY CEODUAL (INDEDI= INDEDIA)
